The Dangers of Writing Taiwan a Blank Security Check
By David M. Lampton
The United States does not have the luxury of contending with only one foreign policy issue at a time. While the Administration has thus far admirably handled the war on terrorism, it has dangerously mishandled another issue that could spark conflict with a big power -- China.
While the Bush Administration has been vigorous in deterring Beijing from attacking Taiwan, it has not been nearly effective enough in cautioning Taiwan's government to be mindful of U.S. interests. When President Bush said in April of last year that he would do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself from attack from Beijing, that sounded like deterrence of China. However, those words and other subsequent actions by Washington have had the perverse effect of emboldening Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian to make moves that increase the chances of war. No matter how many weapons Washington sells Taiwan, in the end it will be American forces that do the fighting-and much of the dying. We have inadvertently transferred the initiative to involve the United States in war from Washington to Taipei. What has happened? Why has this come to pass?
On Saturday August 3rd Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian delivered remarks by video to Taiwanese independence activists living in Japan. In his remarks he made three points. While each is complex and ambiguous singly, taken as a whole they greatly increase the prospects for accelerated militarization across the Taiwan Strait and increase the chances of a conflict into which the United States almost inevitably would be drawn. President Chen called for the passage of legislation in Taiwan that would permit a referendum on independence, though the latter word was not used in this context. He then said, as he has in the recent past, that Taiwan should walk down its own "Taiwan road," an ambiguous phrase but an allusion to independence. And finally, he said, "Simply put, with Taiwan and China on each side of the (Taiwan) Strait, each side is a country, this needs to be clear." Taken together, the phrases push dangerously close to an assertion of independence stronger than those made before. Last year, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, "Taiwanese independence is equal to war."
One of the troubling aspects of these remarks, beyond their content, is that Washington was blind-sided by them, just as former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui caught the Clinton Administration unawares by similarly incendiary verbiage in July 1999.
Why is this happening now, particularly when Taiwan is investing billions of dollars in China and transferring much of its production capacity there? Why is it happening when perhaps 600,000 or more Taiwanese have permanent residence on the mainland? Three factors probably are at work here: Chen's assessment that the PRC is so preoccupied with its domestic problems and political succession that it dare not be diverted to Taiwan at this moment. Second, in the Bush Administration Taiwan has found the most congenial friend since Ronald Reagan in his first year or so in office, before he too saw the dangers of the Taiwan issue. And finally, there is domestic politics in Taiwan, a key factor.
Every time there is a presidential or other highly contested election in Taiwan, Taiwan candidates are tempted to play to nationalistic sentiment in search of votes, thereby infuriating the mainland and risking conflict in the Taiwan Straits. This happened in the run up to the 1996 presidential election in which Lee Teng-hui came to Cornell University in 1995 and made an incendiary speech. A missile "crisis" followed, necessitating the dispatch of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups.
A similar development occurred again in the run up to the 2000 presidential election when President Lee tried to trap all three presidential candidates with his "two state theory" of July 1999-only reassurances to Beijing from the Clinton Administration distancing Washington from Lee prevented possibly serious escalation. And now, President Chen is looking ahead to mayoralty elections in two principal cities later this year and his own presidential campaign of 2004.
What should Washington do? Three things are imperative: First, Congress should not endorse Chen's words and individual members should exercise restraint. Were the Hill to urge prudence in Taipei this would be particularly effective. Second, the Administration needs to make unmistakably clear to Taipei that the United States is not going to backstop a dangerous, open-ended exploration of where Beijing's "red lines" may be. And third, the Administration should explicitly say that growing cross-Strait economic and cultural interaction is a positive, stabilizing development between Taiwan and the Mainland and Americans hope to see more of it.
Looking at the big picture, when the United States faces genuine and large threats to its own national security from multiple directions, Washington should not inadvertently back the provocative behavior of others that could draw us into unnecessary conflict. It is time for the Bush Administration to get its strategic priorities straight.
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David M. Lampton is Hyman Professor and director of China Studies at Johns Hopkins-SAIS and The Nixon Center and author of Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (University of California Press, 2001). The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
