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Uneasy Giant: The Challenges to American Predominance
The Nixon Center, Washington, DC 2000
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
Introduction
I. How Others Are Reacting
The Multipolarity Brigade
Desperately Seeking Autonomy
A World "Unbalanced"
Keeping Our Cool
II. The Historical Trend
Theories of American Decline
How Unipolar? And for How Long?
Problems Nonetheless
III. Our Real Vulnerabilities
Military: Asymmetric Challenges
Economic: Systemic Weaknesses
Political: Centrifugal Forces
IV. Strategy for a Superpower
National Interest Makes a Comeback
A Grand Strategy
The Problem of American Unilateralism
Conclusion: A New Grand Bargain?
Notes
Acknowledgments
Executive Summary
While Americans celebrate their "unipolar moment" in history, the rest of the world seems not to be joining in the celebration. On the contrary, for the world’s other major powers (including our friends), the extraordinary predominance that America now enjoys is a problem rather than a blessing. A main theme of their foreign policies today is to build counterweights to American power. Americans seem strangely oblivious to this trend, and to the need for a strategy to deal with it.
For many nations, "multipolarity" is the mantra; it is the explicit rejection of the idea that the world ought to be, or remain for long, unipolar. The Russians and Chinese have made this a central theme of their foreign policies. Our European allies, as well, see it as one of the main purposes of the growing European Union to be a counterweight to the United States and to reduce Europe’s dependence on us. A number of Third World countries openly declare their unhappiness with a world that is now "unbalanced" since the demise of the Soviet Union.
Most likely, this "unipolar moment" will last for a long time. There is no challenger that will be able to match the scale and range of America’s global predominance for the foreseeable future. But this does not exhaust the problem of American foreign policy. In the real world, our predominant strength is not enough by itself to ensure against a range of potential disasters. Whether America’s physical preponderance translates into predominant influence over events depends, for one thing, on a variety of intangibles – like political will and staying power, the credibility of our commitments, our perceived willingness or unwillingness to take risks, our reputation for reliability and competence. All these depend on our actual performance over time – and could be badly undermined by a policy fiasco (such as a failed military intervention).
Even if we remain Number One in the GDP standings for a long time, both we and the international system are more vulnerable than we seem to realize. In the military dimension, there are potential adversaries pursuing "asymmetric" strategies, attempting to zero in on our weaknesses. Some, for example, are pursuing by either advanced conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction to raise the risk of American casualties and thereby to deter us from intervening against regional challenges. In the economic sphere, the Asian crisis was a warning of the fragility of the international financial system, and the present prosperity remains vulnerable to crisis. In the political realm, relations among all the world’s major powers are much more precarious than they were a decade ago in the first euphoric years after the Cold War.
The United States can defuse some international resentments by a foreign policy based on the American national interest, rather than a Wilsonian mission of global improvement. Given the scale of American predominance, our assertiveness in any cause, no matter how selfless we perceive it to be, is seen by others – including our friends – as an assertion of our power. How else to explain the paradox that resentment of the United States seems to be so high in the time of an Administration so eager to be virtuous, even to the point of apologizing for much of America’s postwar foreign policy? A policy grounded in the American national interest, paradoxically, implies less sweeping American claims and thus a greater possibility of fruitful collaboration with friendly countries.
Strategically, the United States is in a central, pivotal position. All other powers either need us for something (protection; economic ties), or are afraid to cross us, or are afraid to leave us in bed with another power they fear as a more immediate rival. In addition to maintaining our military strength and deterring major challenges to peace, therefore, this central position furnishes the essence of a political strategy for the American superpower: It gives us flexibility and leverage, and the possibility of having better relations with the world’s other powers than they have with each other. It will help us preserve our position of advantage over the long term.
Despite its predominant power, therefore, the United States would be smart to conduct itself as a good internationalist – helping maintain the world economic system, meeting its responsibility to preserve the balance of power, working in concert with capable and like-minded nations and international institutions wherever possible. On security matters, too, we should prefer to consult and work with allies. Building and leading an international consensus is a task at which the United States has demonstrated great skill over the postwar period.
Yet, all this being said, there are some important security issues on which we will not be able to sacrifice our freedom of action even if it means being accused of "unilateralism." If international pressures on us seem not based on serious strategic analysis (e.g., to ban all land mines, or to ease pressures on Iraq, or to constrain all missile defenses) we have a responsibility to say no. Whether we will be indulged on this score by our friends, in return for our more dutiful internationalism on all the other issues – as a new "grand bargain" – remains to be seen.
