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A member of The Nixon Center’s Board of Directors, Robert F. Ellsworth has served as Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, and a member of the House of Representatives (R-KS). He is also Vice President of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a Director of the Atlantic Council of the United States and the American Council on Germany. Ambassador Ellsworth is the Chairman and CEO of Hamilton Technology Ventures, a San Diego-based venture capital

Ambassador Dmitriy Ryurikov may or may not be related to one Ryurik, the 9^th century chieftain of the Rus, or Varangian Vikings, who established himself in 862 as the ruler of Novgorod. A few years later Norse rule extended as far as Kiev and threatened Constantinople. The 20^th century Ryurikov who wrote this essay is, in any case, a Russian patriot of bold passion and high intelligence: a leader. In this essay, he does not hold back.

Ryurikov pours his love of Russia and the Russian people into a quite sophisticated yet almost primal torrent of denunciation of those Russians (and some Americans and Europeans) who have humiliated Russia internationally, caused or allowed the Russian economy to plunge by nearly half since 1991, allowed drug addition among Russian children to rise tenfold in the last decade, and stood by while a ghastly process of depopulation has taken hold in Russia. "Death rates, malnutrition, epidemics, and other everyday dramas do not interest them [Russian ‘democrats’ and ‘reformers’]. Only budgets, banking, finance, securities, stock exchanges, foreign currency markets, auctions and privatization catch their attention." He calls it "the quiet holocaust that started in Russia in 1992."

Ryurikov’s harsh condemnation of Russia’s "reformers" (he uses the term in quotation marks throughout the text) and their Western, and particularly American, supporters is especially significant coming from a man with his background as a highly-educated career diplomat and former senior advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin who often acted as a counterpart to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott during summit meetings. Here is a professional diplomat who sounds more like an Old Testament Prophet: speaking truth to power. He does not spare the political and intellectual elites of the United States.

Exploring the reasoning behind Ryurikov’s arguments provides important lessons for American foreign policy, including the fact that U.S. actions often create perceptions far different from those we intend. Moreover, though his views may be shocking to many American readers, they represent the perspective of a growing portion of Russia’s elite after a decade of unrealized hopes and disillusionment. As disagreeable as this perspective may be in the U.S., it has new resonance in Russia, even among many with previously strong pro-Western and pro-American credentials. At the time of this writing, for example, former First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais—a favorite of the Clinton Administration—attacked a cease-fire plan for Chechnya because it would "stab the Russian army in the back." This evolution in Russian thinking can no longer be ignored by American policymakers.

Still, like the best of prophets, Ryurikov holds out hope. He calls it "The Russian Idea." It is pragmatic—which, he writes, "makes it different from previous ideologies that were either deceitfully romantic or vulgarly optimistic and did not square with real life."

If, as I believe likely, the next U.S. administration will focus U.S. foreign and security policy on restoring American leadership among the major powers, then Ryurikov’s "Russian Idea" would provide a good starting place. The U.S. would follow the old Viking prescription for leadership: Be strong, bold and generous. We and other major powers would (in Ryurikov’s words):

• Help Russia curb "crime and corruption that prevents the normal function of a system of private property, private enterprise, a market economy and democracy."

• Help "improve the immediate material condition of the Russian people. In the last two years a rough consensus on how to accomplish this has emerged among champions of The Russian Idea."

• Help push for "constitutional reform, including achieving a better balance of power between the president, the government, and the parliament. Perfecting the relationship between Moscow and the provinces in finance, the distribution of power, and policy coordination is also a top priority."

• Help place "the environment high among the priorities of survival."

• "In the foreign and defense sphere the restoration of Russia’s strength and influence are critical to defend Russia’s legitimate interests: necessary for Russia’s survival and normal existence in a world still ruled by force."

These and other elements of "The Russian Idea" would go some way toward restoring stability to an international system that seems to be drifting toward serious instability: proliferation of nuclear weapons and modern high-tech arms, bloody tribal and ethnic wars, and a global population driving toward 9 billion or 10 billion people, most of them poor and most of them ambitious for a better life.

In this mix, enter the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and tons of useable material in Russia—plus the 7,000 Russian weapons experts all of them underpaid and many unpaid.

Frankly, the world cannot deal with these emerging realities without the cooperation of the other major powers—including Russia.

Americans can read Ambassador Ryurikov’s cry from the heart with profit.

Executive Summary: Russia Survives, by Dmitriy Ryurikov

What’s going on in Russia? How has a superpower of the 1980s become a weakened ex-giant sinking into poverty? How did "democracy" and "reform" become bad words? After once enjoying such close relations with U.S. President Bill Clinton, why did Russian President Boris Yeltsin speak so harshly with him during the 1999 Kosovo Crisis? Why did then Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov call for a new strategic triangle between Russia, China, and India in December 1998 to counterbalance the West’s "new world order"? Is the Cold War alive or dead? These are just a few of the crucial questions addressed in this study.

The perestroika years—the final years of the USSR—were a tremendous wasted opportunity not only within the Soviet Union but also in its relations with the West. While the Union probably could not have been saved, many of its positive aspects, such as economic ties between the former republics, could have been preserved. Also, more effective negotiation with the West could have defended Soviet and Russian interests in Central Europe and may even have prevented NATO enlargement. Ultimately, however, the USSR failed to realize these possibilities and finally split apart largely because of the impatience of Russia’s "democrats" to take power from Mikhail Gorbachev and their use of the idea of Russian sovereignty as a political weapon.

The era of reform (1992-1998) was no less tragic for Russia. The policies of the "reformers" have resulted in a declining population, expanding poverty, and a social crisis marked by increases in suicide, drug addiction, and crime and other asocial behavior. This is a direct consequence of the "reformers" lack of interest in the impact of their actions on the lives of ordinary people.

Ironically, many Russian political observers had already begun referring to the "reformers" as "neo-Bolsheviks" as early as 1998. Although the "reformers" have definitely been milder than the Bolsheviks, there are very real similarities in the actions and methods of the two groups. Just as the Bolsheviks, the "reformers" used deceptive utopian promises and attacks on the previous regime to develop a frenzied political climate driven by calls for constant, comprehensive change. The "reformers" also purged the bureaucracy to install loyal cadres and seized control of key institutions—no longer railroads and telegraph lines but the financial system and the media—to guarantee their power. They then used the media in a typically Bolshevik fashion to brainwash Russia’s people. There are many other common features. Today, the "reformers" retain some levers of influence but have been largely discredited in Russian society. As a result, their political influence is slowly diminishing, though it is still strong in economics-related ministries, the financial sector, and the media.

It seems impossible that the leaders of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could have been unaware of the corrupt environment created by the "reformers": the criminal privatization, crony banking, and massive flight of capital from Russia. Yet, the Fund did not complain. In contrast, however, the IMF worked much less cooperatively with the Primakov Government, which struggled desperately to repair the damage done by six years of "reforms." This contributed significantly to Russian skepticism about the Fund’s motives in working in Russia and has led many to believe that the IMF has been trying to damage Russia all along.

Nevertheless, despite Russia’s very difficult circumstances, the country will survive. The crucible of the years of reform has contributed significantly to the forging of a new national consciousness—a "Russian Idea"—that transcends Russia’s contemporary battles and may lead Russia and its people to a brighter future. The heart of the Russian Idea is the integrity of Russia’s territory, political system, state, and economy, and the moral integrity of its citizens and leaders. Building a state based on the Russian Idea will require the conquest of crime and corruption, constitutional reforms, a great effort to improve people’s material and spiritual lives, and a host of other changes. In its essence, however, the Russian Idea is the idea that the Russian people can survive only by building a strong state that is fair to its citizens. In other words, Russia must build a democratic state.

Needless to say, a favorable international environment is essential to the realization of the Russian Idea. And by 1999, Russia’s position in the world was no less critical than its domestic situation.

The NATO attack on Yugoslavia was a harsh lesson for Russia almost as significant as the shock of the August 1998 financial collapse. The NATO campaign was seen in Russia as the beginning of a new era. The Alliance appeared to ignore fifty years of international law developed since the founding of the United Nations. Moreover, because the NATO intervention was demonstrably not humanitarian—resulting in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians and hundreds of thousands of Albanian and Serbian refugees—Russians had to search elsewhere for the West’s real objectives. Many believe that the United States was the greatest benefactor of the crisis because of the decline in the value of the Euro, the new complications for European unification, and other developments. The attack also appeared to be intended to establish the legitimacy of an eventual NATO intervention on the territory of the former USSR, possibly in Georgia.

Perhaps most important, however, the crisis in Yugoslavia convinced many Russians that because of their disregard for international law, the United States and NATO had returned to the principle that "might makes right" in international affairs. This has resulted in a number of changes in Russia’s foreign and security policies, including in its military doctrine. It has also intensified Russian efforts to cooperate with other countries that share its concerns regarding American conduct. One outgrowth of this process is the idea of the "Eurasian project," a prospective coalition of nations intent on resisting to the new world order that the West, and particularly the U.S., appear to be attempting to impose. These countries consider the interests of their own people to be paramount and pay real, rather than superficial, respect to each member of this truly pluralistic and multicultural community of nations. They are prepared to defend threats to their sovereignty, independence, civilizations, and existence from the so-called "new world order."

America has played an important and positive role in the transformation of Russian society by opening itself to Russia. This has resulted in the establishment of literally millions of individual contacts between people, businesses, universities, and other groups. At the same time, however, a certain part of the U.S. establishment seems to cling to the idea that the Cold War is still underway and cannot end until the Russian army is destroyed and the Russian government becomes subservient. This is a very real problem for Russia and has crystallized Moscow’s foreign policy thinking as the country enters the 21st century. Some of the consequences of this are already visible.

So, Russia survives. It is in the midst of a terrible struggle, but will eventually emerge and grow stronger. How this new Russia relates to the United States, the West, and the rest of the world will depend to a great extent upon their behavior toward Russia today.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Part I. Inside Russia

Separatism as a Way to Power
The USSR’s Death: Tragedy or Rescue?
Next Stop—Civil Wars
Some Other Bills to Pay
People Under "Democracy and Reform"
Comparing Portraits: Bolsheviks and "Reformers"
Challenges for Mr. Primakov’s Government
Russia Survives
The Russian Idea
The Heart of the Idea

Part II. Russia and the World 47

Yugoslavia: Lessons for Russia
Yugoslav Conflict: New World Order Projected
To Manage a Civil War
Russia’s Second Thoughts
Education Completed
Russia and NATO: Partners?
Russia and the U.S.: Which Way to Go?