SUBSCRIBE TO THE NIXON CENTER EMAIL BULLETIN

ff

Click here to download text (PDF 300k).

Managing U.S.-China Relations
in the Twenty-First Century

David M. Lampton and Gregory C. May

The Nixon Center, Washington, DC  1999

Table of Contents

Foreword

Executive Summary

Part I.  Principal Misconceptions

   China: The Next Superpower
    The United States Has Been the Loser
    Taiwan Has Been the Loser
    Human Rights Have Not Improved

Part II. The Genuine Problems

      The Embattled Status Quo in the Taiwan Strait
     China's Fears of a Unipolar World
     Differing Views of Collective Security

Part III. Establishing a Framework for Managing Relations

Notes

Executive Summary

The first half of 1999 was a bad time for the concept of "constructive strategic partnership"—in both the United States and in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Instead of promoting such a partnership, events served to highlight the significant, and in many cases growing, differences between Washington and Beijing. In April, the Clinton administration and the Chinese government failed to reach an agreement on the PRC’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) despite significant concessions by the Chinese side. On May 8, an American B-2 bomber mistakenly destroyed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, a tragedy many Chinese believe was a deliberate act intended to punish China for its opposition to the NATO intervention in Kosovo and more generally to intimidate the PRC. Finally, in July, Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui precipitated new tensions and endangered the fragile cross-Strait dialogue by insisting that Taiwan and the PRC deal with one another on a "special state-to-state" basis, a formula Beijing equates with Taiwanese independence.

These events (and others like Washington’s March 1999 attempt to have Beijing condemned by the UN Human Rights Commission) highlight key problems—trade friction, China’s fear of U.S. "hegemony," and Taiwan—that will need to be carefully managed by policy makers in both Washington and Beijing. Both sides have an overwhelming, long-term national interest in insuring that bilateral ties do not degenerate into open hostility or a new Cold War. On the U.S. side, several commonly held misconceptions about the U.S.-China relationship hamper a proper prioritizing of issues. The principal misconceptions are:

Misconception #1: China will soon be a superpower. The reality is that China’s military remains plagued by weaknesses. These deficiencies include outdated equipment and a force structure that will impair Beijing’s ability to project significant power at great distances from its shores for many years to come, though the PRC’s capacity to affect U.S. interests closer to its borders (including Taiwan) is growing. The PRC is modernizing its nuclear weapons and missiles, but its nuclear capability remains small, especially in comparison with that of the United States, and continuation of its minimal deterrence strategy is very much in U.S. interests. If it grows too preoccupied with China’s very measured military modernization, America risks overcompensating with containment-oriented policies that would fuel a regional arms race, reduce China’s incentives to integrate itself into the international system, and prevent Washington and Beijing from cooperating in areas of mutual interest.

Misconception #2: America has been the loser in U.S.-China relations. In fact, when examining the broad trends of the last 30 years, the United States has gained tremendously from the normalization of relations with the PRC. Beijing no longer supports insurgent movements in neighboring countries, it has moderated its once indiscriminate arms exports, and the PRC has become increasingly integrated in, and compliant with, international arms control regimes, most recently the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). All of this has helped enhance both American and regional security. While the U.S.-China economic relationship has yet to reach its full potential, mainly because of high protectionist barriers in the PRC, it is not the case that the U.S. economy has been damaged, or American jobs lost, because of trade with China. And, if Washington and Beijing can reach a WTO accession agreement on terms very close to those the Clinton administration turned down in April 1999, many of the market barriers that so disadvantage American business will come down over a comparatively short period of time.

Misconception #3: Taiwan has been the loser. Taiwan lost most formal international recognition as a result of the U.S.-PRC normalization of 1978/79. However, in nearly every other respect—including economic development, democracy, and human rights—Taiwan has thrived, largely by dint of the hard work of the people on the island. U.S. security obligations have contributed to the maintenance of peace across the Strait for the last two decades. Though these obligations have their ambiguities, and some clarification is possible, some efforts to achieve greater clarity could inadvertently spark greater conflict.

Misconception #4: Human rights conditions in China have not improved. The Communist Party continues its gradual and erratic retreat from the private lives of ordinary Chinese who, largely as a result of rising incomes, enjoy freedoms and access to information unprecedented in their own history. Although direct, organized opposition to the Party is tirelessly suppressed, China is experiencing significant political changes—i.e. grassroots participation, greater scope for policy debate, and slowly improving rule of law—but such changes are still poorly institutionalized. Many Chinese—particularly political dissidents and ethnic and religious minorities—continue to suffer human rights abuses. Nonetheless, the overall trend is positive.

All of the above misconceptions draw attention away from the genuine problems in the U.S.-China relationship that do need to be the focus of U.S. leadership attention:

1. Decreasing commitment, in both the PRC and Taiwan, to the status quo: The return of Hong Kong and Macao to Chinese sovereignty, along with an increasingly separate identity on Taiwan, is making the PRC more anxious to make progress on reunification. Taiwan, meanwhile, seeks to delay reunification indefinitely (at least until the PRC democratizes and raises living standards). This volatile mix of diverging time frames and somewhat ambiguous U.S. obligations to defend Taiwan is the greatest challenge facing the U.S.-China relationship.
2. PRC unease with U.S. global predominance: China desires a "multipolar" world where America is somewhat restrained by other major powers. But the reality is that the world is growing more "unipolar" as there is no significant counterweight to the United States. China has watched with alarm as Washington has adopted an increasingly interventionist foreign policy and seems less willing, as in Kosovo, to gain the approval of the United Nations Security Council (where Beijing has a veto) before taking military action. Fear of being humiliated by a "hegemonic" United States is causing Beijing to seek checks on American power by strengthening ties to Russia and others with similar concerns. Furthermore, Beijing will marginally increase its commitment to defense modernization, but without fundamentally overturning the priority accorded to domestic economic modernization.
3. Diverging views between Beijing and Washington on how to preserve security in the post-Cold War era: Closely related to China’s fear of an unrestrained United States is the PRC’s rejection of the idea that America’s bilateral and multilateral security alliances help promote stability. While such alliances form the bedrock of the U.S. security architecture, China views these structures, particularly the newly-strengthened U.S.-Japan Alliance, as a means to perpetuate U.S. domination at China’s expense. Such gaps increase the difficulties for Washington and Beijing to accommodate one another on key strategic issues, such as the benefits of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Effectively managing bilateral relations will require considerable effort by both the United States and China. Recommendations for America include:

1. Have an effectively organized Executive Branch that devotes sufficient attention to the relationship. During the first term of the Clinton presidency, there was little top-level contact between the two sides and Washington pursued a "laundry list" of issues with no clear prioritization. Future administrations should make summits and senior-level exchanges more routine, institutionalize a vice president-premier exchange structure similar to the former Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, and work more closely with internationalists in Congress to develop Capitol Hill leadership on China policy. There is no substitute for the president paying attention to this issue and placing someone firmly in charge of the policy on a day-to-day basis.
2. Reestablish a realistic strategic rationale for the relationship, even if this means downgrading expectations. Beijing and Washington should explicitly acknowledge the mixed nature of the relationship, work on areas of parallel interest (such as maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and in South Asia), and try to prevent incompatible interests from degrading into confrontation. In addition, the United States should continue to encourage Beijing to join more multilateral economic and security organizations and find ways to foster mutual confidence among the United States, China, and Japan. Strengthening military-to-military exchanges and dialogue with the People’s Liberation Army will be important for avoiding an East Asian arms race. A central U.S. objective should be to minimize the incentives for Beijing to move away from its current nuclear doctrine of minimal deterrence and pledge of no first use. China’s continued emphasis on economic development over ideological or military priorities is profoundly in U.S. interests. Securing China’s entry into the WTO is an example of how the United States can work to create an environment in which Beijing continues to give priority to economic development and greater interaction with the global community, while promoting its own economic objectives simultaneously.
3. Do more to promote cross-Strait exchanges while maintaining a firm commitment to a "One China" policy. The United States must maintain a policy of "double deterrence"—deterring the use of force by Beijing and deterring provocative unilateral moves toward de jure independence by Taipei. The currently suspended cross-Strait dialogue has so far failed to enhance cross-Strait stability and Washington may find it needs to be bolder in asserting its interests in positive cross-Strait interaction. Such efforts could include more "track II" diplomacy. Bringing both Taiwan and the PRC into the WTO will help. At the same time, the United States, particularly Congress, should resist the urge to "fix" the framework provided by the Three Communiqués with China and the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which has proven robust and flexible over the past two-plus decades. Proposals like the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (S. 693) are particularly unwise because explicitly upgrading the U.S.-Taiwan military relationship would heighten the PRC’s sense that its window of opportunity for future reunification is forever closing. Further, such legislation would undermine the basis on which Sino-American normalization occurred twenty years ago and, contrary to the legislation’s intent, would increase the chances of military confrontation. A better way for Washington to proceed would be to explicitly oppose any unilateral efforts on either side of the Strait to change the political status quo.
4. Encourage positive change in China, but not regime transformation. The United States should give credit for the important economic, social, and political changes that have occurred in China and should pursue human rights issues using multilateral organizations and venues. American efforts should focus on working with the Chinese to establish legal and civic organizations that make gradual political change possible. The United States cannot be an effective advocate for human rights when it devotes virtually no money to programs aimed at fostering China’s social and economic development or to disaster relief.

The full text of this monograph is available for purchase in the Museum Store by following this link or by calling 800-USA-8865.