America and Iran: Road Maps and Realism
Geoffrey Kemp
The Nixon Center, Washington, DC 1998
Table of Contents
Foreword
Executive Summary
Part I. Being Realistic About Better Relations
Introduction
U.S. Policy Toward
Iran: A New Beginning?
Iran's Regional
Challenges
Iran's Domestic Agenda
Part II. The "Red Button" Issues
A Legacy of Mutual Grievances
Deconstructing the
Terrorism Problem
The U.S. Presence in
the Persian Gulf
Iran's Weapons Programs
Israel and Iran
Economic Issues:
Assets, Sanctions and Energy
Part III. Road Maps and Realism
Toward Official Contacts
Economic Options
Terrorism
Military Issues
Confidence Building
Measures
Wild Cards
Conclusions
Notes
Acknowledgements
Executive Summary
It is in America’s strategic interests to seek normal relations with Iran. That said, several realities condition the present situation. First, the Clinton Administration’s attempt to isolate Iran politically through containment has failed. Second, Iran’s anti-Israeli policy is a major obstacle to normalization. So long as Iran pursues policies that directly threaten Israel neither the Clinton Administration nor the Congress will initiate or accept radical changes in, American policy. Third, the election of Mohammed Khatami to the Iranian presidency has radically changed the dynamics of Iranian domestic politics. Yet, until he and his moderate supporters gain control of the key instruments of power, his proposed reforms and even his tenure in office could be in jeopardy. Fourth, unfavorable economic and demographic trends in Iran pose serious challenges for any Iranian leader, whether moderate, centrist or radical. Fifth, the negative impact of American sanctions on Iran’s vital energy sector provides a strong incentive for the regime to improve relations with the United States. Sixth, America remains a dominant factor in Iran’s strategic, political, economic, and psychic ethos. The regime’s conservatives realize that a rapprochement will inevitably mean a diminution, if not end, to their power. Seventh, Iran faces serious security challenges in its neighborhood. It will continue to develop surface-to-surface missiles and an infrastructure to exercise a nuclear weapons option in event that the security environment deteriorates.
On June 17, 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called for the United States and Iran to bring down the walls of mistrust between the two countries so that "we can develop with the Islamic Republic, when it is ready, a road map leading to normal relations." The official Iranian response has been muted and cautious. Critics of the administration argue that helping Khatami provides oxygen to the hardliners and keeps them in power. Supporters of the new Clinton policy believe the reverse: helping Khatami opens up Iranian society and ultimately weakens the hardliners. No matter who is right, there will be no real progress until six "red button" issues are addressed. They are: historic mutual grievances; terrorism; the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf; Iran’s weapons programs; Iran’s opposition to Israel and the peace process; and, economic issues, especially sanctions and pipeline policies.
There has been a reduction in the harsh rhetoric between America and Iran. However, concrete improvements in the relationship now require actions by both sides, not words. It is unlikely that any of the "red button" issues can be resolved absent an official dialogue. A key U.S. objective, therefore, must be to work toward official contacts, a move Iran currently rejects. This does not require immediate diplomatic recognition, an exchange of ambassadors or even formal, high-level government-to-government meetings, but it must involve government officials from both sides. uch contacts can be helped by the citizen diplomacy called for by Khatami. owever, citizen diplomacy has its limits since it is, by its nature, uncoordinated and unstructured, representing different interest groups with different agendas.
The United States cannot stop Iran’ advanced missile development program. owever, with effective Russian cooperation it can slow down and delay missile production and development perhaps for 7-10 years. Iran’ nuclear weapons option is a longer-term but a more serious issue. Since Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it can only proceed with a nuclear weapons program if it either violates or formally withdraws from the NPT. If Iran is in violation of the treaty, it will be subject to UN sanctions. If Iran chose to go the covert route to nuclear weapons production, it is doubtful that either Russia or China would support Iran. Likewise, Iran’s compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, of which it is a State’s Party, is an important bellwether concerning its intentions.
On terrorism, the United States needs to distinguish between direct Iranian actions against Americans and U.S. allies and actions against Iran’s domestic opponents. The former is much more serious and unacceptable. On Israel and the peace process, Iran should be persuaded that it has much to lose if it continues to vilify Israel. No one expects the regime to support Israel, but formally decreeing Arafat the primary and legitimate interlocutor for the Palestinians would signal a tacit acceptance of recent developments in the region.
Other confidence building measures include indirect or multilateral talks on issues of mutual interest. Afghanistan and Iraq are two obvious candidates, as would be drug smuggling. In addition, speedier visa procedures should be adopted. There is no U.S. Diplomatic presence in Tehran. Iran could authorize there turn of a low-level consular officer to a friendly embassy in Tehran (probably Switzerland), thereby speeding up the cumbersome process of vetting Iranians for visas. Also, certain items from the U.S. sanctions list could be removed. For instance, the import of Persian rugs could be permitted and American companies could be allowed to export wheat and other non-strategic items to Iran.
Wild card events could abruptly change the dynamics of U.S. -Iran relations. The removal of Khatami and his replacement by a conservative mullah would put a freeze on prospects for detente. New congressional sanctions against the Iranian energy sector would have a chilling effect on diplomacy. The most serious event would be another successful terrorist attack on Americans with clear Iranian complicity. Some wildcards—i.e., the death of Saddam Hussein—would be viewed positively in the United States but would spark a more ambivalent reaction in Iran. On the other hand, an unexpected breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli peace process could make it much easier for Iran to trim its anti-Israeli rhetoric and, at the same time, reduce its support for Hizbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In event of such positive breakthroughs, the United States and Iran should consider a "grand bargain" that would seek to limit Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and open the door for U.S. -Iran cooperation on energy projects, including oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian through Iran.
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