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Drifting Apart? Trends in U.S.-European Relations
Peter W. Rodman
The Nixon Center, Washington, DC 1999
Table of Contents
Foreword by Amb. Robert F. Ellsworth
Executive Summary
Introduction
Disputes and Irritants
The Structural Problem
The Historical/Psychological Problem
The Bottom Line
I. Economic and Monetary Union
Goals of the Euro
The Euro’s Vulnerabilities
The American Stake
Trade Quarrels – and Solutions
II. Foreign and Security Policy
CFSP and Its Origins
The Institutional Evolution
Saint-Malo and Its Implications
Contentious Issues
Capabilities: The Widening Gap
III. The Political/Psychological Dimension
Problems of the European Identity
Anti-Americanism: An Infantile Disorder
American Unilateralism
The Pivotal Role of Britain
Collateral Damage: The Impact of Kosovo
Conclusions
European and Atlantic Institutions
Lessons for Both Sides
Notes
Executive Summary
The Kosovo crisis, despite its successful outcome, is paradoxically only accelerating a disturbing trend in U.S.-European relations – namely, the impulse in Europe to seek greater autonomy from the United States. The collapse of the Soviet threat, and America’s emergence as the "sole superpower," have led Europeans to seek to build the European Union (EU) into a counterweight to American dominance. Specific irritants in Atlantic relations – over trade, unilateral U.S. sanctions, Middle East policy, etc. – are familiar, but they are seriously exacerbated by the European response to this new structural change in the international system. The relationship is more precarious than it seems. The dilemma for the United States is that a more self-confident and self-reliant Europe could be a stronger strategic partner – provided that differentiation from the United States does not become Europe’s main motivation.
Even Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, for example – the new common currency – is explained in Europe as a political as much as economic undertaking. Europeans hope not only that it will create a more dynamic Single Market that can rival American economic power, and make the new "euro" a rival to the dollar as an international reserve and transaction currency; they hope the result will be a Europe that is more of an equal to the United States geopolitically. The flow of investment in both directions across the Atlantic is a positive factor keeping America and Europe tied together. The trade quarrels, however, are becoming more difficult to manage in part because they involve traditional problems like tariffs less and less, and involve sensitive domestic issues of social and regulatory policy more and more (e.g., genetically modified foods). Bold new measures of trade liberalization may be called for to head off a worsening transatlantic economic relationship.
The most interesting new development is the drive to give the EU a common foreign and security policy, including an autonomous defense capability. How tightly this will be linked to NATO has, unfortunately, been left somewhat ambiguous. Such an enterprise needs to be kept within the Alliance framework (as the April NATO Summit attempted to ensure) or else it could tear at the cohesion of the Alliance, to the common detriment. Yet, the Kosovo crisis has been interpreted in Europe – even by our British allies – as only underscoring Europe’s need to have the ability to act militarily without dependence on the United States. Moreover, the idea that American and NATO military actions require a UN Security Council mandate – despite the "exception" of the Kosovo war – is now widely endorsed in Europe. This is anti-American in its implication, since its main point is to constrain unilateral action by the United States. Given the increasing likelihood of obstruction by Russian and Chinese vetoes, insisting on Security Council mandates makes little sense for the West.
The European eagerness for military autonomy, however, is hampered by the widening gap between the United States and its allies in military technology. The so-called Revolution in Military Affairs is bypassing Europe; the European defense industry is scrambling to compete and to survive. While the success of the European common foreign and security policy may complicate relations within the Alliance, its failure may do so as well.
As Europe struggles to create its own identity, the psychological dimension is important. A relationship of dependency is corrosive. It breeds resentments on both sides – on the part of the weaker who resent their weakness, and on the part of the stronger who grow weary of their burdens.
There are lessons for both Europeans and Americans. The United States, if it wishes to preserve an Atlantic alliance, needs to encourage a more autonomous European identity and capability – but it has the right to try to ensure that it remains within the Alliance framework (particularly in the defense field). On many of the strategic issues on which Europeans and Americans disagree, the Americans may have the better arguments. But the United States pays a price for unilateralism and should always prefer more collegial solutions. Europeans, in turn, need to come to terms with the fact that the peace and stability of Europe are likely to remain dependent on the United States for a long time to come; anti-Americanism is a dangerous and counterproductive reaction. The British role will be pivotal in determining the direction of Europe’s future political course vis-à-vis the United States.
In an era of new turbulence and dangers, Europeans’ and Americans’ first recourse should still be each other. Shoring up the Atlantic relationship should be a priority for the next U.S. President. European leaders should seize the opportunity.
