"U.S.
Must Ease Away From Yeltsin," by Paul J. Saunders
Newsday, May 14, 1999
Boris Yeltsin’s decision to fire his latest Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, demonstrates once and for all the Russian President’s determination to cling to power at any cost. The dismissal of Primakov and nomination of First Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin to fill his post sharply raises the stakes in Yeltsin’s confrontation with Russia’s lower house of parliament, the State Duma, over the Duma’s debate on Yeltsin’s impeachment. It also requires a new attitude toward Yeltsin on the part of the Clinton Administration.
While Yeltsin claimed that Primakov’s dismissal and his nomination of Stepashin would accelerate Russia’s economic recovery, Russia’s top policeman has little or no economic background. His reputation is that of a Yeltsin loyalist, not an ardent reformer. When Yeltsin dissolved the country’s old parliament, the Supreme Soviet, in 1993, Stepashin resigned his position as Chairman of the parliament’s Security Committee to become Deputy Security Minister. For the last six years, he has stood by the Russian President through thick and thin.
This loyalty – and Stepashin’s embarrassing involvement in the intervention in Chechnya – is the real reason for the Interior Minister’s elevation. Prior to Wednesday’s government shakeup, Yeltsin’s conduct of the Chechnya war was the only one of five impeachment charges which stood a chance of gaining the necessary two-thirds support in the Duma debate scheduled to begin May 13. While Primakov vocally opposed the impeachment drive, he had little to lose (relatively speaking) if it were successful. In contrast, Stepashin – who was head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and a key member of the so-called "war party" at the time – may face jail time if the government’s conduct of war is determined to be a criminal offense. Thus, Stepashin’s appointment is a guarantee of strong government support for Yeltsin and a powerful signal to the Duma that Yeltsin is prepared for a fight to the finish.
There is little doubt that a fight will come. The Duma is virtually certain to reject Stepashin’s nomination, now slated for debate on May 19. Under normal circumstances, Yeltsin would be constitutionally authorized to dismiss the Duma after three rejections of his nominee, which could come by mid-June. However, Russia’s president is not allowed to dissolve the parliament once it has initiated impeachment proceedings. Thus, the country could soon face a full-scale constitutional crisis.
The problem for Yeltsin is that the environment in Russia today is very different from that which prevailed during the October 1993 conflict with the parliament, in which constitutional deadlock between the president and the Supreme Soviet led Yeltsin to shell the parliament building and impose a constitution granting himself much broader powers. Although Russian society was deeply polarized in 1993, Yeltsin enjoyed significantly greater public support than the legislature and was still seen as a champion of reform. He was also in far better physical and mental condition. In May 1999, the Russian President has a 2% approval rating and is widely perceived as a pathetic, ailing autocrat clinging to power.
Moreover, the support of the "force ministers" – the Ministers of Interior and Defense and the head of the FSB – may not be enough this time. Yeltsin’s popularity is very low among officers and enlisted personnel and there is no guarantee that orders to suppress the current parliament would be followed. This is particularly true in Russia’s regions, where many commanders owe more loyalty to the regional governors who provide housing, power, and food for their units than to Moscow. Similarly, Moscow Mayor and presidential candidate Yuri Luzhkov – who reportedly has strong ties to crucial Moscow-based police and military forces – is much less likely to stake his political future on Yeltsin this time. Even his neutrality could be a serious problem for Yeltsin if the Duma resists its dismissal.
Under the circumstances, Yeltsin may be inclined to turn to the West for help, as he did in 1993. He will want not only rhetorical support but financial assistance as well; after all, the Duma is now extremely unlikely to approve the legislation required by the $4.5 billion debt refinancing package negotiated last month with the International Monetary Fund and Russia could face default soon. The Russian President’s desperation could lead to renewed attempts to blackmail Washington with his country’s weakness ("I am the only guarantee of stability") or to bargaining with concessions on Kosovo or other foreign policy issues. We cannot allow him to succeed.
The Clinton Administration’s unflinching support for Yeltsin, including through the events of October 1993 and the brutal war in Chechnya, has convinced many Russians that Washington is deliberately pursuing a strategy of keeping the Yeltsin regime in power while ensuring that it is sufficiently weak to be unable to challenge American actions in the international arena. The consequences of allowing this view to become widespread by supporting the Russian president again will be costly – and will last well beyond Boris Yeltsin’s tenure in office. At the same time, propping up a leader widely seen as illegitimate, and whose term expires in just over a year anyway, does no service to U.S.-Russian relations or American interests.
It is well past time for the Clinton Administration finally to learn the lessons of 1993, to separate "democracy" and "reform" from Boris Yeltsin, who has never really pursued either, and to support the Russian constitution, which is the true guarantor of democracy and stability in Russia.
