Europe,
Iraq and the War on Terrorism
December 22, 2002
recent extended trip by the writer to Europe suggests that President Bush enjoys more respect than was the case earlier in his presidency. There are three reasons why this is so. First, the President's September 12 speech before the United Nations was well received. It demonstrated his willingness to support multilateral rather than unilateral diplomacy. Second, the decision to cooperate with the United Nations on arms inspectors appears to be working. Third, the results of the U.S. midterm elections have established him as an effective and powerful politician. All three events have dampened much of the hostility directed against him as late as last summer.
When it comes to terrorism the Europeans are increasingly aware of the problem of radical Islam as a security concern. Not only has there been the fallout in the aftermath of 9/11 when Al-Qaeda cells were unearthed all over Europe, but renewed attention over the question of migration to Europe, particularly illegal Muslim migration is high on their agenda. The civil disturbances that have been breaking out in various European cities, most recently in Antwerp, are causing concern for both the Muslim immigrant minorities and the often hostile indigenous populations.
It is against this background that the European debate about Iraq has to be viewed. Those who oppose the war - and there are many of them - argue the fight against terrorism should have priority over military action against Saddam. Those who support the American administration and believe that the threat and probable use of force against Iraq is necessary (i.e. Tony Blair) are worried about unilateral U.S. decisions. They believe that if the U.S. acts precipitously, Al-Qaeda will be the natural beneficiary. There will be widespread unrest in most Islamic countries and the fallout will be felt directly and immediately in Europe. This is paralleled by intense concern about the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and the widening gap between European and American public opinion on the policies of Ariel Sharon and what his reelection is going to mean.
If war with Iraq is inevitable, most European analysts believe that it is essential that there be a broad consensus at the UN in favor of the use of force and that the military campaign be quick. Most Europeans would prefer a bloodless victory--a coup d'etat. If there is a security council consensus that the Iraqis have been lying, there will be a good deal of whining but, at the end of the day, there will be support for military action. Much depends on the evidence against Iraq that is presented by the U.S. and UK. That is particularly important in Britain where Prime Minister Tony Blair will face strong opposition if he handles this issue badly. Blair will be careful enough to make sure he does not get out too far ahead of his other European partners. France is being more cooperative on Iraq these days. The mood in Germany is one of contriteness. The foreign policy establishment was appalled at how the Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder handled the Iraq issue during the recent elections. Schroeder is so unpopular now in Germany that, despite his victory, Germany will not want to go out on a limb opposing a war particularly if the evidence is compelling and France and Britain support the U.S.
While most European officials have confidence in the way that the White House and the State Department have handled Iraq since Bush’s September 12 UN speech and believe in the ability of the U.S. military to achieve victory, they are worried about the aftermath of war. They do not believe that the Bush Administration has carefully thought through what it will do. They are unimpressed with analogies with the allied occupation of post war Germany and Japan.
The most critical issue following the fall of the Saddam regime will be security. This will have two dimensions. First, to assure that Iraq is denuded of weapons of mass destruction. This will require an expanded inspection team. There will also be the problem of civil unrest and possible social chaos. On these matters the Europeans will probably be willing to cooperate since they, as much as the U.S., have huge stakes in the stability of the region.
