How
Stable Is Iran?
November 24, 2002
Many observers of the Islamic Republic of Iran agree that since Mohammed Khatami was elected President in May 1996 day to day conditions for most Iranians have improved, especially in the realm of personal freedoms. The society is more open and pluralistic than at any time since the revolution. However, in parallel, frustration levels may well be at an all time high precisely because rising expectations after Khatami’s first election have only been partially met. After his reelection in 2000 these expectations have been bitterly frustrated.
The reality is that the majority of Iran’s educated youth are disillusioned with the government and their future opportunities in Iran. If they could raise the money to immigrate to the west, they probably would. The government, including both conservatives and moderates, knows this is the case. There are few illusions on their part. Yet they have no idea how to resolve the structural problems facing the country. What they do know is that the current situation cannot continue indefinitely. The only question is what will be the catalyst for change. The murder of reformers? A collapse of oil prices? Bread riots? A constitutional crisis triggered over the selection process for the next presidential candidates? An American victory in Iraq followed by an ultimatum on Iran’s support for terrorism?
What is clear is that everybody involved with Iran, be they insiders, outsiders, reformers, conservatives, monarchists, anarchists, communists, fundamentalists, or pragmatists all agree that the current regime is headed for a crisis. But when will this happen? For some years members of the Iranian external opposition and some foreign intelligence groups have been predicting that upheavals within the country are imminent. But aside from a couple of serious student demonstrations in 1999 and some lesser troubles in 2000 at the time of the World Cup playoffs, Iran has remained stable. This may be changing.
The regime has become more repressive in recent months. The closure of newspapers has continued, right wing thugs have been enforcing with greater vigor dress and social codes and the endless battle against satellite televisions continues. The recent death sentence imposed on Iranian Professor Hashem Aghajari by a hardline judge has led to new demonstrations in the universities. But for the time being the conservatives can continue their reign of repression because they control the guns and the courts. In the long run they know their tactics will lead to their demise. Eventually they will probably compromise on a sufficient range of issues to assure their personal survival and to keep their hands in their considerable wealth.
This leads some to believe that the more pragmatic conservatives will adapt to new realities. This could include accommodating the United States on terrorism and Israel in the wake of a U.S. victory over Iraq especially Iran if played a helpful role in determining the outcome. Rapprochement with the Great Satan will mean the end of the Islamic Republic as we have known it since 1979. However it will not necessarily herald a new era of democracy. Indeed, some of the most ardent reformers in Iran worry that under these circumstances the conservatives will make a deal with the Americans; they will change their foreign policy and the U.S. will back off on issues pertaining to democracy and human rights. Given the evidence of what the U.S. has been doing in south and central Asia since 9/11 the Iranian reformers have reason to worry about this scenario. They would note that the U.S. was able with extreme alacrity to adopt more favorable policies towards two repressive states, Pakistan and Uzbekistan, once it became clear these countries would support the U.S. war on terrorism.
It is logical for this sort of deal to be considered by the conservatives. It is a vital U.S. interest that the terror against Israel stop and Iran’s complicity in this terror is well documented. If Iran, in effect, "walked away" from the Arab-Israel conflict it would be much easier to consider a new policy of U.S.-Iranian engagement and even to have a dialogue with Iran about its weapons programs. From an American point of view this would be a major breakthrough since the Iranian involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict has been the most debilitating element of the relationship. This is not to minimize the importance of Iran’s continuing WMD programs but since one of the most dangerous scenarios is a possible confrontation between Israel and Iran, any steps to minimize this risk will be important.
