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Will the Korean Crisis Effect Plans for Iraq?
October 27, 2002

When President Bush decided Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were to be part of an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union speech on January 29, he was roundly criticized for using the phrase "evil." Less was said about his concerns of an "axis" – that is to say some sort of strategic cooperation between the three identified countries that, in different ways, threatened U.S. interests.

It was disclosed in the past week that North Korea has been covertly developing an enriched uranium capability that could ultimately lead to the development of a nuclear weapon. This event violates the spirit, if not of law, of the Agreed Framework, signed by the U.S. and North Korea in October 1994, to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. It has come as a shock to many. For the Bush Administration it is a mixed blessing. On the one hand it confirms the President’s identification of North Korea as a dangerous country. Furthermore evidence of North Korean nuclear cooperation with both Iran and Pakistan, but not, at this point, Iraq reinforces the case for a threatening axis. On the other hand, the last thing the Bush Administration now wants is a crisis on the Korean peninsula which could detract from preparations for a war with Iraq.

In many ways, North Korea poses a more immediate threat to the United States than Iraq. Intelligence sources believe North Korea already has 2-3 nuclear weapons developed from the plutonium in its power reactors that were in service through the 1980s and early 1990s. It has deployed surface to surface missiles that can reach South Korea, China, Japan, and U.S. military interests in the Pacific. In theory several of these could be equipped with nuclear warheads. Its army, poised on the 38th parallel, the line separating North and South Korea, also known as the DMZ, has over 10,000 artillery pieces aimed at U.S. and South Korean forces across the border. In a full-scale war it would be able to launch devastating attacks on Seoul, the capital of South Korea, which is only 30 miles away.

Iraq poses none of these threats. The most Saddam Hussein could do in a war would be to launch a few missiles or possibly other devices armed with chemical or biological weapons. While these are not to be ignored and would certainly pose a major risk if they were ever successfully deployed, they are not as fearsome as Korea’s nuclear capability. Iraq’s army is incapable of threatening any neighboring country at this point in time.

So does this mean that the Bush Administration will have to de-escalate their efforts to unseat Saddam Hussein? Not at all! Precisely because Iraq is now relatively weak, supporters of regime change in Washington argue that now is the time to have a showdown, because if we wait a couple of years Iraq, too, will have nuclear weapons. The one development that could change plans for an early confrontation with Saddam would be an outbreak of war or a serious crisis on the Korean Peninsula. But this is unlikely. North Korean leaders know that however costly the war to the U.S. and South Korea they would lose in the end. What they seem to want is an economic agreement with the United States and the West and in return they would be prepared to negotiate away their weapons of mass destruction. The danger is that while they may want this sort of deal, they also believe that George Bush wants to remove their regime. They fear the new Bush Doctrine advocating preemption will be directed against them once Saddam Hussein has been dealt with. The test for Bush is to resolve the Korean case with adroit diplomacy. This is possible, but it will require the active support from China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan. Nevertheless there will be tough moments in the months ahead and there is always a possibility of miscalculation by either side, but particularly North Korea’s isolated and paranoid leaders.

If, in the meantime, the United Nations Security Council passes a resolution that permits the arms inspectors to go back to Iraq it could be that Iraq will be able to avoid a war with the United States this year. If the Iraqis are prepared to cooperate with the inspectors, at least initially, the war could be postponed until 2003. It could come as early as January 2003 if the Security Council fails to reach a resolution or Saddam Hussein plays games with the inspectors. Another possible date for a confrontation would be October 2003 given that the United States military does not want to fight a major ground war in the Persian Gulf between February and August because of the weather. U.S. military planners know that they may have to occupy Iraq with many troops and face chemical and biological attacks. The possibilities of postponement have risen in recent weeks, but most Bush watchers believe some military confrontation is inevitable.

 

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