Securing
Iraq After a War
September 8, 2002
One hopes that any military operation against Saddam Hussein’s weakened military forces will be a "cakewalk", as some civilian hawks have suggested. This will minimize casualties on both sides. However the U.S. military is too professional to assume it will be easy and it will prudently prepare for a worst case scenario. Either way, military victory against Iraq is assured because the Bush presidency could not survive anything less. But then comes the question of how does the United States manage Iraq after Saddam? This thorny problem has so far received scant attention.
Aside from the inevitable internecine and very personal violence that such a liberation would generate, Iraq’s major ethnic groups - the Kurds in the north, the Sunnis in the center and the majority of Shiites in the south - have different political agendas and will want a major stake in how to run the country. The U.S. job will be to keep the peace. This cannot be done on the cheap. Scott Feil, a highly respected military analyst who testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July argued that the U.S. might need to deploy up to 70,000 troops over a number of years to assure Iraq’s stability. This will not only require control of the borders, but the pacification and management of Baghdad, a city of over 5 million. The Iraqis are a capable people, but many of those who have been running the country for the past twenty-four years have very questionable records and will be targets for reprisals. While it may be fine for the United States to tell members of Saddam’s Republican Guards that if they keep their heads down during the war they will not be penalized when they are liberated, it is unrealistic to expect the Iraqi people to go along with such a benign posture. For Iraq to be de-Baathisized will require the equivalent of the de-Nazification of post war Germany. This was accomplished with massive allied armies in Germany and took a long time.
Aside from keeping the peace, the other priority task must be to find all Saddam’s residual WMD, which, in the case of biological weapons, can be hidden in a bathroom or a small refrigerator. For this purpose, the much maligned UN arms inspectors may finally have a role to play because anarchy in Iraq whereby such weapons fall into the hands of maverick groups and either be used or sold to others cannot be allowed to happen. Bringing good governance and the new legal system and economic growth to Iraq, absent a strong security environment, is a waste of time.
The example of Afghanistan is illustrative. Reluctantly the Pentagon has now accepted that U.S. forces will have to be there for a long time probably with an expanded military presence. As long as Afghanistan remains insecure international aid to rebuild the infrastructure of the country will not materialize. Iraq, likewise, will be in need of massive reconstruction. To be sure, Iraq has potential wealth in its oilfields, but these cannot be redeveloped and made productive absent good security. And, of course, the competing political, ethnic, and tribal factions all want to make sure they get a good share of the oil wealth. For instance the Kurds have made it clear that they would like to control the city of Kirkuk after the war. Kirkuk is the site of one of the most lucrative Iraqi oil productions facilities. Yet this is a redline for Turkey since a majority of the population of Kirkuk are Turkomens who regard Turkey as their protector, not the Kurds.
The task of securing Iraq will be difficult, protracted, and costly and there should be no illusions about it. Anything short of a secure, stable Iraq after the end of Saddam Hussein will be a recipe for disaster. In making the case for war the President will have to spell this out for the American people in honest terms and include a price tag. This is why it is so essential that the President build international support for such an effort if it is undertaken. The reconstruction of Iraq will require international cooperation. The world will be unforgiving of George Bush if he acts unilaterally. While this might not matter during a war, it surely will over a period of time. Some wish to use the ouster of Saddam Hussein as the precursor for establishing a new age of reform and democracy in the Middle East. This is a nice objective, but, it, too, will be no cakewalk. The passions and history of this region are complex. The American people need to know why it is in America’s interest to redraw the map of this part of the world and whether to do so will require that America behave like a colonial power.
