America Against the World?
By Geoffrey
Kemp
From the September 1, 2002 edition of Al-Ittihad
Vice President Dick Cheney has emerged as the Bush administration’s key spokesman advocating a preemptive war against Iraq. In two speeches on August 26 and August 29, before friendly audiences of U.S. veterans, Cheney outlined in clear and concise language the administration’s determination to confront Saddam Hussein citing the unacceptable danger of his weapons of mass destruction programs and the threat they pose to the region, to U.S. friends and allies, and to the U.S. itself. His stark and uncompromising language reflects growing concern in the White House that the critics of the Administration’s policy seem to be gaining the upper hand. Since some of the more vocal critics have been fellow Republicans, such as former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and former Secretary of State James Baker, the Administration felt it had to speak out forcefully and regain the initiative in the ongoing debate.
The irony is that while President Bush seems to have made up his mind that force will be necessary to remove Saddam Hussein, opposition to U.S. preemptive action now includes most of the world, including key allies whose support would be essential in event of any military operation. Whether or not the United States’ closest ally in Europe, Britain, will be able to support a war may well depend on how successfully Prime Minister Tony Blair copes with growing opposition within his own party to any British involvement in such an attack. Worldwide opposition to war on Iraq is paralleled by growing antagonism towards the United States because it seems to be pursuing a policy of unilateralism and flaunting its strength as the world’s number one superpower. The hawks within the Bush administration, far from seeking cooperation among its friends and allies seem determined to go it alone, if necessary, in the expectation that if the U.S. is determined to proceed with a war against Iraq, key allies will fall eventually into line and will be supportive of the United States, if not during the war then certainly in its aftermath.
Critics argue that the hawks disregard the opposition to American policy around the world at their peril. However it would be unwise to underestimate the persuasive powers of the President of the United States to win acceptance of his policy provided that he takes two critical steps which so far he has avoided. First, he must engage the U.S. Congress and make the persuasive case that not only is the use of force against Iraq necessary, but that the administration has thought clearly about what it will do in the aftermath of a military victory. Will the United States have to occupy Iraq for months or years? If so, how many troops will be required and what will it cost? If Bush can persuade the Congress to back a coherent policy it will send a clear message to the allies that, like it or not, the United States is determined to change the status quo in the Gulf.
Under these circumstances it’s likely that the Europeans will be willing to agree to support the United States provided Bush takes a second necessary step and puts more emphasis on the legitimacy of such an action and works more closely with the United Nations. The fact is that Iraq has been in flagrant violation of UN Security Council resolutions stemming from its invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which it has signed and ratified. Iraq, of course, has been under sanction for these actions ever since, but unless Saddam Hussein permits UN arms inspectors to return to Iraq with unfettered access he will remain an international outlaw. This is the issue that the Administration needs to press both in the Congress and at the UN, rather than the broader geopolitical and moral arguments in favor of regime change which now include bringing democracy to the region. If Bush is prepared to make a final effort to get UN backing for an unequivocal ultimatum for Iraq to accept the arms inspectors, he will find it easier to unify his own administration and bring the Europeans on board. Under these circumstances Russians are not going to stand in the way of any American action since they see all sorts of benefits for themselves in supporting Washington. And if the Europeans and Russians, albeit reluctantly, go along with a determined and united America it is likely that some of the key Arab countries, including Egypt and possibly Saudi Arabia, will consent to cooperation. Certainly Turkey, in the last resort, is going to be supportive of American action.
Therefore it is misleading to see this as a case of America against the rest of the world, though, it could turn out to be this way if the Administration mishandles domestic politics and international diplomacy in the weeks ahead. The Administration has recently changed its attitudes towards peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan. The Pentagon has now decided that the United States needs to expand its military presence outside Kabul. This is a 180 degree reversal of previous policy and reflects a growing awareness that in Afghanistan the U.S. cannot disregard allied opinion which has urged a greater U.S. role. In a similar fashion, slowly but gradually, the Administration is likely to adopt a more flexible posture on making the case for confrontation with Iraq which will be acceptable to many more countries than is presently the case.
