Abdullah and Sharon: Feelers for an Agreement
By Geoffrey
Kemp
From the March 17, 2002 edition of Al-Ittihad
Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon have very different perspectives on the origins and nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, in the past few weeks, both leaders have surfaced ideas that, taken together, may provide a roadmap to eventually end the increasingly dangerous crisis.
The Abdullah plan calls for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders in exchange for normalization of relations with the Arab world. What appeals to Israel is the expectation that normalization means full diplomatic and economic relations and eventually an Israeli embassy in Riyadh. Whether Saudi Arabia is ready for such momentous events remains to be seen, but once offered it would be difficult to refuse provided that Israel meets its obligations and withdraws to the 1967 lines and a Palestinian state comes into being.
Faced with mounting Israeli casualties and escalating Palestinian violence, Sharon has called for the construction of strategic buffers to physically separate parts of Israel from the Palestinian territories. The practical details, including the location of the buffers, remain vague. Because of his dependence on right-wing political support, it is unlikely Sharon’s plan in its first incarnation will call for the abandonment of remote settlements. Yet the logic of separation is that eventually this will have to happen. It will be too much of a burden for Israel to protect indefinitely widely scattered settlements that serve no strategic purpose other than a manifestation of Israel’s earlier determination to hold on to territory in the West Bank, Gaza and on the Golan.
Sooner or later a majority of Israelis will demand secure and defensible borders with physical barriers to separate them from the Palestinian population, who, it is assumed, will be living in their own state. The precise lines that will be drawn on a security map will have to take into account both strategic and political realities. The betting is that at the end of the day Israel’s redefined borders will look very much like the 1967 borders with some obvious adjustments to take into account large, urban settlement areas around Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. This assumes that Sharon or some other right wing politician will be able to convince most Israelis that territorial compromise is essential for the survival of the state however painful the abandonment of many settlements will be. It will be analogous to President Nixon’s decision in 1972 to normalize relations with China. Only a Republican president could have made such a dramatic change in U.S. policy given the inherent Republican hostility to Communist China.
It is at this point that Abdullah’s proposal becomes most relevant. If for strategic reasons Israel decides to withdraw from most of the occupied territories including the Golan Heights, than the added value of the Abdullah plan would be to put a legitimate stamp of approval on normalization and Israel’s full recognition by Arab states. This, in turn, would make it easier to reach an eventual compromise on Jerusalem, refugees, security and water resources. It would also provide a politically acceptable way for the Palestinian Authority to formally end the violence and curb Palestinian extremists who will never agree to a permanent settlement with Israel. Under these circumstances, Palestinians would now have contiguous territory within their state and would be able to move to and from their cities and towns unencumbered by Israelis checkpoints. However for them to visit Israel they would have to have visas and enter through a number of clearly marked border posts. The Palestinians would be responsible for their own lives and for their economy.
Could this ever happen? Right now the situation seems so gloomy that any suggestion of compromise, particularly territorial compromise, seems out of the question. Yet precisely because things are so bad both Sharon and Abdullah have decided, in different ways and for different reasons, that changes must be made. The status quo is simply unacceptable.
