Crown Prince Abdullah's Peace Proposal
By Geoffrey
Kemp
From the March 10, 2002 edition of Al-Ittihad
The new Arab-Israeli peace initiative, proposed by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah, calls for Israel to withdraw to its 1967 borders in exchange for normalization of relations with Arab states. Although the initiative contains little new in terms of substance, its political effects could be far reaching.
Some have dismissed the proposal as a brilliant public relations exercise designed to win gratitude in Washington from an administration and Congress still angry over Saudi Arabia’s wishy washy response to its own culpability in the events that led up to the September 11th terrorist attack on the United States. Others, including several senior Israeli officials, have welcomed the Crown Prince’s initiative. They now hope he will formally present the plan in Arabic to an Arab audience, preferably at the upcoming Arab League Summit in Beirut at the end of March and engage in negotiations.
The initiative needs to be taken seriously for a number of reasons. First, it is an Arab initiative and not an American, European, UN or Israeli plan. Second, Saudi Arabia is the most important Arab country with no diplomatic relations with Israel. What Saudi Arabia says and does will influence other Arab states including Syria and the smaller GCC members. Third, the Abdullah plan reportedly calls not only for peace with Israel, but normalization of relations. This means trade and people exchanges as well as diplomatic recognition. Fourth, if the proposal becomes a formal one supported by other Arab countries, it cannot be dismissed by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon: Israel will have to respond positively and this could help lower the levels of tension and violence that currently overwhelm the Arab-Israeli scene. Fifth, the Crown Prince will be in a position to demonstrate to U.S. Vice President Richard Cheney, when he visits the Kingdom in a few weeks, that there is a linkage between progress on ending the Arab-Israeli conflict and coordinated efforts to address the difficult issue of Saddam Hussein and how to change the Iraqi regime. Sixth, a formal Saudi proposal would demonstrate to the world that Arab pragmatists are willing to take risks for peace and become fully-fledged partners in the effort. (Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been sharply criticized by former members of President Clinton’s peace negotiating team for their lackluster support of former Prime Minister Barak’s proposals at the Camp David summit in July 2000. Had the Arab leadership been more assertive, Arafat might have adopted a different negotiating stance and the disastrous new Intifada might have been avoided.) Seventh, Saudi Arabia’s involvement in peace negotiations will make it more difficult for Yasser Arafat to continue to equivocate on Palestinian strategy. He will have to accept Abdullah’s leadership and finally take steps to crack down on Palestinian extremists in his own midst who want to wreck any chance of peace. Finally, constructive high level Arab involvement in the peace process will send a message to the hardliners in Iran who want to prevent an Arab-Israeli rapprochement and who have gone out of their way to cause trouble between Israelis and Arabs in recent months.
There have been many disappointments and setbacks in the long, tortured history of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. For this reason the Saudi proposals may lead to nothing more than a lot of hot air and newsprint. Nevertheless, given the lack of peace initiatives and the dire situation on the ground in Palestine and Israel, one cannot give up hope. The absence of any forward diplomatic momentum can only mean regression and an inevitable escalation of violence. This will set the region on a collision course for further war and political and economic chaos. Which, of course, is what the rejectionists on both sides want to see happen.
