Will Middle East Democracy Serve American Interests?
After much equivocating, the Bush Administration has come out in favor of supporting greater democracy and reform in the Middle East. Two speeches in quick succession, the first on December 4 by Richard N. Haass, the State Department’s Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and then on December 12 by Secretary of State Colin Powell at the Heritage Foundation, argued that it is very much in America’s interest to help the Muslim world, in general, and the Middle East, in particular, to reform itself in order to promote economic growth, the emancipation of women and greater participation of the citizens in government. Called "The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative", the U.S. is now "firmly on the side of change, on the side of reform and on the side of a modern future for the Middle East."
The belief that more democratic governance in the Muslim world will serve American interests is not a new concept. However, in the past its promotion was not high on the agenda of U.S. administrations for fear of alienating key Arab allies whose regimes were anything but democratic. Since September 11, 2001, and under pressure from a coalition of neoconservatives, liberal internationalists and a number of Europeans who have been critical of America’s cozy relationship with autocratic regimes, the Bush Administration felt it necessary to advocate reforms that neither the Clinton Administration nor the administration of George Bush senior, had been eager to talk about.
There is no doubt that more freedom and reform in the Middle East will be welcomed by most of its citizens who are tired of corrupt, inefficient and often brutal rule. Iran’s restive population has tasted some of the fruits of the democratic process, but now finds continuing restrictions on their lives almost unbearable. Sooner rather than later a more open Iranian society will emerge with radical implications for the region.
However it may be stretching the bounds of credibility to assume that more democratic regimes, whether in Iran or the Arab world, will lead to greater cooperation and acceptance of American foreign policy priorities. Democratic regimes may share more of America’s basic human rights values and this will be welcomed, but it will still be difficult for the parties to accept many of the premises of American foreign policy. One only has to look at recent developments in Germany, South Korea and Turkey – all democratic and all close allies of the United States – to make that point.
In September 2002, Germany held national elections which were extremely close. In final weeks of the campaign, the embattled Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, managed to turn his weak campaign around by invoking a distinctly anti-American message, including a pledge to refuse to join any war against Iraq even if it had UN Security Council approval. Schroeder probably would not have won reelection had he not taken this route. The ensuing quarrel with the United States has not been fully resolved and it is still unclear what Germany’s role would be in the event of another Gulf War. South Korea held an election in December 2002 and its winning candidate, Roh Moo Hyun, also ran on a distinctly anti-American ticket gaining support from many younger Koreans who do not remember America’s contribution to saving their country in the Korean war. Instead, the young people resent the large presence of the U.S. forces in their country and do not see the threat of North Korea in the same ways as their elders and most Americans do. The current crisis over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has been exacerbated because South Korea wishes to pursue a less confrontational policy towards the North. They fear chaos more than they fear a North Korean nuclear weapon..
Likewise, Turkey, another ally which had elections in December, has made it clear that the majority of its population do not support an American war with Iraq for fear it will destabilize the region and cost them a great deal economically as happened during the 1991 war. Turkey may eventually provide access for American troops and aircraft but it will be unpopular and it poses a severe problem in the short run for the United States. Without access to Turkey the military operations against Iraq will be much more difficult, particularly in the north.
So we cannot assume that more democratic regimes in the Arab world are going to fall in line with American policy over Iraq, weapons proliferation and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The belief that if they are democratic they will weaken their resolve to support a viable Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza is wishful thinking. Democracy in the Middle East should be supported because it will bring a better life for ordinary people. This will serve both regional and American interests in the long run. But this does not mean a consensus on regional geopolitics.
