Putin opened his five minutes on the world stage Wednesday by praising the United Nations for guaranteeing "freedom from the arbitrariness of hegemony and diktat," a thinly veiled attack on American global leadership.

He then promoted the ABM treaty as the "foundation" of disarmament, proposed a Moscow conference on preventing the militarization of space and implicitly defended Russia's brutal conduct in Chechnya in a call for international cooperation against terrorism. Finally, Putin questioned the universality of the principles of democracy and freedom by asserting countries' rights to "national self-expression" and "independence" (from whom we can guess).

The Clinton administration's Manichean division of Russia's political leaders into so-called "reformers" and "reactionaries" ignores both the authoritarian, corrupt and self-serving tendencies of many of the so-called "reformers" and the defense of democracy and the rule of law by some "reactionaries" who, being outside the establishment, had few other means to protect themselves. No less important, it has given scant attention to the increasingly assertive foreign policy views of many "reformers." Putin's remarkable reception at the G-7 Summit on Okinawa demonstrates that confusion about Russian developments is not limited to the United States.

The most that could be said of Putin when he came to power was that he had given his anointed "reformer" masters-St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak and former President Boris Yeltsin-the same loyalty he doubtless offered the KGB.

Putin's book-length interview, "In the First Person," suggested not that he was a born-again democrat but rather that he was a dedicated servant of the state willing to do what was necessary to protect his superiors.

Attacks on Putin's inadequate reaction to the tragic sinking of the Russian submarine Kursk, which predict a return to Soviet-style dictatorship are on the other extreme.

Critics have generally ignored the fact that any nation would have very serious security concerns if its newest and most technologically advanced submarine experienced similar problems-particularly if, as may apparently be the case, it was testing a new torpedo. The Russian president can and should be criticized for failing to understand democratic politics and not returning to Moscow (or, better, flying to Murmansk) at the beginning of the crisis. Yet, he deserves credit for eventually deciding to ask for foreign help and for his difficult meeting with the lost sailors' families.

Although much commentary suggests otherwise, Putin remains quite popular after the Kursk crisis, in part because of improvements in the Russian economy.

One respected poll put Putin's public support at 65 percent-a level many presidents would envy. Whatever some in the West may hope, this is a direct result of the fact that Russians want a no-nonsense leader, that a KGB background is a plus, and that in the best Russian tradition many see a powerful czar as the only way to protect the weak from the strong.

The facts of life in Russia call into question the utility of the newly fashionable prescription of shifting American engagement from the Russian government to Russian society. This idea ignores not only that Russian society actually wants a strong state, but also that the regime has considerably greater influence over its society than Americans do-particularly if American influence is seen at variance with the Kremlin's interests.

More fundamentally, it is yet another call for U.S. management of Russia's evolution, which Americans have only a limited ability to affect.

The good news is that both the Russian government and its subjects are currently in a pragmatic mood and have little interest in a Stalinist political system or a global ideological crusade. Despite Putin's rhetoric at the UN, they understand that Russia needs the West-and the United States in particular-more than the United States needs Russia. But much more is needed for a successful relationship with Russia. Rather than try to engineer the details of Russia's transition, the United States must: Maintain sufficient economic and military power to act unilaterally when necessary if it is unable to reach agreements with Moscow on vital interests, including protecting the American people through national missile defense; avoid the destructive impulse to see everything in Russia in black and white; be realistic about the character of Russian society and politics; respect Russia's perspectives, so long as they do not contradict key American interests or values; establish international priorities rather than attempting to advance a laundry list of commendable but contradictory objectives (by recognizing, for example, that humiliating Russia in Kosovo and rapidly expanding NATO into the Baltic States could hinder productive discussions on non-proliferation, terrorism and other essential issues); and be patient.