Abandoning
ABM Treaty Would Cost U.S.
By Dimitri K.
Simes and Paul J. Saunders
Reprinted from the September 5, 2001 edition of Newsday.
President George W. Bush's recent statement that the United States will withdraw
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty "at a time convenient to
America" raises an important question. Namely, how does the Bush
administration define what is "convenient" in foreign policy?
The administration's handling of missile defense suggests that it may seek the
convenience of doing whatever it wants whenever it prefers at the expense of
getting the right outcome.
The administration is right to pursue limited missile defenses. It is also wise
to cultivate a sense of inevitability behind missile defense to blunt European
skepticism and Russian foot-dragging (not to mention domestic U.S. opposition).
Similarly, common sense suggests that America should not unduly limit its
flexibility before testing has determined which technological approaches to
missile defense are likely to be most successful.
But the deployment of a missile-defense system cannot be viewed in isolation
from other important American interests. Rather, it should be assessed in the
context of other key U.S. priorities, including maintaining relations with
Russia, China and our European allies and limiting the very nuclear
proliferation that it is to protect us against.
Russia obviously will not declare war on the United States if it withdraws from
the ABM Treaty. In fact, despite ominous pronouncements, Moscow is unlikely to
make real changes in its nuclear policies or force levels. Even if it does,
there is little cause for alarm. The Cold War is over, and the Russian arsenal
is most unlikely to be used against us.
But this does not mean that the United States can pull out of the treaty
unilaterally without cost. The pragmatic Vladimir Putin government - keenly
aware of American power - will not become overtly hostile to the United States,
but the Kremlin will be considerably less accommodating of U.S. interests in
other areas.
For starters, Russia will likely be even less restrained in arming China and
anyone else prepared to pay in cash and on time. The collapse of the
arms-control regime will reduce Moscow's inclination to cooperate with the
United States in safeguarding its nuclear materials, limiting foreign access to
its nuclear technologies and pursuing other nonproliferation efforts. Iran may
well be the main beneficiary.
Beijing is sure to react similarly, given that the impact on its relatively
small ICBM force will be greater and more immediate. Chinese cooperation on
nonproliferation matters, particularly vis-a-vis North Korea and Pakistan, is
likely to be limited at best. In concert with Russia, China could also
effectively frustrate U.S. efforts to use the United Nations Security Council to
advance American interests.
Our European allies would doubtless grudgingly support the United States if
forced to choose between this country and Russia. The danger, however, is not
that Europe will walk away from America but that it will see less reason to walk
the extra mile for America.
Every day, every month, every year, Britain, France, Germany and others will
decide how much support to offer the United States with respect to Russia,
China, Iraq, Iran, Israel, international trade and every other contentious
matter in today's increasingly complex world. A unilateral U.S. withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty would fuel European support for the view that the United States
is a "rogue superpower" rather than a credible world leader.
Such concerns would not be paramount if unilateral abandonment of the treaty
were the only way to build missile defenses. The irony is that Russian officials
have already admitted that the ABM accord is not sacred and that the United
States could be permitted to test and deploy limited ABM systems in the context
of offensive reductions both sides want.
Some in Russia have gone farther by suggesting that the planned test facility in
Alaska could be consistent with the ABM Treaty in its current form. The Putin
administration is eager to obtain the potential benefits of a stronger
U.S.-Russian relationship and recognizes that it has much to lose.
Under the circumstances, a deal almost entirely on American terms should be
possible to achieve. Moving ahead without a deal risks creating a
self-fulfilling prophecy in which Russia and China may feed growing
proliferation that accelerates and heightens the threats to the United States
and necessitates increasingly elaborate and expensive defenses. Surely, it is
worth a little inconvenience today to avoid considerable additional costs - to
our security and to our budget - in coming years.
The real question, then, is what's the rush? Why is the Bush administration
talking about withdrawal from the ABM Treaty without genuinely trying to reach
an agreement? Has missile defense developed into a religious dogma for the right
as arms control has for the left?
Like any president, George W. Bush is entitled to his ideological
predispositions. But, as a responsible leader, he should recognize that it is
not convenient for America to provoke acrimony when an attractive deal is within
reach.
Dimitri K. Simes is President of The Nixon Center. Paul J. Saunders is
the Center's Director.
