"Musical
Prime Ministers," by Paul
J. Saunders
from The Washington Times, August 11, 1999, p. A17
Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s decision to dismiss Sergei Stepashin - his fourth prime minister in less than eighteen months - is yet another demonstration of the glaring flaws in both his personality and his regime. In view of his frequent urges to dismiss them, is virtually incomprehensible how Mr. Yeltsin could continue to believe that any of his prime ministers might be taken seriously, let alone elected his successor, as he has proposed in the case of his new nominee, Vladimir Putin.
Stepashin and his immediate predecessor, Yevgeny Primakov, were both been dismissed at times when their popularity was high (especially by Russian standards) and increasing. Stepashin had a 45% approval rating; Primakov’s was 68%. Moreover, Russia’s economy, while still in terrible shape, has been improving slowly but surely all year and, aside from the political excitement surrounding the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections and Moscow’s normal rumor mill, the country has been relatively calm.
Internationally, Moscow finally received long-sought credits from the IMF under Stepashin and appears to be able to avoid default on its sovereign debt. And despite resentment of NATO and especially American behavior during the Kosovo crisis, most Russians feel better about the situation in Yugoslavia after the surprise seizure of the Pristina airport by Russian paratroops and the subsequent expansion of Moscow’s role in KFOR, the Alliance’s peacekeeping force.
So why did Yeltsin fire Stepashin after less than three months on the job? He gave no official reason, but there are several contributing factors:
- "The Family," Yeltsin’s unofficial inner circle, was never been united behind Stepashin, despite his loyalty to the President. Notorious banker Boris Berezovsky and oil magnate Roman Abramovich reportedly preferred Nikolai Aksyonenko, who was made First Deputy Prime Minister in Stepashin’s government and was quick to seek a visible and independent role. Also, Stepashin was seen as an ally of Berezovsky’s nemesis Anatoly Chubais, now head of Russia’s electricity monopoly.
- Despite the fact that Russia has been relatively calm, the country (and Yeltsin) face sufficient challenges that it is not difficult to generate a case against almost any particular figure in government. In fact, recent reports in the Russian media blamed both a recent alliance between two key political groups opposed to Yeltsin – Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s "Fatherland" and the "All Russia" alliance of regional leaders – and the spread of separatist violence from Chechnya to Dagestan on Stepashin’s "excessive flexibility."
- More fundamentally, Yeltsin cannot tolerate prime ministers or other officials acting independently or having too high a profile. Both Viktor Chernomyrdin and Yevgeny Primakov were clearly sacked in part for this reason; Chernomyrdin had just returned from a summit with Vice President Al Gore in which he looked increasingly "presidential," while Primakov was becoming too popular and seemed to comfortable with opposition leaders. Before being dismissed, Stepashin was gaining public support, was described as having a "desire not to quarrel" with the opposition, and had just returned from successful meetings with Gore and President Clinton.
This last point is the most important and, in combination with the role of "the Family," may be the most difficult to overcome. As his tenure in office comes closer to an end, Mr. Yeltsin is increasingly interested in guaranteeing that his successor as President will not only be sympathetic to him but also protect him, and his family, from harassment, investigation, or even prosecution. As a result, he is driven to seek an unswervingly loyal prime minister to groom for higher office.
However, because President Yeltsin is so deeply unpopular – his approval rating is at most seven percent – no prime minister can hope to succeed him without establishing some distance from Yeltsin and moving closer to the political center (not to mention without being given enough power to be effective and build a record of accomplishment, which is a related problem). In a somewhat similar situation in the United States, Vice President Gore has sought to distinguish himself from President Clinton (who is much more popular than Mr. Yeltsin), with the support and understanding of his superior. Despite being a brilliant political tactician, Yeltsin has been unable to follow a similar course, perhaps because he simply does not understand his own incredibly weak political position. It is easy to imagine how a combination of mental deterioration, self-deception, and reliance on information filtered through his inner circle could lead to such a miscalculation.
Whatever the reason, if Mr. Yeltsin cannot overcome his resentment of popular prime ministers, it is difficult to see how "his" candidate for the presidency – whether it is Vladimir Putin or (who knows?) a successor – can win a remotely free election. As the average tenure of the three previous prime ministers is under six months, we should find out relatively soon whether the Russian president is up to the task.
Under the circumstances, the Clinton Administration was correct to announce that it is unconcerned by Mr. Stepashin’s dismissal and is prepared to work with his successor. More broadly, we can only hope that the dispensability of Russia’s prime ministers will encourage the administration to consider the fact that Mr. Yeltsin will soon be out of office as well and to spend significantly more time getting to know the responsible members of the Russian opposition. Unless Boris Yeltsin’s personality changes overnight, they aren’t likely to remain the opposition for long.
