The replacement of Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin with Vladimir Putin, director of the Federal Security Service – the principal successor agency to the KGB – is not terribly significant in itself.

In fact, Stepashin and Putin are similar in many respects: they came to politics from the security services, started their political careers in St. Petersburg, became early allies of the reformers, have impeccable records as Yeltsin loyalists, and are of roughly the same age. Thus, while parliamentary leaders across the political spectrum have expressed strong reservations about Putin, most expect that he will eventually be confirmed.

One key reason for this is that most parliamentary factions, including the Communists, are reluctant to risk the dissolution of the State Duma prescribed in the Russian constitution if Putin's candidacy is rejected three times. With new Duma elections just four months away, it is clearly advantageous for members of the parliament to campaign as incumbents, with the considerable resources and prestige of their offices.

Yet, while Putin's appointment is unremarkable on the surface, it raises troubling questions about Yeltsin's decision to make Putin his fifth prime minister in just 18 months. Why was Stepashin dismissed? What is Putin expected to do that Stepashin failed to deliver? And what are the consequences for Russian politics and U.S. interests?

Stepashin was fired for two reasons. First, he did not establish himself as a political leader apable of succeeding Yeltsin democratically and protecting the interests of the president and his inner circle. Just last week, the Kremlin attempted to persuade the new center-left electoral bloc created by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and a number of regional governors that Stepashin should lead its party lists. The bloc's leaders responded that the top spot was reserved for Primakov, that the places below were for Luzhkov and his key allies, and that Stepashin could be number eight at best. This was unacceptable to Yeltsin and ''the Family' – it would have meant that Stepashin was supporting Luzhkov, whom the Kremlin fears, rather than taking over the new coalition.

At the same time, Stepashin proved to be nicer and more honorable than the Yeltsin entourage hoped or the opposition feared. He proclaimed that assuring honest elections was one of his principal tasks. But minimally honest elections could not result in the election of a Duma friendly to Yeltsin in December or a president who could be reliably expected to protect the interests of the extended Yeltsin family next July.

In contrast, it is widely assumed that Putin would be prepared to do whatever it takes to assure that the Yeltsin family remains a commanding presence in Russian politics.

The Kremlin doesn't seem to have a specific plan of action. Yeltsin, who is concerned with his legacy and unsure of the support of the military and security services, would probably prefer to avoid canceling the elections. So, the new prime minister is first expected to try to pressure provincial governors into following the Kremlin line by threatening to deny essential federal budgetary support. Putin is also assumed to be more willing than Stepashin to be ruthless about putting major companies, such as the natural gas monopoly, under direct government control to commandeer their finances. Similar pressure is expected on media outlets that support the opposition.

If these maneuvers prove insufficient, Yeltsin has already hinted that he may ban the Communist Party or, using some legal technicality, deny Luzhkov's faction the opportunity to participate in the Duma elections. As a last resort, he could impose emergency rule as a result of either the renewed fighting in the northern Caucasus or some other violence, perhaps intentionally provoked through the removal of Lenin's preserved remains from Red Square, which the Communists adamantly oppose.

That these measures would be undemocratic is not their only problem. While the increasingly broad opposition to Yeltsin is prepared to go a long way to accommodate him to ensure that elections take place and Yeltsin steps down quietly, attempts to subvert or cancel the vote may backfire. Even more ominous is the possibility that political infighting in Moscow could shift the real power to regional governors, many of whom are even less democratic and more self-serving than Yeltsin himself. The fragmentation of a country with thousands of nuclear weapons could have terrible repercussions far beyond Russia's borders.