Optimists will argue that at Camp David a good deal of progress has been made on many of the most difficult final-status questions, including borders, security and water. While there remain problems with the return of Palestinian refugees and the future of Israeli settlements, many of the fundamentals are now in place for a peace treaty.

The optimists will argue that there is still time for the parties to regroup and come back for more meetings before Sept. 13. On that date, both sides have set a deadline for a final agreement. In addition, Yasser Arafat has said he will declare a Palestinian state with or without an agreement on that same date. President Bill Clinton has all August to refocus on these efforts.

There must be intense pressure on him to rescue at least some of the agreements that were reached at Camp David. As Clinton himself has said, "I think the alternative is unthinkable." But the alternative is what the pessimists will now dwell upon. They will point out that Jerusalem cannot be resolved, except if one side capitulates to the other on a matter of supreme importance to both parties.

If after all the cajoling and efforts, the parties cannot settle Jerusalem, then a partial peace will be disastrous, since it would leave open the most difficult issue. The conflict would fester and continue to be a serious threat to regional security.

Some will go further and say it is now unlikely more talks will be productive and that, if Arafat unilaterally declares a state on Sept. 13, Israel will respond by annexing further Palestinian territory. This could quickly lead to violence.

Indeed, violence may happen sooner than September if Palestinian radicals have their way. Violence could escalate rapidly all over the remaining occupied territories and within the Palestinian Authority itself. It would bring Israeli troops into direct contact with Palestinian police who Israelis say have been armed and trained for just this occasion.

Violence could even spill over into Lebanon, where buoyant Hezbollah forces may be willing to join in the fray if the fighting gets fierce. This is the scenario for disaster, which could escalate ultimately even to involve Syrian and Israeli forces. There are hard-line voices in Israel who would argue that, if worse comes to worst, Israel has never been in a stronger military position to confront its neighbors in a final military showdown if that is what the neighbors want.

A third, and in my opinion more realistic perspective, would argue that both Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat came to Camp David with much weaker hands than their predecessors, Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat. Barak had lost his majority in the Knesset and Arafat, while he knew all along that he had to be very conscious of the attitudes of the Palestinian Diaspora, found himself at Camp David under enormous pressure from the worldwide Muslim community, demanding that he make no concessions on the right to Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem.

Thus, until such time as Arafat and Barak are able to re-establish some negotiating authority, it is unlikely that any breakthrough on Jerusalem can happen. One ray of hope is that, for the first time, the possibility of dividing Jerusalem is being openly discussed in Israel, thanks to Barak's bold and controversial decision to compromise. This means the United States must now use all its influence with the key Arab countries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to point out how close the parties were to an agreement and why, ultimately, Arafat also has to reach some compromise on the status of East Jerusalem.