Bush, Putin Working for R-E-S-P-E-C-T
by Paul
J. Saunders
Reprinted from the June 24, 2001 edition of the San Diego Union-Tribune
President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin discussed a broad range of topics during their hundred-minute meeting last weekend in Ljubljana, Slovenia. Missile defense, NATO, and Iran came up, as did Russia's continuing intervention in Chechnya and American concerns over media freedom. Yet one of the most important issues in the relationship -- and possibly one of the most important achievements of the meeting, which was intended to allow the two leaders to get to know one another -- drew little public attention: respect.
President Bush did, in fact, refer to respect; at the post-summit press conference, he called for the United States and Russia to move beyond "mutually assured destruction" and toward "mutually earned respect." Though the reference to the Cold War doctrine of nuclear deterrence may have been a little too cute, it pointed directly to one of the greatest failures in American policy toward Russia -- and one of the areas of Russians' deepest resentment.
Taking into account that fewer than 10 years have passed since Russia lost its status as a global superpower, it is not surprising that Russians as a nation remain extraordinarily sensitive to the treatment they are offered in the international system.
The problem was that Russians saw the United States offering essentially symbolic gestures, like G-7 membership, talk of partnership, and bear hugs at Clinton-Yeltsin summit meetings, in exchange for substantive Russian concessions. Worse, from the Russian perspective, was that when Moscow was given a formal role in discussions of important international issues, its views were ignored.
Russian resentment was tinged with a new sense of desperation in the early months of the Bush administration. Suggestions that the United States was easing into a harder line toward Russia seemed to be confirmed by the dramatic expulsion of 50 Russian diplomats after the arrest of accused spy Robert Hanssen, tough rhetoric on Russian arms sales, and the administration's visible commitment to missile defense.
So when Putin said to the press afterward that "[Bush] listens to our arguments very carefully," he was making a significant statement sure to be understood by a Russian audience. It was, in a sense, not so different from Margaret Thatcher's famous statement that Mikhail Gorbachev was a man with whom the West could do business.
Needless to say, overcoming Russia's wounded pride and developing a sense of mutual respect in the U.S.-Russian relationship are important but hardly sufficient to put the relationship back on track. The other side of the coin of Russian resentment is the undeniable fact that Russia is no longer a superpower and does not deserve the same status. Moscow must therefore reassess its own expectations as well.
This problem was not addressed at the summit but it has been an unspoken element of the administration's early policy toward Russia. The low level of official contacts in the administration's first months, bureaucratic adjustments at the State Department and National Security Council, and unconvincing denials that Russia is being downgraded all sent a message to Moscow.
While doubtless unpleasant for the Kremlin, this was an essential basis on which to build mutual, and honest, respect at the summit. It is also something the pragmatic President Putin clearly understands: he himself has said that years of sustained and relatively high economic growth will be required to make Russia as wealthy as Portugal. This suggests that Putin could quickly adjust to Russia's revised status -- especially if American respect for his country meant that the United States would make some real concessions.
More broadly, progress in the U.S.-Russian relationship will obviously require progress on substance. The successful reopening of dialogue at the Ljubljana summit must not obscure the fact that this is where the real work will be in the coming months. And notwithstanding the two leaders' friendly tone after their conversation, the differences between them remain considerable.
On missile defense, one of the Bush administration's highest priorities, Moscow remains unconvinced of the threat from so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea and proposes a discussion of the danger and possible joint responses. Needless to say, at the normal pace of intergovernmental discussion, such an effort could take years. Also, while many in the Russian foreign policy establishment acknowledge that a limited missile defense system would not threaten their country, Moscow seems increasingly concerned about its implications for China as well. Speaking to reporters on Monday, Putin expressed Russia's concern that American missile defense could "result in a hectic, uncontrolled arms race on the borders of our country" if China should respond by building up its missile force. Putin met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin in Shanghai just before his trip to Slovenia to see Bush.
The prospect of further NATO enlargement is no less troubling to the Kremlin, particularly as the three Baltic States -- Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia -- seem to be gaining momentum as potential members of the alliance. In addition to anger at the prospect of NATO bases on the Russian border, Moscow has expressed frequent concern about discrimination against the region's ethnic Russians, who Russia claims have been denied citizenship and fundamental rights because of language laws and other barriers. Ethnic Russians are a substantial minority in Latvia and Estonia.
Progress on these issues, and on other U.S. concerns, such as Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, will not be easy. The reality of the U.S-Russian relationship is that our two countries have important and legitimate interests and that many (but by no means all) of those interests do not coincide. Under those circumstances, reaching agreement will require sacrifices of one kind or another from both sides. Still, so long as we understand this -- and respect one another -- there is room for hope.
Paul Saunders is Director of The Nixon Center, a foreign policy research institute in Washington.
