Bush-Putin Summit Was Just a Start
by
Dimitri K. Simes and Paul
J. Saunders
Reprinted from the June 19, 2001 edition of Newsday
Although the first summit between President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin was pronounced "historic" by American television networks before it even began, the most that can be said of Saturday's meetings in Ljubljana, Slovenia, was that they successfully reopened dialogue between the United States and Russia.
This achievement may prove historic -- if it eventually contributes to improved relations that advance American interests -- but heavy lifting will be required in Washington and Moscow to make it so.
Despite talk of strained relations in both capitals, each leader needed a successful summit last weekend. They accomplished this in part by agreeing to disagree in advance (rather than waiting for their press conference) and instead concentrating on developing a personal rapport.
Interestingly, this approach -- and, indeed, the initiative for the meeting -- came from the Russian side. Many Russians felt their country had been treated with disdain by the new American administration; there was a sense that Russia had been demoted from "former superpower" to "failed state" and that Moscow's views were no longer heard in Washington. Putin would have been damaged by an impression that he was unable to work with the White House.
The lack of dialogue was also a real constraint on Russian foreign policy.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, an assertive or even hostile Russian policy toward the United States could be much more costly to Moscow without dialogue than with it. So long as the White House and the Kremlin are talking, Russia will have an easier time cultivating separate relations with Europe and encouraging foreign investment.
Conversely, pursuing such a policy while cut off from Washington would risk self-isolation dangerous to a weakened Russia. The importance of the meeting to the Russian side was demonstrated by Putin's careful preparation: In addition to substantive work, he took English lessons and carefully studied Bush's record and habits in order to make just the impression he chose. His intelligence background was probably of some help in this.
For its part, the Bush administration does not need a positive relationship with Russia to the same extent, but it does need to demonstrate progress on several specific issues on which the Russian position is important, such as missile defense and NATO enlargement.
On missile defense, the president's meetings with European leaders showed that even the prospect of a deal with Moscow will make our allies, particularly France and Germany, more willing to go along with the United States. This is more evident in the case of the newly Democratic Senate. As a result, it has been difficult for the administration to project the sense of inevitability about missile defense that had previously been used to press Russia into an agreement. In Europe, Bush stressed instead that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (which prohibits most testing of missile defense systems) is out-of-date and far from sacred.
While key U.S. allies in Europe are more favorably inclined toward the further enlargement of NATO -- including the Baltic States -- than missile defense, Russia's position remains important because of its possible reaction. The less tension in U.S.-Russian relations, the easier it will be to reach consensus within the alliance.
From this perspective, the summit in Ljubljana was undoubtedly a good beginning. As both sides move forward, however, it is essential that they recognize that it was only a beginning and that most of the real work still lies ahead.
In Moscow, this means understanding that the Russian president's charm offensive will not be sufficient in itself to preserve the ABM Treaty or affect major U.S. decisions on missile defense. It also means understanding that NATO enlargement is indeed inevitable. Failing to take either of these points to heart could lead to considerable disillusionment.
In Washington, it is important to recognize that, unlike Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin will not make concessions in return for a hearty slap on the back and public praise. The new Russian president does not crave acceptance into the club of world leaders quite so desperately and will not give in to the United States without "deliverables" to bring home. Some recognition of Russia's legitimate security concerns will be required to win Russian acceptance of missile defense.
Similarly, while some in Moscow's foreign-policy elite may realize that membership for the Baltic States in NATO is very likely, the validation of Latvia and Estonia in particular as fully-fledged democracies will not sit well in Russia, where many believe that hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians in each country have been disenfranchised. Bush was correct to say that the key question is not whether but when; from the Russian standpoint, when and how will be decisive. U.S. diplomats should look forward to hard work on this issue.
Putting the U.S.-Russian dialogue back on track without sacrificing important American interests is a significant achievement, especially in light of America's fragile relationship with China. Turning it into something more -- and getting what the Bush administration wants from Russia -- will require a firm sense of priorities, diplomatic skill and some old-fashioned deal-making.
Dimitri K. Simes is President of The Nixon Center in Washington. Paul J. Saunders is the Center's director.
