An Ill-Conceived Summit Avoided Embarrassments
by
Paul J. Saunders
from the June 11, 2000 edition of the San Diego Union-Tribune
President Clinton's trip last weekend to Moscow -- almost surely his final visit to Russia before leaving office -- was a sadly fitting farewell to a country that has come to symbolize the failures of his administration's foreign policy. Yet precisely because it was a farewell, the visit did not do too much damage.
Any analysis of the summit must begin with the fact that the meeting was something the Russians did not particularly need. Although senior administration officials seemed to believe that Russian concern over a possible November election victory by George W. Bush would encourage Moscow to try to lock in a deal on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to constrain American efforts to build a national missile defense, they clearly overestimated current U.S. leverage. In fact, Russian officials seem to be relatively sanguine about working with Bush on the issue. Moreover, as Russian President Vladimir Putin's subsequent statements indicate, Moscow sees a clear opportunity to exploit European concerns over an American missile defense system to put pressure on the United States and undermine the unity of the NATO alliance.
Beyond arms control, Russian officials adamantly stated in advance of the summit that Moscow no longer required economic assistance from the United States, which removed from the agenda a key topic addressed at past summits. And the meeting was not even necessary to introduce the two presidents: Clinton and Putin already have met twice (when Putin was prime minister) and are scheduled to see one another three more times this year at multilateral events.
Under the circumstances, initial expectations for the summit were clearly too high and, approximately two weeks before the meetings, senior administration officials admitted that a deal with President Putin was unlikely.
Still, the summit did produce two useful but minor arms agreements; Moscow and Washington committed to the destruction of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and to the establishment of a joint early warning center in Moscow to share global missile launch data. Nevertheless, a former Russian ambassador to the United States expressed a sentiment shared by many observers when he noted that neither agreement required a presidential visit. They could have been handled at a lower level.
President Clinton's two extensive public statements outside his official meetings -- his interview with the radio station Ekho Moskvy and his speech to the Russian parliament -- reflected the lecturing tone that has dominated his administration's approach to Russian matters.
The Ekho Moskvy interview included an extensive discourse on the merits of a free press that likely turned off many listeners. Though an expression of concern over the status of Russia's media is entirely appropriate given disturbing developments there, and was likely welcomed by many, Russians do not need to hear why a free press is important. After more than 70 years of Soviet communism, they likely understand the alternatives better than the president does. This made his remarks almost offensive to some -- especially when combined with his suggestion that Russians study American history. Attempts to impose U.S.-style solutions to Russian problems have borne little fruit.
Though the president was more sensitive to Russian pride in his speech before a joint session of the Russian parliament than he was in an exhortative September 1998 address at Moscow State University, his remarks still disturbed some members, particularly communists and nationalists. The address shows that the administration has learned from its previous mistakes, but the solution adopted seems to have been to pay rhetorical obeisance to criticism without dealing with its substance in a serious fashion. Thus, the president humbly said "we Americans have to overcome the temptation to think that we have all the answers" but, just paragraphs later, listed several "institutions of a modern economy" that he hopes the Russian parliament will establish.
Clinton's insistence that he recognizes that Russian and American interests are not identical was similarly undermined by his statement that "real peace in life comes not when you give up the feelings you have that are wrong, but when you give up the feelings that you have that are right, in terms of having been wronged in the past . . . those of us who lead big countries should take that position and try to work through it." Since the president did not seem particularly prepared to "give up" any of his feelings, he seemed to expect that his audience would willingly sacrifice its own perspectives and interests to achieve "real peace in life."
Even the president's attempts at expressing sympathy for conditions in the country did not seem fully genuine. Though he admitted that Russia's citizens "do not yet have the Russia they were promised in 1991," he laid the blame squarely on them by saying, "I [believe] very strongly . . . that Russia's future fundamentally is in the hands of the Russian people." Communist Governor Vasily Starodubtsev called the speech "extremely insincere . . . because all the troubles, blood, diseases and tears [of Russia's transition] bear a relation to the leadership of America, Clinton included. Why does the man who has taken part in the ruin of our people and country behave like he has nothing to do with it?" Many Russians share Starodubtsev's resentment of American policy.
Finally, it cannot be ignored that the original objective of the summit -- agreement on the ABM Treaty and national missile defense -- appeared to be driven at least in part by domestic rather than international concerns in the United States. The fact that Clinton has yet to achieve a major arms control agreement with Moscow, a potentially important element in his historical legacy, has been widely reported in America and Russia. Russians also recognize that an agreement could defuse a political issue likely to be used against Vice President Al Gore.
Such perceptions in Moscow can be quite dangerous; many in Russia's elite dismissed NATO enlargement as a domestic American political issue and did not understand the extent to which it was seen as a vital security measure. This contributed to needless tension in the relationship that has not yet been overcome.
Fortunately for Clinton, the Kremlin also was interested in having a successful meeting to bolster the standing of Russia's newly elected president. As a result, some pro-government parliamentarians stepped forward with positive comments about Clinton's visit. And in an apparent attempt to limit criticism of the president's remarks to the Russian parliament, Vladimir Putin's representative in the State Duma complained publicly about the quality of the translation -- implying that Clinton's message and tone were confused as a result.
In the end, while lessons the administration has learned about Russian domestic politics are too little, too late, the president managed to avoid provoking significant new resentment in Russia during the trip. Given the water already under the bridge, that might have been all Clinton could have achieved.
Similarly, no deal on a national missile defense is probably better than a weak deal seen as having been reached as a result of American political considerations. Such an outcome would have provoked a divisive debate within the United States and ultimately could have led to embarrassment (or worse) internationally if it were repudiated by Clinton's successor.
Some legacy.
( Paul Saunders is Director of The Nixon Center.)
