Understanding Russia
by
Dimitri K. Simes and Paul J. Saunders
Reprinted from the May 4, 2001 edition of The Washington Times
Though
President George W. Bush's commitment to national missile defense will
doubtless provoke controversy in both the United States and Russia, his
administration's clarity on this issue may well contribute to a new beginning
in relations between Washington and Moscow.
There is no doubt that a new beginning is necessary. The international
environment has changed dramatically since 1992. Russia is no longer a
superpower and did not evolve into a Western-style democracy.
Critics who argued that the Bush administration was inviting trouble with Moscow
by failing to give the Kremlin sufficient attention in its first three months in
office have been proven wrong. Ending the pretense that a diminished Russia
deserved special treatment because of its former glory was an essential
precondition of renewed and realistic dialogue. The administration's expulsion
of 50 Russian diplomats in the wake of the Hanssen spy affair was a timely
demonstration that the United States would not be deterred from taking steps to
protect American security.
In fact, while some commentators – especially former Clinton administration
officials – decried the Bush team's "mismanagement" of ties with
Russia, reaction in Moscow suggests that the new administration's calculated
diplomatic gamble is starting to pay off. The White House succeeded in getting
Russia's attention and after provoking predictable anger in communicating new
realities with which Russian President Vladimir Putin must come to terms.
Whatever his preferences, Mr. Putin seems to be a pragmatist capable of
understanding the dynamics of the U.S.-Russian relationship.
The Bush administration is right to reach out to Moscow now that new parameters
for the relationship are beginning to take shape. Though its economy remains
troubled, Russia is not as irrelevant as is often assumed. In fact, the Russian
economy is growing while inflation remains under control. And while Russia's
official GDP remains on the level of Holland's, up to 40 percent of the economy
may be hidden as a result of deliberate underreporting. Statistics could also
change quickly if Mr. Putin succeeds in implementing the changes he has promised
in corporate governance, banking, and judicial reform. Though the seriousness of
his intent is not yet clear, simply reducing the risks of investment in Russia
could sharply increase the market capitalization of many key firms, especially
in the energy sector, by cutting the de facto penalties applied to their share
prices by investors.
Internationally, America's rocky relationship with China should remind us of
the dangerous role Russia could play in any of a number of anti-U.S. coalitions.
Fortunately, most Russian officials and politicians realize that Moscow needs
Washington more than it needs Beijing. They also recognize that potentially
China may well be a greater danger to Russia than to the United States and that
Russia cannot hope to rejoin Europe, and regain international influence, if it
is locked in conflict with America.
Nevertheless, Russia's willingness to accommodate the United States is not
bottomless. If pushed too hard, the Kremlin could turn to Beijing despite the
costs to its own long-term interests. Moscow is, after all, strapped for cash
that China can still provide in return for advanced weapons that could do harm
to U.S. interests. Even a short-lived tactical alliance between Russia and China
could have unpredictable and undesirable consequences.
If America is willing to become the "humble nation" President Bush has
described and gives up on trying to turn Russians into Jeffersonian democrats
overnight, the United States can probably deal with Russia on reasonably
favorable terms. Importantly, Russian officials appear more flexible on many key
issues in private conversations than their public statements imply. On missile
defense, for example, so long as Moscow continues to believe that deployment is
inevitable and that attempts to split the United States and Europe will not
succeed, Washington should be able to modify or even abrogate the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty without serious damage to the relationship. NATO enlargement is
probably also achievable without confrontation, especially if NATO shows
restraint in moving forces and infrastructure into the Baltic States. As one
senior American diplomat in Moscow put it to us, the United States can probably
have both missile defense and NATO enlargement without trouble from Russia, just
not at the same time.
Movement on these two issues is possible in part because the Bush
Administration's
new approach to Russia has contributed to a Russian appreciation that Moscow is
not the center of the universe and that many American decisions are driven by
other considerations. As a result, Moscow is more able to accept even what it
does not like because U.S. actions are not seen as inherently hostile.
Dispensing with sentimentality clears the air.
The problem of proliferation will be harder to solve, especially since Russia so
desperately needs the money raised by its arms and technology sales. Still, if
Washington is prepared to be tough but discriminating – by reacting severely
to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or other sensitive technologies
(especially to China and Iran), and being more flexible in our approach to
Russian sales of older weapons systems – cooperation is likely possible here
as well. Discussions will be difficult, however.
Russia cannot be a strategic partner of the United States for the foreseeable
future. Its national interests – not to mention the status of its democracy
and its economy – preclude an intimate friendship. But Russia remains an
important country and the Bush administration is correct to explore areas of
possible cooperation while firmly promoting American interests and values.
Dimitri K. Simes is president of the Nixon Center; Paul J. Saunders is its
director. They have just returned from meetings with senior Russian officials in
Moscow as participants in a Nixon Center delegation.
