Putin's Power Move Bears Close Watch
by
Dimitri K. Simes and Paul J. Saunders
from the May 26, 2000 edition of Newsday
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT Vladimir Putin's recent moves to re-establish central authority over his country's far-flung regions and republics are unobjectionable on the surface. After all, many regional leaders have essentially become feudal lords who have abused their power at the expense of both their constituents and Russia as a whole.
Some regions, such as Bashkortostan, Tatarstan and Ingushetia, have written constitutions that contradict Russia's constitution or federal laws in important respects. Similarly, leaders in many regions are elected and re-elected without even the pretense of democratic procedure.
Yegor Stroev, chairman of Russia's Federation Council and the governor of Orel, is an excellent example: He succeeded in disqualifying all serious challengers. Ultimately, he ran against a collective farm manager who said that, while she was on the ballot to ensure a legitimate election (at least two candidates are necessary), she herself would vote for Stroev.
Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that numerous governors were re-elected with more than 90 percent of the vote.
Key to the governors' power is the fact that they often control not only their regions' executive branches, but also local legislatures, judges and media outlets. This has predictably led to widespread corruption and disregard for civil liberties.
Even in Moscow-which has relatively liberal standards-Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and his obedient city legislature have systematically refused to comply with federal laws on residency for years. Although Russians today have the legal right to live anywhere in their country, Moscow continues to require special permission (often denied) and registration of those who want to reside in the city.
Under such circumstances, it is easy to understand the support across Russia's political spectrum for Putin's initiatives to make regional leaders more accountable to the Kremlin. Pro-government parties, the Communists and the liberal opposition party Yabloko all support new measures.
Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov said that the "historical traditions of Russia demonstrate the need to strengthen (central) authority." But few things are simple in Russia. Even with their obvious imperfections, the governors have been an important check on the power of Russia's super- presidency. They have provided insurance, of sorts, against strong authoritarian rule.
But if Vladimir Putin receives the new powers he seeks-which the parliament is inclined to give him-he will gain the authority to dismiss regional leaders and legislatures. This could remove a constraint on the president and may create a concentration of power unseen since the days of Josef Stalin.
Even if one assumes that Putin's intentions are benign, these powers are troubling. And that is not an easy assumption to make.
In addition to seeking the right to dismiss the governors and legislatures, Putin has already established a new Kremlin administrative structure to manage the regions by appointing seven new and stronger special representatives to oversee large districts created by multiple regions.
They replace 89 weaker officials -one sent to each region -who were often more dependent on local officials than vice versa.
Of the seven presidential representatives, five have backgrounds in the military and security services. The men appointed to the districts including Moscow and St. Petersburg, federal cities with status equivalent to regions, are both career KGB officers. The St. Petersburg representative, Lt. Gen.
Viktor Cherkesov, has been especially controversial because of his role in the suppression of dissidents in St. Petersburg (then Leningrad) in the 1980s.
Putin has argued that the driving force behind the appointment of the seven representatives was a desire to coordinate the work of federal agencies in the regions more effectively and assure local compliance with federal legislation.
But his personnel choices hardly suggest that protecting the rights and enhancing the prosperity of Russian citizens will be the principal focus of the new general-governors.
The impression that Russia is turning in an autocratic direction is reinforced by attacks on press freedom and the continuing brutal war in Chechnya.
Still, there are many blanks to fill before we will be able to pass final judgment on Vladimir Putin's intentions, let alone his ability to make them into reality.
The Kremlin has yet to propose specific procedures through which the governors and local legislative bodies would be dismissed. Once the measures are proposed, they must be approved by the parliament.
If the process is handled through two separate court decisions, as some Putin aides have suggested, and if the courts are allowed to be at least autonomous (if not independent) from the government, cutting regional leaders down to size may serve a useful purpose. Of course, it also remains to be seen to what extent the presidential representatives will rely on KGB techniques to influence local authorities.
This is not the time to condemn Putin's moves pre-emptively; rather, his actions should be watched carefully with an open mind.
When President Bill Clinton arrives in Moscow in early June, he and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright should raise the issue-not by giving in to their instincts to lecture Russians about the virtues of democracy and market economics, but by telling Putin as a point of information that Americans are increasingly concerned by developments in Russia that suggest new limits on democracy.
If these developments continue, they should explain, it may have a serious impact on Washington's attitude toward Russia and on the ability of any U.S. administration to support Russia's integration into the world economy -something Putin seems to desire strongly.
