"Mending
U.S.-Taiwan Relations after State-to-State,"
by Greg May, from the Taiwan
International Review, Vol. 5, no. 6, November-December 1999, pp. 44-47.
Since an American B-2 bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade last May, the U.S. has worked hard to rebuild its relationship with the People’s Republic of China. But comparatively little effort has been spent on repairing the U.S.-Taiwan relationship following President Lee Teng-hui’s July 9 statement that Taiwan and China should deal with one another on a "special state-to-state" basis. While Washington and Beijing have restored momentum to their bi-lateral ties with a landmark agreement on China’s entry into the World Trade Organization, the relationship between Washington and Taipei continues to drift.
President Lee’s "state-to-state" announcement illuminated serious strains between Taiwan and the United States. As a whole, the U.S. government reacted with annoyance and even anger to Lee’s statement, which, so soon after the embassy bombing, could not have come at a more sensitive time for Washington. To many American officials, Lee’s behavior seemed reckless. The Clinton Administration’s delay of a trip to Taiwan by a Pentagon delegation and media leaks about possibly scaling back deliveries of F-16 spare parts sent a clear signal that Taiwan could not go too far down the "state-to-state" road without risking its security ties to the United States. Even some of Taiwan’s traditional friends in Congress criticized Lee’s remarks as being unhelpful.
The Taiwan side, however, also had some legitimate complaints about the United States. From Taipei’s vantage point, the Clinton Administration was leaning too far towards Beijing in the cross-Strait political dispute. In June 1998, President Clinton publicly stated the "three nos"—no support for Taiwan independence, "two Chinas," or Taiwan’s participation in state-based international organizations. Taiwan also sensed that the U.S. was pressuring it to accept an interim agreement whereby Taipei would agree not to declare independence in exchange for Beijing’s pledge not to use force. Faced with these developments, President Lee apparently felt the need to reemphasized that Taiwan (aka the "Republic of China") is already an independent, sovereign state and everyone, including China and the United States, needs to deal with this reality.
Misconceptions on both sides have made these tensions worse. First, Taiwan overreacted to interim agreement proposals from United States academics and officials. Although Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth and other U.S. diplomats suggested that an interim agreement might be useful for improving cross-Strait relations, these were hardly demands for Taiwan’s surrender. Rather, such recommendations were made more in the spirit of buying time and stabilizing the status quo than making Taiwan permanently subordinate to the PRC.
Americans, meanwhile, have generally misinterpreted Lee’s "state-to-state" announcement, which was more a declaration of equality than a declaration of "independence." Taiwan realizes that it will need to enter into political talks with the PRC sooner or later and "state-to-state" can be viewed as part of the preparation process. Since Taiwan is unlikely to fare well in these talks if it accepts Beijing’s idea that it is merely a province, Taiwan naturally wants to establish itself as an equal of the PRC—just like the former East and West Germany. Although many Americans might find "state-to-state" unrealistic and question Lee’s timing and tactics, to call "state-to-state" a move towards a separate Taiwanese republic is an oversimplification.
Taiwan’s adoption of a "state-to-state" formula has highlighted an unhealthy cycle in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship where a perceived lack of American support—i.e. the "three nos" and interim agreements—heightens Taiwan’s anxieties. Fear that the United States will stand by as Taiwan becomes another Hong Kong (a "special administrative region" of questionable autonomy) makes Taiwan even more eager to assert its status as an independent, sovereign state. This, in turn, increases American annoyance and Washington’s desire to restrain Taipei’s "provocative" behavior, which fuels Taiwan’s anxieties, and so on.
The challenge for the new presidents of both the United States and Taiwan will be to try to stop this cycle. To do so, Washington and Taipei will need, to borrow a phrase popular among Chinese diplomats, "set aside differences while expanding cooperation." This involves refocusing on the areas where the U.S. and Taiwan enjoy clear mutual interests while avoiding conflict over Taiwan’s desire for recognition as a separate state and America’s insistence on maintaining a "one China" policy. Specifically, the two should concentrate on:
1) Insuring Taiwan’s continued de facto (but not necessarily de jure) independence from the PRC
Taiwan’s desire to remain free from PRC control should be obvious to all Americans. Allowing Taiwan to fall to the PRC by force or coercion could prove fatal to American leadership in East Asia. Should such a disaster occur, South Korea, Japan, and other U.S. allies would rightfully question America’s ability to maintain security.
First and foremost, the U.S. and Taiwan should place security above symbolism. It its more important for Washington and Taipei to maintain regular, though unofficial, security and defense-related exchanges than to engage in high-profile visits by political leaders, especially when such action (as with Lee Teng-hui’s 1995 trip to Cornell University) exacerbate cross-Strait tensions. Better communication is essential since neither the U.S. nor Taiwan act like reliable friends when they drop bombshells on each other (the "three noes" or "state-to-state") with little or no warning.
2) Pushing back China’s reunification time horizon
Taiwan is rising on Beijing’s agenda due to both a desire to maintain the momentum of the Hong Kong/Macao return and a fear that Taiwan is steadily drifting away. In a September meeting with Western businessmen, Chinese Premier Zhu Rong-ji warned ominously that "sooner or later" China would use force "because the Chinese people will become impatient." Such impatience is dangerous. Both the U.S. and Taiwan need to avoid giving China the impression that its window of opportunity to reunify with Taiwan is closing. For Taiwan, this means proceeding with extreme caution (or not proceeding at all) to constitutionally implement state-to-state.
3) Encouraging cross-Strait political dialogue
The U.S. can encourage constructive talks by maintaining strict political neutrality in the cross-Strait dispute. Taiwan cannot be expected to enter into negotiations when it feels the outcome is preordained. President Clinton’s "three nos" statement erred in this regard by taking a position on Taiwan’s ultimate status. The only thing the U.S. should rule out is the use of force; anything Taiwan and China can agree to peacefully is worthy of American support.
For its part, Taiwan should avoid playing the formula game. Rigid adherence to "state-to-state" is just as bad as China’s stubborn insistence on "one country, two systems" as both formulas establish preconditions the other categorically rejects, thus rendering any negotiation stillborn. By simply maintaining that the future status of Taiwan and the nature of the Taiwan-China relationship are political problems to be solved through negotiation, Taipei will keep the onus on Beijing to drop its unrealistic prerequisites.
4) Promoting positive political change in the PRC
While there is room now for Taiwan and China to expand contacts and build confidence, there is little chance of reaching a final resolution until political reforms take root on the mainland. Reunification under any model is never going to be attractive to Taiwan so long as the PRC remains a repressive one-party state. The current regime in Beijing, grappling with serious social and economic tensions and dependent on nationalism for legitimacy, is simply unable to deal with Taiwan realistically. As a result, China’s Taiwan policy is a mix of crude threats, diplomatic strangulation, and monotonous chants of "one country, two systems."
The entry of Taiwan and China into the WTO provides an opportunity to expand cross-Strait economic interaction. By lifting some restrictions on direct cross-Strait trade and transportation links (as DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian has proposed) Taiwan can help expose more mainland Chinese to the island’s economic and political achievements. The U.S. and Taiwan, through investment, trade, cultural, legal, and political exchange can help promote the emergence of a more stable, prosperous, and self-confident China that, with luck, will be less inclined to the kind of emotional nationalism that is currently hampering cross-Strait relations.
This strategy is not without risk as rising incomes in the PRC and more international interaction will not necessarily translate into greater political liberalism or a more enlightened attitude toward Taiwan. But amid all the hand wringing, in both Taiwan and the United States, about China’s growing economy and military capability, its easy to forget Taiwan’s many advantages. With a vibrant free-market economy, stable society, and democratic government, the Taiwan model is much more robust than the volatile stew of socialism, capitalism, and single-party repression on the mainland. Baring a serious meltdown in cross-Strait ties, the system on Taiwan is one that can survive indefinitely. The same cannot be said of the PRC.
For now, Taipei and Washington can afford to be patient while the changes underway in China play themselves out, hopefully to Taipei’s advantage. So long as the U.S. and Taiwan manage their differences and maintain a strong, if unofficial, relationship, time is not necessarily the enemy of peace.
(Mr. May is the Assistant Director of The Nixon Center.)
