"Proceed
With Caution," by Peter W. Rodman
from The Wall Street Journal Europe, December 28, 1999, p. 6.
This month’s European Union summit in Helsinki marked the beginning of a historic sea-change in Europe’s military and political links to the U.S. Eager to see the current trans-Atlantic relationship mature into a partnership of equals—and embarrassed by Europe’s military dependence on the U.S. in the war over Kosovo—European leaders formally established the political and administrative structures for an all-European defense organization that could field a corps of between 50,000 and 60,000 troops by 2003.
This corps would take on missions of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and crisis management in Europe, and these undertakings would be determined by the European Council. The prospective EU force should, according to past pronouncements, be able to operate either "within ... or ... outside the NATO framework" and "without prejudice to actions by NATO." To allay American anxiety about the force’s ambiguous relationship to NATO, summit leaders in Helsinki reassured the U.S. that NATO remained "the foundation of the collective defense of its members."
Despite this and other efforts to reassure the Americans, an uneasiness has been building in the U.S. that Helsinki’s soothing diplomatic rhetoric is unlikely to alleviate. The Clinton administration—seconded by overwhelming majorities in the Republican Congress—has been voicing its concerns lest the notional EU defense project, pursued in a misguided manner, cause needless duplication, discriminate against non-EU NATO allies and decouple Europe’s security from America’s.
The Clinton administration has expressed these fears in public statements by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a pointed speech by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott in London on Oct. 7, and most recently in remarks by Mr. Talbott at the NATO ministers’ meeting on Dec. 15. And while Mr. Talbott officially declared his support for a European security identity, European leaders would be well advised to take U.S. concerns with a great deal more seriousness than they’ve shown so far.
For 50 years there has been only one major security apparatus in the West; now there are about to be two. No one can explain how the new EU institution will fit into, or link up with, the Atlantic alliance. Indeed, many on the Continent are in no hurry to establish such a link. European leaders aim specifically to create an all-European chain of command that bypasses NATO. The goal of an independent defense force is to enhance Europe’s autonomy from the U.S., to make Europe a "counterweight" to the U.S. German Greens even speak of it as the first step in Europe’s "emancipation" from America.
That is why Atlanticists in the U.S.—senators like Indiana’s Richard Lugar and Delaware’s William Roth, and elder statesmen like Henry Kissinger—worry about the impact of the EU defense initiative on Atlantic cohesion. American isolationists, by contrast, couldn’t care less. Pat Buchanan would stand grinning on the dock as he waved Europe goodbye. That is one impending danger: If Europeans seem to regard the Alliance as dispensable, some politicians in America will draw the same conclusion.
Britain’s role in this process is pivotal. An EU defense force was not only a British proposal (reversing many years of British policy that had rejected such an institution as harmful to NATO), but Britain retains a key role in shaping its evolution. British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s new Continental defense policy testifies to the strong gravitational pull that Europe exerts on his Labour government. Americans appreciate the support that Mr. Blair has provided on issues such as Iraq and Kosovo. But owing to Mr. Blair’s recent commitments in Helsinki, a future British prime minister may find himself in a quite different position.
Once Britain is deeply embedded in the institutions of a common European security and defense policy, won’t a future prime minister hesitate much longer before spending political capital with his European partners on some American-inspired adventure in, say, Iraq? An increasing British reluctance to stand behind U.S. military initiatives would seem almost inevitable, and decreased military cooperation could transform and perhaps terminate the "special relationship" the two countries have cultivated for 60 years.
That would be a pity. Since joining the EU in 1973, Britain has pulled off a brilliant balancing act. It has become a key player in Europe, without sacrificing its American connection. What Britain enjoys through its special role and influence in Washington is geopolitical freedom of action. This liberty is Britain’s leverage, its unique asset. Other Europeans would dearly love to reduce Britain to their dimensions. But why should Britain agree to this?
Mr. Blair claimed in Aachen, Germany last May that he wants Britain to "resolve once and for all its ambivalence towards Europe." But this formulation gets it wrong. The last thing Mr. Blair should want to do is gradually weaken Britain’s link with the U.S. and, paradoxically, perhaps reduce Britain’s weight in Europe as a consequence. And if Britain plunges heedlessly into a common European security initiative, it tips the trans-Atlantic balance and thereby widens the gulf between Europe and the U.S.
Irrevocable decisions are now being made, with profound implications for America’s relationship with Europe as a whole and Britain in particular. So far few European leaders seem much aware of what it is they’re doing—and of how much they’re risking. America’s Atlanticists, at least, have been assertive in voicing their doubts. It’s time Europe’s Atlanticists do the same.
(Mr. Rodman is Director of National Security Programs at The Nixon Center.)
