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"Russia Has a Case in Chechnya," by Dimitri K. Simes
and Paul J. Saunders, from Newsday, December 14, 1999, p. A49.

Rarely has there been as much oversimplification and outright demagoguery (albeit for a good cause) as in the case of opposition to Russia's brutal military campaign in Chechnya.

As usual, the Clinton administration is ahead of the pack.  Remarkably, the president - who compared Boris Yeltsin to Abraham Lincoln during Russia's earlier, no less brutal (but certainly less justified) intervention in the rebellious republic - is now shocked that Moscow's "indiscriminate" artillery and air attacks have harmed innocent civilians.

If protecting innocent civilians is of paramount consideration in war, perhaps Bill Clinton should denounce Harry S. Truman for dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki - which were unquestionably civilian targets - and condemn his hero, Franklin D. Roosevelt, for the indiscriminate bombing of Germany's cities, particularly Dresden.

Similarly, Republicans, who take pride in being members of the party of Lincoln, should remember that it was President Abraham Lincoln who unleashed Gen. William T. Sherman on Georgia in a deliberate effort to terrorize its citizens and hasten the Confederacy's surrender.

Nothing can justify Russia's brutality in Chechnya. But those in the West who would lead a moralistic crusade against Moscow should apply the same standards to their own records. They also have a strategic responsibility to examine the complexity of Russia's predicament in Chechnya and the realistic options available to influence the Kremlin.

Russia has no good options in Chechnya. Though we were strongly opposed to Moscow's 1994-96 military campaign and critical of the Clinton administration's defense of Yeltsin, we believe that this time Russia had good reasons to act.

While the Russian government has been unable to prove conclusively that Chechen militants were responsible for terrorist bombings that killed 1,000 civilians in Moscow and other major cities, there is no doubt that Chechnya had become a lawless land plagued by kidnaping and murder, and that it harbored groups that launched regular armed incursions into neighboring Russian regions and eventually a large-scale invasion of Daghestan. No government could ignore similar developments.

Given that Russia was entitled to act, and that the Chechen government had no control over its warlords, what could Russia do? Storming Chechnya's cities with poorly trained, underequipped soldiers failed the last time. Instead, Moscow tried to replicate NATO's campaign against Serbia, which we now know did much more damage to Serbia's civilian infrastructure than to its military - without NATO's resources or training.

This course was perfectly predictable. In fact, we argued at the time that NATO's "humanitarian intervention" in Serbia would be interpreted as giving the green light to governments around the world, including Russia's, to deal in a similar manner with those whom they saw as terrorists and violators of human rights. Typically, the Clinton administration failed to foresee - or to accept responsibility for - the consequences of its actions.

The ugly new war in Chechnya reflects both the ruthlessness and the capacity for blatant lies of today's Russian political establishment. It is sadly significant that the Russian government's only "success" since the collapse of the Soviet Union is on the battlefield against its own citizens. Worse, this "success" gives greater legitimacy to the military and security services and leads many to see it as a political device to increase the chances that the Yeltsin inner circle, and its chosen oligarchs, will retain power in Russia's forthcoming elections.

A country that behaves in this fashion cannot be a strategic partner of the United States. The next American president must take note of this - and of the growing anti-Americanism in Russia - and take appropriate steps to protect U.S. national security interests. However, Washington should not confuse official policy with editorial commentary.

The State Department's worldwide alert to Americans traveling abroad over the holidays should be a powerful reminder that the world is a dangerous place, and that it could be much worse if an alienated Russia refuses to cooperate with Washington in efforts to curb terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is tempting to suggest that we can ostracize Russia for its behavior in Chechnya while continuing to work with Moscow to destroy nuclear warheads and safeguard Russian nuclear materials, but this would be a reckless assumption.

With all of these complexities and constraints in mind, what should the United States do? First, as difficult as it may be during an election campaign, focus on national interests rather than public
relations. Second, approach the Russian government without undue moralizing but with a firm and realistic message that continuing the war will contribute to Russia's international isolation. Third, cancel those things that do not make sense on merit, such as Export-Import Bank credits that serve primarily to support Russian oligarchs.

This would also be a good excuse to end the pretense of Russian participation in the G-8, supposedly a grouping of the world's most economically advanced democracies, and return to the G-7 format that excludes Russia.

Finally, and most important, tell Moscow that if and when Russian leaders conclude that they are unable to prevail in Chechnya at an acceptable cost, the United States would be prepared to offer a helping hand by promoting Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mediation of the conflict.

Such mediation could not be based on Chechnya remaining within Russia; rather, it would likely require a referendum, perhaps partition and international peacekeepers to protect both Chechnya's independence and Russia's right to security from terrorism. This would not be easy or cheap, but it could work and would benefit Chechnya, Russia and the U.S.-Russian relationship.

(Mr. Simes is President of The Nixon Center. Mr. Saunders is the Center's Director.)


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