Moving Toward a New Agenda With Russia
By Paul
J. Saunders
From the May 26, 2002 edition of the San Diego Union-Tribune
While President Bush may have given in to rhetorical excess in saying that the arms control treaty signed by the United States and Russia in Moscow on Friday would "liquidate the legacy of the Cold War," the statement could prove true in a sense somewhat different than that seemingly intended by the president.
In practical terms, the treaty does little more than codify nuclear force reductions long planned by each government for its own reasons. Neither Washington nor Moscow currently sees a particular reason to deploy more than the 1,700 to 2,200 warheads stipulated in the agreement, though the Bush administration did win Russian acceptance of the principle that the United States could keep additional warheads in storage as spares or for reliability tests.
What might be more significant about the treaty, however, is that slashing each country's nuclear arsenal by two-thirds – and applying existing verification procedures of the START I arms agreement – could help finally to remove arms control from its central position in the U.S.-Russian relationship. The fact that Russia has acquiesced to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty contributes to the same aim.
It is in this sense, then, that the new treaty might genuinely help to "liquidate the legacy of the Cold War" and focus the attention of American and Russian leaders on developing a new common agenda to replace the inherently adversarial and decreasingly relevant pursuit of traditional arms control.
Removing arms control from its privileged place on summit agendas, which it has dominated for four decades, could even fundamentally alter the nature of U.S.-Russian summits. In the past, progress (or lack thereof) on arms control has been the principal criterion by which summits have been judged as successful. Removing this artificial pressure to reach agreements would allow both governments to concentrate on the real purpose of summits – dialogue – rather than on public relations and spin.
In this sense, summits with Russian presidents need be no different than meetings with British, French or other leaders.
Friday's so-called "framework agreement," which is a political rather than a legal document, expresses the desire of both governments to create this kind of cooperative relationship. And, in fact, there is broad agreement on at least three core elements of the new U.S.-Russian agenda: the war on terrorism, nonproliferation, and economic cooperation. All are areas of significant mutual interest.
Russia already has provided unprecedented assistance in America's war on terrorism, particularly in sharing intelligence and in facilitating U.S. access to key facilities in Central Asia that directly support ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Moreover, destroying the Taliban was a clear common goal; remarkably, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had approached the Clinton administration as early as 1999 with proposals for joint action against the Afghan regime.
Tragically, U.S. officials, then deeply skeptical of Russian claims that Chechen rebels had ties to al-Qaeda and highly critical of Russia's self-styled "war on terrorism" in the separatist region, declined Moscow's offer. Nevertheless, Russia today sees itself as directly threatened by some of the same Islamic extremists who target America.
This shared concern over terrorism further heightens each government's interest in nonproliferation. In the wake of Sept. 11, no one need explain the potentially horrifying consequences of allowing nuclear weapons or materials to fall into the hands of those willing to murder civilians on a massive scale. Still, Washington and Moscow do have important differences on nonproliferation, primarily with regard to Iran. The two most significant issues have to do with Russia's official and internationally monitored assistance in the construction of a nuclear power station at Bushehr and Russia's apparent failure to prevent illegal transfers of nuclear and missile technology to Iran. Both matters will be important topics for continuing dialogue.
The third area of the new agenda, economic cooperation, could contribute importantly to resolving the Iran problem. Both the official and the illegal technology transfers are driven primarily by commercial motives. Creating more attractive options for Russia through expanded trade and technological cooperation with the United States would make a difference, especially in the context of a broadly improving relationship. Regrettably, much remains to be done in this area; the U.S. Congress and the Commerce Department have yet to remove Cold War-era restrictions on trade.
The common U.S.-Russian interest in energy cooperation, which many believe could reduce American dependence on oil from the Middle East while promoting U.S. investment in Russia, is another area that merits further discussion. However, despite considerable excitement in the United States, Russia is not in a position to replace U.S. imports from Saudi Arabia: its production capacity is significantly lower and its production and particularly transportation costs are higher.
Also, while Russian and Saudi production volumes are currently roughly comparable, most Russian oil is consumed domestically rather than exported. Nevertheless, Russia could play a more active role in stabilizing global energy markets.
Despite much promise, the new U.S.-Russian agenda will face important tests in the future, one of which will be highlighted when Presidents Bush and Putin meet again at an Italian air base not far from Rome on Tuesday. Then, the two leaders will come together with the heads of state or heads of government of America's NATO allies for the first meeting of the NATO-Russia Council, a new consultative body created to strengthen Russia's relationship with the alliance.
The first attempt at NATO-Russia cooperation, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, collapsed rather predictably in 1999 in the wake of NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia. The Permanent Joint Council had allowed for discussions between NATO and Russia, but only after the NATO allies had reached a joint position. As a result, though Moscow believed it had been promised a "voice" in the alliance, Russian officials found themselves across the table from officials of 19 other countries who had a common position. When NATO attacked Yugoslavia over strong Russian opposition, Moscow essentially pulled out of the body.
The new NATO-Russia Council was designed to give Russia a greater role in some alliance deliberations by using the "NATO at Twenty" formula, which involves Moscow in NATO discussions of terrorism, non-proliferation, and other issues before NATO members have reached a common position. Russia is therefore, in theory, an equal participant in the meetings.
In practice, there will be two important tests that apply to both NATO-Russian and U.S.-Russian relations. One was explained well by a senior Kremlin official who met with a Nixon Center delegation in Moscow last month: he said, "will the United States not do something because we object?" Of course, the only American answer can be, "it depends." But this Russian question, the eventual U.S. answer in deeds, and the Russian response to that answer, could define much of the meaning of the NATO-Russia Council and the U.S.-Russian relationship.
The second test will focus more strictly on Moscow. Can the Kremlin learn to participate in the NATO-Russia Council, and work with the United States, in a constructive and sophisticated way? America's NATO partners have influence in the alliance (or don't) because they are able to bring something to the table and, frankly, because they also know how to make their cases effectively in Washington and other NATO capitals, and among the American and European peoples.
Russia's ability to succeed in both respects is not guaranteed.
The promise of moving toward a new agenda and a new relationship with Russia some ten years after the end of the Cold War is an exciting one. But we have yet to see how it will be fulfilled.
Paul Saunders is Director of The Nixon Center, a nonpartisan institute in Washington specializing in foreign policy issues. He is a specialist in U.S.-Russian relations and Russian domestic politics.
