Rein
in Pakistan or Lose India
U.S. Must Focus on a Resolution of the Kashmir Dispute
By
Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev
From the May 24, 2002 edition of the Los Angeles Times
While
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell feverishly works to avoid the outbreak of a
full-scale war between India and Pakistan, the ongoing developments in Kashmir
reiterate the need for a sustained U.S. focus on the region. Powell's long-held
position--to expect these two foes to work out the issue of Kashmir
themselves--is no longer tenable.
In the aftermath of the attack in December on the Indian Parliament, intense
U.S. pressure compelled Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to arrest hundreds
of Islamic militants and promise to shut down their training camps. Believing
the problem solved, Washington diverted its attention to the crisis in the
Middle East. With American scrutiny relaxed, the militants publicly rounded up
last winter were quietly released. U.S. intelligence confirms that the training
camps believed closed have been reactivated. As the snow melts, the number of
Pakistani-supported militants crossing the border into India has increased.
The people of Kashmir have legitimate grievances. The assassination of moderate
leader Abdul Ghani Lone, however, again demonstrates that, as in Chechnya, the
aspirations of the local population for self-determination have been hijacked by
radical Muslims bent on exploiting this struggle to provide cover for their
worldwide campaign against secular rule. Militant Pakistani Muslims have
established subsidiary organizations in Kashmir that not only advance the cause
of radical Islam but have formed substantive links with Al Qaeda.
Although Washington has worked hard to sanitize Musharraf, it is important to
recall that, as army chief of staff, he cultivated the links between Pakistan's
religious militants and their brethren in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
Given the porous nature of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Washington should be concerned about fleeing Al Qaeda or Taliban fighters
finding refuge in Pakistani-controlled camps and being reborn as "Kashmiri
freedom fighters."
Musharraf has shown himself to be a consummate pragmatist. After Sept. 11, he
readily abandoned Pakistan's Taliban proteges in Kabul and aligned himself with
Washington in order to get U.S. aid and tacit legitimation of Pakistan's
possession of nuclear weapons. In what is arguably the greatest diplomatic
triumph in the annals of Pakistani history, Musharraf managed to transform
Pakistan from a "rogue" state into a key ally of the U.S. war on
terrorism.
While Washington continues to press sanctions against states--such as Iran--that
pursue weapons of mass destruction and support Palestinian terrorists, Islamabad
has largely escaped criticism because of the deft diplomatic skills of its
warrior-president.
Musharraf continues to believe that he can quietly bleed India by using the
Muslim militants who provide him with "plausible deniability" while
the U.S. is distracted by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
However, the Pakistani strongman is susceptible to U.S. pressure, and he can be
induced to abandon Pakistan's support of the militants if that pressure is
applied.
American credibility in the war on terror, as well as the emerging strategic
relationship between India and the U.S., is at stake.
India is the cornerstone for peace and stability throughout South Asia. For its
part, the Indian government of Atal Behari Vajpayee has diminished the Bharatiya
Janata Party's traditional resentment of the U.S. and openly called the two
sides "natural allies."
Unless Washington now tempers the designs of its new Pakistani ally, the nascent
strategic relationship between India and the U.S. that is so critical to
stabilization of an increasingly volatile South Asia--and which may hold the key
to a final resolution of the Kashmir dilemma--will be lost.
Ray Takeyh is a Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Nikolas
K. Gvosdev is a Senior Fellow in Strategic Studies at The Nixon Center.
