U.S., Russia Getting on One Accord
By
Dimitri K. Simes and Paul
J. Saunders
From the May 22, 2002 edition of Newsday
The
U.S.-Russian summit that begins tomorrow in Moscow represents a major
opportunity not only in U.S.-Russian relations, but also in American foreign
policy. Yet, interestingly, this opportunity lies less in the substance of the
meetings - which have been orchestrated over the course of the last several
months - than in the evolving basis of the relationship.
One of the summit's principal "deliverables" is expected to be an
arms-control treaty that slashes U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals to 1,700 to
2,200 warheads each. In reality, the treaty changes little: It essentially
codifies force-reduction decisions that each government took independently for
its own reasons while preserving each country's ability to adjust its force
structure.
In Russia's case, the Kremlin will be able (if it chooses to do so) to cut costs
by loading additional warheads onto heavy missiles. Still, because the treaty
utilizes existing verification procedures established by the START I agreement,
it promotes predictability and transparency.
However, as President George W. Bush is reported to have noted recently, few
Americans currently lose sleep over the possibility of a U.S.-Russian nuclear
exchange. Of far greater concern in the 21st century, and expected to be
discussed at the summit, is the danger of nuclear "leakage" - the
possibility that terrorists or "rogue states" could obtain nuclear
warheads, materials or technology from the massive and disintegrating Russian
nuclear-weapons complex. Improved U.S.-Russian ties are a real help in this
area. It is self-evident that collaboration on such sensitive matters would be
sharply limited if Moscow viewed the United States as an adversary.
This issue - cooperative efforts at nonproliferation - is one of the essential
elements of the new agenda for U.S.-Russian relations. U.S.-Russian cooperation
on missile defense can also be a key part of the new agenda; though Russia's
contribution is likely to be modest, offering to work together in this area
could mitigate Russian concerns about America's future deployments while
increasing Moscow's long-term stake in an emerging partnership.
Russia's new relationship with NATO could have a similar impact. While Moscow
will not wield great influence within the alliance, it will have a voice in
deliberations on important matters, including counter-terrorism. Taking into
account that a new Soviet-style threat to Europe is unlikely, Russia can be a
proud partner in what may become a central aspect of NATO operations.
Changes in the economic agenda have been even more important. Russia no longer
asks for the massive credit packages and international bailouts that dominated
economic discussions in the 1990s. Instead, the United States and Russia will
talk about what they can do for each other, including U.S. help on Russian
membership in the World Trade Organization and greater American investment and
Russia's possible contribution to reducing U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf
energy supplies.
Moving beyond strictly bilateral issues, Russia has abandoned its intransigent
position on Iraq and has supported a new U.S. "smart-sanctions" plan.
Moreover, while Russians do not support an American effort to depose Saddam
Hussein, there are signs that this issue need not do major damage to the
relationship, particularly if the United States is appropriately sensitive to
Russian interests in Iraq, including existing energy contracts. Our own recent
meetings with Russian officials, parliamentarians and opinion leaders in Moscow
suggest this as well.
Remarkably, Russia's position on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute has drawn
closer to Washington's perspective than that of many European governments. This
is in large measure a reflection of the fact that Israel has absorbed more than
1 million Russian-speaking immigrants from the former Soviet Union. These new
Israeli citizens have maintained strong personal and economic ties to Russia.
Many Russians have also come to view Israel's predicament with new sympathy as
they have come to see their own country as a victim of terrorism at the hands of
Islamic extremists.
Growing cooperation in these areas could imbue an expected agreement on a
"strategic framework" with real substance. This agreement will not
establish an alliance, but it could well build a realistic road to genuine
partnership.
There will, of course, always be limits to the U.S.-Russian relationship so long
as Russia remains, as Vladimir Putin himself has described it, a "guided
democracy." Working with Russia to advance important individual and joint
interests should not suggest either that Washington does not understand these
limits or that it expects the sudden introduction of American-style freedoms and
norms. On the contrary, the United States government should explain tactfully
that a true alliance with Moscow, or its NATO membership, will be difficult to
achieve before Russia has demonstrated a real commitment to democracy and a
fully free press.
Yet, as in dealing with other important U.S. partners, American comments on
Russia's domestic situation should be presented tactfully and without
patronizing posturing. Lecturing Russia on how to conduct its affairs will not
be welcomed even by the country's reform-oriented leaders, who believe that
Russians should make their own decisions on such matters. As, in fact, they
must.
Dimitri K. Simes is president of The Nixon Center in
Washington. Paul J. Saunders is the Center's director.
