Iran and the Axis of Evil
By
Geoffrey Kemp
From the February 10, 2002, edition of Al-Ittihad
In his State of the Union speech on January 29, President George Bush included Iran in the "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea. He did so for several reasons. First, continued U.S. anger concerning Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in their war against Israel, as well as Iranian complicity in the shipment of smuggled arms for the Palestinian Authority on the Karine-A merchant ship. Second, Iran’s continued attempts to develop nuclear weapons - - a finding supported by the intelligence services of the United Kingdom, Germany and France, as well as the U.S. and Israel. Third, disillusionment with President Khatami and his inability to challenge Iran’s hard-liners and open a direct dialogue with the U.S. government to resolve outstanding problems.
Despite the President’s harsh rhetoric towards the three designated countries, there remains much uncertainty as to the next military actions in the war against terrorism. For many in Washington Iraq remains the prime target once Afghanistan has stabilized. Yet, ironically, by including Iran in the "axis of evil" the administration may now witness greater cooperation, both directly and indirectly, between the hard-liners Tehran and the regime in Baghdad as they seek common ground against an increasingly threatening American military posture.
While Iranians still harbor bitter resentment towards Saddam Hussein, these days Tehran’s hard-liners fear America more than Iraq. And for good reasons. Consider the following strategic developments:
- The United States now has military forces deployed in Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and is reportedly using military facilities in Tajikistan.
- The United States retains a formidable military presence on the Arabian Peninsula, in the Gulf itself, in the Arabian Sea and in Turkey.
- If the U.S. military decides on operations against Iraq, the objective will be the end of the Saddam Hussein regime. This will require a continued American military presence in Iraq. The likelihood is that no matter what regime follows Saddam, it will be more pro-American than the current one.
- Iran will then be surrounded in all directions by countries hosting American military forces.
- The end of the Saddam Hussein regime could make it easier for the United States to negotiate a conclusion to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This would be an anathema for Iran’s most intransigent mullahs who regard the demonization of Israel as one of the cornerstones of their ideology.
- Iraq, under a new regime, could once more become a major focus for international investment in energy development and production and could soon over take Iran as an oil exporter. This, in turn, could lead to further reductions in oil prices at a time when Iran desperately needs foreign exchange to meet its ever growing population.
Under these circumstances any change in the status quo in Iraq would be regarded as a threat and the pressures on the hard-liners to relinquish power to the elected moderates under Khatami, or his successors, are likely to reach a crescendo.
It would therefore be logical for the hard-liners to take steps to help Saddam Hussein avoid being overthrown by American military power. How can they do this? One way would be to stir up trouble in Afghanistan. So long as there is unrest in that troubled country, the U.S. will be under pressure not to expand the war into Iraq. Another opportunity is to provide more arms and support airlifted via Iraq and Syria to the anti-Israeli forces in Lebanon and the occupied territories in the belief that the more unstable the Arab-Israeli front, the more difficult it will be for the United States to gain support in Arab world for a war against Saddam. A third possibility, which has been suggested by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, is to assist the escape of Al Qaeda personnel from Afghanistan in hope that they will live to fight another day and cause trouble for the United States in other areas, possibly even in the United States itself.
While none of these options are likely to be supported by President Khatami and his entourage, the reality is that Khatami has little say in what happens in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Until recently, rogue elements in these institutions were assassinating Khatami’s own supporters. The bifurcation of power in Iran and the failure of the elected majority to exercise any real control over the militant elements of Iranian foreign policy assure continued enmity between Washington and Tehran.
While Bush’s speech may backfire (it has already caused great concern in Europe, China and Russia), there is no doubt he made a conscious decision to put Iran on notice that it must change its foreign policy. The smiling face of Mr. Khatami and Iran’s help in the early stages of the Afghan conflict, particularly at the Bonn Conference setting up the new Kabul government, do not compensate for the dangerous activities promoted by the hard-liners.
Whether Bush will succeed with this new, assertive policy, is a matter of
intense debate. In the short run labeling Iran "an evil" state has
undoubtedly strengthened hard-liners and further weakened Khatami. However most
Iranians know that their long term national interests are not served by playing
with fire.
Geoffrey Kemp is Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon
Center. He writes a regular column for Al-Ittihad.
