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U.S. and Iran -- What Next?

By Geoffrey Kemp
From the January 27, 2002 edition of Al-Ittihad

For a few weeks following the September 11^th terrorist attack on America, it seemed that U.S.-Iranian relations were improving. On November 12^th, 2001, President Khatami in New York offered his "deepest sympathy to the American nation." Iran’s Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi shook hands with Secretary of State Colin Powell on November 13^th, also in New York. There were good reasons for such gestures. In September 1998 the Iranian regime had nearly gone to war with the Taliban and had worried about the potential "Talibanization" of a nuclear armed Pakistan.

Now, once again the United States has come to Iran’s rescue. In 1991 it ended the Iraqi threat to Iran by saving Kuwait and destroying a great deal of Saddam Hussein’s military forces. Now the U.S. has removed the Taliban threat from Iran’s eastern border. Iran will likely have better relations with the new Afghan government and be in a good position to control the dangerous drug traffic across its borders.

During the recent U.S. led military operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban Iran clearly cooperated with American military forces. Though its leaders expressed concerns about the U.S. bombing campaign, they posed few practical obstacles to the successful prosecution of the war.

What comes next? In recent weeks relations between Washington and Tehran have deteriorated. The United States remains critical of Iranian support for the military operations of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and elsewhere. The United States believes that the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards are actively supporting efforts of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and to a lesser extent, Hamas, to undermine and defeat the American sponsored peace process between Israel and its neighbors. There is continuing concern about Iran’s long term military ambitions, particularly its surface-to-surface missile program and the likelihood that it is taking steps to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

Part of the difficulty in establishing a U.S.-Iran rapprochement is the domestic situation in Iran. The struggles between reformers and conservatives are unresolved. Yet on foreign policy there seems to be more consensus. The reformers are unwilling to make better relations with the United States a cornerstone of their platform, for fear it will derail their domestic agenda. Furthermore, on matters relating to foreign affairs, Iranians, both reformers and conservatives, display a strong nationalist sentiment that puts priority on Iranian interests above all else. This has important implications for America’s presence in the Gulf and the security of the Gulf states.

The irony is that while Iran has hegemonic aspirations in the Gulf, it would be vulnerable to a resurgent Iraq if the U.S. were to withdraw its military presence from the region. If Iran were to change its hostile attitude towards the Arab-Israeli peace process, their approval rating in Washington would soar and many economic sanctions would be removed. Yet the conservative leadership persists in issuing inflammatory statements and condemning the United States and Israel at every turn. This guarantees a hardline American response.

A tough question for Iran concerns Russia. Russia has been a close strategic ally providing arms, technology, and moral support. Yet Mr. Putin’s new relationship with President Bush gives Washington considerable leverage if Russia wishes to align closer to the west. The United States would probably be prepared to see greater Russia dominance in Central Asia and the Caucasus, provided Russia alters its current policies towards Iraq and Iran, which the U.S. regards as dangerous.

Iran’s future is murkey. It could emerge as a powerful force for regional stability and reform if the moderates’ agenda is ultimately adopted and the Islamic Constitution is amended. On the other hand, if the conservatives succeed in stymieing reform, it is inevitable there will be a social explosion. The vast majority of young Iranians and the female population dearly want change. If it is not granted they will eventually take to the streets. This could happen more speedily if there is a continued downturn in oil prices and a further deterioration of the Iranian economy, which is woefully antiquated and corrupt.

For these reasons there is a debate in Washington about how useful better relations with President Khatami are given that he has little power to stop the conservatives. It is interesting to note that the son of the former Shah, Reza Pahlavi, frequently dismissed as ineffectual, has recently assumed a higher profile in Washington. He is now regarded as a moderate reformer, advocating peaceful change and a new democratic constitution that acknowledges Iran’s Islamic heritage but ends the absolute rule of the clergy.

Geoffrey Kemp is Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center.  He writes a regular column for Al-Ittihad.