What To Do About Iraq?
By
Geoffrey Kemp
From the January 13, 2002, edition of Al-Ittihad
The debate in Washington concerning future military operations against Iraq is more about timing and methods rather than the legitimacy of such action. The ease with which US air power and small numbers of ground forces have destroyed the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has encouraged some to believe a similar "cost free" operation against Iraq is possible. While others are less sanguine and worry that any war with Iraq runs the risk of serious escalation, there is a consensus that the Saddam Hussein regime cannot be rehabilitated and that it poses a growing danger to the Middle East and the United States.
The danger increases the longer Saddam Hussein has access to large amounts of hard currency, which enables him to continue to fund his security services and his weapons of mass destruction programs. Until December 13th, when terrorists tried to assassinate the Indian leadership in New Delhi, it was assumed that Iraq would soon be on the list of American targets in the war against terrorism. However the events on the Indian subcontinent have increased the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan and until this crisis is resolved and the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan destroyed, the Bush administration will be cautious concerning new military interventions, especially in the Gulf.
Iraq, however, will remain very much on the American agenda. Most Middle East governments detest of the Saddam Hussein regime. However, they worry that a new American military offensive that did not ensure the removal of the regime and the parallel emergence of a stable, unified Iraq would create more problems than it would solve. There is no guarantee that a successor from within the regime will be any less anti-American than Saddam or that he will disband Iraq’s WMD programs or abandon the wish to rebuild Iraq’s military conventional forces. Iraq has suffered great humiliation in the past 10 years; the desire for redemption and revenge is not restricted to Saddam Hussein.
It is therefore essential that a new Iraqi regime be willing to accept and implement all outstanding UN security council resolutions concerning Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, its territorial ambitions and its treatment of Kuwaits and other nationals victimized by the 1990 invasion.
Leaving aside military operations, legal efforts to deny Saddam Hussein access to hard currency and military equipment should be intensified. The existing sanctions regime is unraveling. The revised sanctions policy—so-called "smart sanctions"—proposed by the U.S. administration focuses on four key issues:
- preserving the U.N. "escrow" account and other measures directed against the regime’s financial assets;
- giving Iraqis more freedom to purchase civilian goods;
- continuing an embargo on all conventional weapons transfers to Iraq; and
- refining the list of prescribed dual-use technologies that can assist Saddam Hussein’s efforts to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction.
These are realistic goals for which there is considerable international support. Now that the U.S. and Russia have a better relationship, President Putin may be prepared to go along with the U.S. proposal to tighten the sanctions on Saddam Hussein.
"Smart" sanctions won’t work unless Jordan, Turkey, Syria, and Iran believe their interests are served by supporting the new policy. Even if new sanctions are approved, there is no guarantee that goods and services will reach the Iraqi people and not be pilfered by Saddam and his cohorts. Yet under these circumstances Saddam would be clearly accountable for the suffering of the Iraqi people, not the United Nations.
In the meantime the strategy should be to keep Baghdad guessing as to what the United States and its regional allies are going to do. Since September 11 those seeking lucrative business deals with Iraq have had second thoughts, not wanting to be seen acting against American interests or to be caught in the crossfire of military confrontation. If Turkey and Jordan reassess their favorable relations with Iraq, others including Saudi Arabia, might follow if they, too, believe the United States is serious about regime change.
Geoffrey
Kemp is Director of Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center. He
writes a regular column for Al-Ittihad.
