January 9, 2001
REALITY CHECK:
A NEW PRESIDENT AND AN OLD PROBLEM: CHINA POLICY
By David M. Lampton, Director of Chinese Studies
On the off chance that President-elect George W. Bush doesn’t have a chance to read my new book, entitled Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000, until his first long weekend at Camp David or his ranch in Texas, it might be useful to distill the lessons of U.S.-China relations since the bloodshed of 1989.
Five come to mind:
To start, Bill Clinton crippled his China policy for his first three and one-half years in office by not being credible. Vacillation in policy with respect to Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia conveyed weakness to Beijing. When the Taiwan crisis came along in 1995-1996, as one Chinese official bluntly stated to me when assessing the Clinton White House’s inner fortitude, the administration did not have the "guts" to intervene in the Taiwan Straits. This Chinese misperception was reinforced by an errant State Department official who said in October 1995 (when asked if Washington would intervene in the Taiwan Strait if force were employed by Beijing), "We would not be in a position to react with force." In part, as a result of this misapprehension, not only did Beijing subsequently fire a new salvo of missiles into the seas near Taiwan, but Washington also had to respond by dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups (16 ships) to the island’s vicinity in March 1996. The Chinese were surprised. Such miscalculation can have tragic consequences.
The first set of lessons? Choose your commitments carefully, avoid vacillation in public, and make certain that the administration speaks with one voice on issues of war and peace. You need to be prepared to fire people.
Selecting policy commitments carefully brings us to the second set of lessons: discipline your commitments and convey a clearly articulated sense of priorities. While the supply of human tragedy and the appetites of various American interest groups are infinite, America’s resources to alleviate this suffering and satiate these appetites are finite. The new administration, therefore, needs to distinguish areas and issues that are central to America’s national interest from those that are desirable, but not essential. If security interests, peace and stability in Asia, are priority one, then we can work with China. If trying to compel dramatic and rapid change in the PRC’s domestic political system is at the top of the agenda, then we cannot. And if, as in the first Clinton administration, security, trade, and human rights priorities are all treated as equally weighted objectives, with each cabinet agency riding its own hobby horse, we will achieve little of importance and find ourselves frustrated, ineffective, and working at cross purposes with China globally.
This brings us to the third set of lessons: Taiwan is the "for keeps" issue in the U.S.-China relationship. The margin for error on all three sides is slight. The biggest asset Washington, Beijing, and Taipei have in maintaining stability in the cross-Taiwan Straits relationship is the evolving dynamic economic and cultural exchange between the mainland and Taiwan. The United States should encourage the positive developments now under way, articulate to Beijing that the use of force will not be tolerated, underscore for Taipei that incendiary action will not be rewarded, reaffirm our commitment to the "one China, peaceful resolution policy," and otherwise keep our fingers out of the gears of cross-Strait relations. With cross-Strait relations improving for the moment at least (with Taiwan having partially lifted the 52-year old ban on cross-Strait travel and shipping), there is no justification for destabilizing weapons sales to Taipei this spring.
Fourth, focus on getting more cooperation among the three major powers in East Asia. Ties among America, China, and Japan will shape this century’s possibilities for war and peace in East Asia. While maintaining the fabric and vitality of the U.S.-Japan alliance and relationship, it also is essential that we develop regular diplomatic and military consultations at the highest levels among the three powers.
And finally, recognize that China’s leaders have complex domestic politics that drive their external actions just as your actions, Mr. President-elect, sometimes will have domestic origins. Where possible, calibrate your policy so that it does not unnecessarily undermine the very policymakers in China with whom it is most advantageous for America to work. From day one, try to establish a positive agenda for your meeting with President Jiang Zemin at the fall APEC meeting in Shanghai and try to establish a relationship with those who soon will succeed Mr. Jiang.
In short, we have complex ties with China, a mixture of cooperation and contention. Even the faithful observance of these guidelines will not make it a smooth relationship, but with careful attention and parallel efforts in Beijing, we can avoid falling into the dead-end of an adversarial relationship. Good luck.
David M. Lampton is Hyman professor of China Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Director of Chinese Studies at The Nixon Center in Washington, D.C. His new book, Same Bed, Different Dreams, is available from University of California Press.
