China's New Leader Steps Into the Spotlight
By Dan Ewing
Reprinted from the February 21, 2002 edition of the Korea Herald
When President Bush visits Beijing on Thursday, he will have a rare chance to meet the head of China's upcoming leadership. Over the next year, China will experience a leadership sea change: Jiang Zemin and most other senior leaders will soon retire, as the government makes only the third generational leadership transfer in over 50 years. Among these new "fourth generation" leaders, none is more important than Hu Jintao - Bush's future opposite number.
Hu Jintao, China's current vice president, is widely expected to succeed Jiang as president and general secretary of the Communist Party over the next two years. Hu has been a rising star (he was the youngest provincial leader and politburo member), but has kept a low profile until his recent tour of Russia and Europe. Despite this trip and the broad expectation that he will soon lead the world's most populous country, little is known of his political views.
Hu hails from one of China's poorest provinces. He was educated in the early 1960s at Qinghua, China's MIT, and joined Communist Party while in college. However, his promising start was derailed by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and he found himself working in China's western deserts. After a decade, Hu's personal connections enabled him to return to Beijing and advance his political career. Extremely hard working, Hu connected with several powerful patrons, including Deng Xiaoping and former Party Chairman Hu Yaobang, but he also had conservative sponsors as well - providing a diversified patronage base.
Now at age 59, Hu is preparing to step into the spotlight himself.
Just as Hu comes to power though, China will be confronting major challenges. U.S.-China relations, Taiwan policy and WTO induced economic dislocation have enormous implications for China. Hu's views on these matters have not been clearly articulated, though he made his the first tentative steps in this direction recently.
Clearly, Hu greatly values social stability and his past actions so indicate. Hu was directly involved in forcibly quelling major social unrest when he presided over a crackdown on a Tibetan uprising in 1988. Most recently, Hu has taken a leading role in silencing the Falun Gong spiritual movement.
A question mark is Hu's attitude toward the United States. Hu has never traveled to the United States and rarely meets with American officials, however, this month he did meet with a distinguished group of former U.S. officials. Moreover, he delivered China's official, and angry, response to the bombing of the Chinese embassy, though he tried to damp down excesses. That performance earned him nationalistic credentials, an important political asset in China.
Despite the nationalistic and authoritarian concerns outlined above, Hu has shown himself to be progressive on certain issues. Early on, Hu associated himself with some of China's leading reformers and he does not appear to oppose China's opening to the world economy. He is also actively trying to reform the Communist Party by cultivating younger members and reaching out to various new groups. In addition, Hu has prosecuted high-level corruption cases, including the Xiamen smuggling scandal, indicating that he may be committed to addressing that endemic problem.
Moreover, the very rise of Hu Jintao sends hopeful signals that China's political system is evolving. Although factional politics is heating up, the transition of formal political power appears to be proceeding on schedule - a marked contrast to prior shaky successions and suggestive that institutional rules count more now than in the past.
In addition, Hu does not hail from a traditional political background. Communist China's first leaders had been military commanders or had governed major provinces. Although he has provincial-level experience, Hu built his career on personnel and doctrinal expertise, and he has made his mark as a troubleshooter. His background is similar to the emerging profile of China's younger leaders - better educated, more professional, and with broader international experience.
But questions remain about the extent of Hu's actual power once he gains office. In Beijing, political power often depends on personal connections and status. Jiang Zemin seems to want to retain substantial influence after his retirement, perhaps from the perch of head of the powerful Central Military Commission. Deng Xiaoping's sole official position towards the end of his life was honorary chairman of the China Bridge Association, yet he retained decisive political control.
In Beijing, George W. Bush may have an opportunity to forge a personal connection with Hu - something Bush seems to value highly. Hu and Bush can lay the foundations for a future working relationship that could be useful to both. Moreover, a productive relationship could help stabilize U.S.-China relations in years to come and perhaps produce a pattern of cooperation similar to what we have seen develop between Bush and Vladimir Putin.
Dan Ewing is a
research fellow in Chinese studies at the Nixon Center, Washington, D.C. -
2002.02.21
