January
29, 2002
REALITY
CHECK: Hu
Jintao: Stepping into the Spotlight
by Dan Ewing
During President Bush’s summit in China next month, the most important part of the meetings will not be the agenda on the table; it will be the young leaders sitting across from him. Jiang Zemin and most of China’s other senior leaders will soon step down from their formal positions, as the Chinese government is poised to make only the third leadership transfer in over fifty years. Bush then has an opportunity to meet the men who will lead China and shape U.S.-China relations for the next decade. Among this group of upcoming leaders, none is more important than Hu Jintao – Bush’s future opposite number.
Hu Jintao, China’s current Vice President, is widely expected to succeed Jiang as President and Party Secretary over the next two years. Hu has been a rising star (he was the youngest provincial leader and politburo member), but has kept a low profile until his recent tour of Russia and Europe. Despite this trip and the broad expectation that he will soon lead the world’s most populous country, little is known of his political views.
Hu hails from Anhui, one of China’s poorest provinces, but he was educated in the early 1960s at Qinghua, one of the country’s best universities. Hu became a member of the Communist Party in 1964 and graduated with a degree in hydroelectric engineering the next year. However, his promising start was derailed by the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, and he found himself working as an engineer in Gansu’s impoverished western deserts. Hu’s knack for making political connections enabled him to return to Beijing in 1982 and launch his political career. Extremely hard working, Hu connected with several powerful patrons, including Deng Xiaoping and former Party Chairman Hu Yaobang. (Indeed, Hu Jintao was the only Politburo member to be present when Deng Xiaoping’s ashes were scattered into the Bohai Sea.)
Now at age 59, Hu is preparing to step into the spotlight himself.
Just as Hu comes to power though, China will be confronting major, perhaps even existential, challenges. The U.S.-China relationship, Taiwan’s drift toward independence, and WTO induced economic dislocation have enormous implications for China; Hu’s views on these matters have not been clearly articulated.
What is evident is that Hu holds firmly to social stability, and his past actions may open him to criticism from Western governments. Unlike Jiang, Hu was directly involved in forcibly quelling major social unrest when he presided over a crackdown on a Tibetan uprising in 1988. Following the Tiananmen massacre, Hu acted as a loyal functionary for the embattled senior leadership. Most recently, Hu has reportedly taken a leading role in silencing the Falun Gong spiritual movement.
Another potentially troubling aspect is Hu’s attitudes toward the United States. Hu has never traveled to the United States and rarely meets with American officials. Moreover, he delivered China’s official, and angry, response to the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. That performance earned him nationalistic credentials, an important asset for Chinese leaders in an ideologically vacuous era, but it may also suggest that he harbors serious concerns about America’s geopolitical intentions.
Although his formal diplomatic experience has been limited, Hu has been active over the past few years and has completed trips to Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia and Japan. Moreover, he has an influential role in policy toward Japan and North Korea. Hu also speaks Russian and has met with many Russian leaders. As a member of the powerful Central Military Commission, Hu would exercise significant influence in a Taiwan Straits crisis.
Despite the nationalistic and authoritarian concerns outlined above, Hu has shown himself to be progressive in a number of areas. Early on, Hu associated himself with some of China’s leading reformers and he appears to endorse WTO entry. He is also actively trying to reform the Communist Party by cultivating younger members and reaching out to capitalists. In addition, Hu has fought high-level corruption cases, including the Xiamen smuggling scandal, indicating that he is committed to addressing that endemic problem.
Moreover, the very rise of Hu Jintao sends hopeful signals that China’s political system is evolving. First, although factional politics is heating up, the transition of formal political power appears to be smooth – a marked contrast to the shaky periods surrounding Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin’s succession. The relative tranquility suggests that Hu is not strongly opposed by any faction.
Second, Hu does not hail from a traditional political background. Communist China’s first crop of leaders had initially been military commanders or had governed major provinces. Although he has provincial level experience in Guizhou and Tibet, Hu has built a career on personnel and doctrinal expertise. His background is similar to the emerging profile of China’s younger leaders – better educated, more professional and with broader international experience.
These facts suggest that China’s personality driven political system is institutionalizing. As a product of that process, Hu may help further these structural changes.
Hu has risen to his current position through professional skill and personal connections, but he is also appealing to the conservative Chinese elite because of his ideological expertise. As head of the Central Party School and the Communist Youth League, he advocated making officials "red and expert" – disciplined Marxists and professional administrators. His doctrinal credentials make him attractive to leftist leaders leery of rapid change and he has been instrumental in supporting Jiang’s ‘three represents’ political campaign. Hu is even helping to compile the selected works of Jiang Zemin.
Another important factor in Hu’s rise is that Jiang Zemin’s chief protégé, Zeng Qinghong, was prevented from assuming full Politburo membership in late 2000. This failure suggests that other leaders either oppose Zeng personally, or want to prevent Jiang from securing too much political power after he formally steps down.
But as Bush is preparing to meet with Hu for the first time, questions remain as to how much power Hu will actually wield once in office. Jiang will want to remain influential in Chinese politics, perhaps even aspiring to rule from behind the scenes. Political power in China often depends on personal connections and status. Deng Xiaoping’s sole official position towards the end of his life was honorary chairman of the China Bridge Association, yet he retained decisive political control during critical junctures. Hu does not appear to be firmly committed to any major faction, and that may limit his influence. On the other hand, it widens his political appeal within the leadership, potentially giving him broad support.
In Beijing, Bush will have an opportunity to forge personal relations with Hu - something Bush seems to value highly. Both men are in their late 50s and have two children. They are focused on Central Asia, but also need to manage pressing domestic problems.
One way for Bush to improve ties with China and strengthen Hu’s domestic position is by clearly expressing a willingness to work with the likely new President. For China’s leaders, the ability to improve U.S.-China relations is critical. Hu and Bush can lay the foundations for a future working relationship that will boost Hu’s position and inspire him to be proactive on bi-lateral issues. If Bush can work effectively with Hu, he has an opportunity to foster a solid personal relationship that will help stabilize U.S.-China relations in years to come.
(Dan Ewing is
Assistant Director of Chinese Studies at The Nixon Center.)
