“America,
China, and Russia: The Trilateral Relationship”
A roundtable
discussion with Dr. Christopher Marsh, March 10, 2003
The
Nixon Center, Washington, DC
The
Nixon Center recently hosted a roundtable discussion featuring Dr. Christopher
Marsh, director of Asian Studies at Baylor University, a research scholar at the
Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a former
research fellow at the Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences at Tsinghua
University (Beijing). Dr. Marsh
focused his attention on how Americans, Chinese and Russians view international
relations and the relationship between the three countries, and how such
perceptions affect policy decisions in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow. Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev, Senior Fellow in the Nixon Center’s
Strategic Studies program and executive editor of The National Interest, introduced Dr. Marsh, remarking
that while there have been a number of discussions concerning the bilateral
relationship—between the US and China, the US and Russia, and Russia and
China—the overall trilateral relationship between Moscow, Beijing and
Washington is often overlooked.
Dr.
Marsh viewed the trilateral relationship as significant, because one state (the
United States) is the current global hegemon, another (China) is a rising global
power, while the third (Russia) is a descending global power.
This causes the relationship to be in constant flux.
The perceptions these three have of each other, Marsh argues, is a
critical aspect of international politics and one that is important in
understanding the motivations for different policies and the likely course of
future relations between the three states.
Dr.
Marsh started by explaining that his research into Sino-Russo relations and
perceptions has grown out of his study of their respective transitions from
communism. Fluent in both Russian
and Mandarin Chinese, his research has been primarily based upon scholarly
journals and newspaper articles from inside both Russia and China.
He has concluded that China watched and learned from Russia’s attempts
to transform their economic and political structures in the Gorbachev and
Yeltsin periods. Drawing lessons
from Russia’s experience, China was able to avoid similar mistakes and has
promoted its domestic reforms in a slower, more stable fashion.
Dr. Marsh also mentioned that, while the Chinese regularly learn from
Russian actions—both the mistakes as well as the successes—Moscow has been
much more reluctant to draw lessons from its counterparts in Beijing.
Most
of Dr. Marsh’s discussion focused on how the Chinese perceive Russia’s role
in an international system that is dominated by the United States.
He argued that the Chinese view of Russia could not be separated from the
Soviet collapse and its subsequent path of uneven reform.
He called attention to the Chinese term heping
yanbian: while it literally translates as "peaceful evolution,"
the concept carries the connotation of using non-violent means to transform and
reshape another society, with the purpose of extending one's own influence.
In other words, in the Chinese view, the collapse of the Soviet Union was
deliberately precipitated in order to reshape Russian society along Western
lines and bring Russia and the other states of the former Soviet bloc into the
orbit of the West--a development that the Chinese lament.
The Chinese assess the Yeltsin Administration as a period when Russia
lost status, where the attempts to cooperate with the US and foster close
relations during the 1990s only further reduced Russian influence by forcing the
Russians to make concessions to the US in exchange for empty or
partially-fulfilled promises of aid and support. The Chinese leadership has paid close attention to
Russian-American relations over the past decade and concluded that a pro-US
foreign policy does not pay the dividends it might promise--that a close embrace
of Washington may not enhance one's economic position or sense of security.
This, in turn, has influenced their post 9/11 behavior--offering guarded
support for the war against terrorism but not moving to cement closer ties with
Washington.
Russian Foreign
Policy Through Chinese Eyes
Dr.
Marsh observed that many Chinese analysts divide Russian foreign policy in the
1990s into three phases. The first
phase was the first Yeltsin Administration when foreign policy was dominated by
Andrei Kozyrev and the "Euro-Atlantic" faction.
Here, the Chinese believe that Russia opened itself too quickly to the
West and was easily "fooled" into giving up too much ground in order
to obtain illusory Western aid. The
belief that Russia would be rapidly integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures
proved to be wishful thinking. Instead,
Russia's economy collapsed and the groundwork was laid for NATO expansion right
up to Russia's own borders. In
other words, the idealistic hopes that Russia would be quickly integrated into
the West were used to the detriment of Russia's own national interests.
The
Chinese believe that the second phase--when policy was being guided by Yevgeny
Primakov--was equally unrealistic. Primakov's
view of a multipolar world was amenable to the Chinese but they believed that
Russia still suffered under the illusion that it in fact remained a great power. From the Chinese perspective, the Russians should have
re-evaluated their policies in light to the overwhelming decline in Russia's
economic and military potential, and concentrated on internal efforts to
strengthen the state rather than attempt to play a role in the international
arena for which it was ill-suited.
Chinese
commentators have been much more approving of the foreign policy line
implemented by Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Ivanov, believing that
Russian policy is now guided by realpolitik.
A realistic, pragmatic policy emanating from the Kremlin is welcomed by
Beijing, although, as Marsh pointed out, Russia's assessment that a closer
strategic partnership with the United States serves Moscow's interests has led
to increased American penetration of the former Soviet space and further
compromises on Russia's part, including additional NATO expansion, the demise of
the ABM Treaty, and the stationing of US troops inside the former Soviet Union.
The Chinese are watching closely to see whether Putin's decision to align
more closely with Washington brings Russia concrete economic and strategic
dividends.
Chinese
Assessment of Russian Foreign Policy
As
with its domestic transition from communism, China is learning from Russian
foreign policy mistakes, Marsh argues. Chinese
scholars see Russia’s adoption of an extremely pro-US foreign policy as a
mistake, as it only facilitated Russia’s loss of power and influence.
Additionally, by the time Russia realized that its "pro-Western
strategy" was not going to work, it was heavily in debt, NATO had expanded,
and US troops were inside the former Soviet Union.
Given what he had to work with, however, the Chinese have thought Putin
has done a decent job of defending Russian interests, even if the Kremlin
refuses to admit that it is a descending power, Marsh argued.
During
the Cold War, China referred to Russia as its “big brother.”
Though China does not now see itself as the older sibling, it does want
to be treated on an equal playing field with Russia.
Marsh said that China does not want to see Russia become too powerful or
too weak, but, rather, “take its proper place in the international
system”--not acting as a junior partner to Washington, but as a realistic
actor able to maintain some distance from the United States.
Additionally, China wants to see a Russia that bases its foreign policy
decisions upon realism, instead of trusting the West to support Russian
interests. Marsh specifically
discussed a recent article that was published in Nanfang
Zhoumo that contended that Russia's role in the international system should
be that of a mediator in global affairs--balancing the various powers, rather
than taking on the role of a great power itself. Such a role would keep Russia in the spotlight and maintain
Russia’s role in key global issues, but such a role would also be more fitting
for a state with diminished economic and military resources.
In the final analysis, Chinese analysts have concluded that China's own interests are best served by a stronger Russia that is capable of maintaining some degree of distance from the United States. While Beijing does not wish to create some sort of "alliance" with Moscow against Washington, it would prefer that Russia (and Europe) be able to counter American influence to some degree.
This
Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center Intern Cole Bucy.
