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“Turkey at a Critical Juncture”

February 20, 2003
The Nixon Center, Washington DC

The Bush Administration has sought a deal with Turkey to allow a Northern attack option to finalize plans for a potential war with Iraq. With both sides bluffing and Turkey driving a harder bargain than expected, bilateral relations are strained. Zeyno Baran, The Nixon Center Director for International Security and Energy Programs warned that a failure to reach an agreement within a week would have long term negative implications for Turkey and its relations with the US. Former US Ambassador to Turkey during the Gulf War, Morton Abramowitz, who is currently a Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation, moderated this luncheon discussion.

New government, Conflicting Messages

Baran stated that Turkey’s leading Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been in office only since November 2002 and its inexperience led to mistakes in negotiations with the US. Moreover, she added, the party’s Islamist identity at a time when almost 96 percent of Turks are opposed to war has posed additional difficulties. In response to a question, Baran underlined that “Turks do not feel threatened by Saddam as long as he is in his box.” They are worried, however, she said, that war in Iraq would bring political and economic instability as well as increased terrorism.

She said the US also made mistakes in dealing with Turkey, such as inviting AKP leader Tayyip Erdogan to the White House in December 2002, even though he held no government position. The correct person to invite would have been Prime Minister Abdullah Gul, especially if the intention was to urge a quick answer on Iraq. Turks have also felt bullied by the Bush administration, and public ultimatums have merely led them to dig in their heels even deeper in the negotiations in order to save face domestically. 

Economic Package Key for a Yes

Baran explained having a Northern attack option would make the war cheaper, shorter and lead to fewer casualties. The US would also provide security for the Arabs, Kurds and the Turkmen as well as the oil fields of Kirkuk. Because of these realities, she reckoned, many Turks believe the US is bluffing about a viable “Plan B.” Moreover, Turks have estimated a Plan B option to cost an additional $150 billion or more. Believing in their invaluableness, they have originally asked for an economic assistance of $92 billion in grants, whereas the US was willing to give only $4 billion.

Baran said that the economic assistance package has been an essential part of the bilateral negotiations. Turks have incurred about $10 billion just as a result of the 1991 war, and they wanted at the very least this amount. In addition, given that Turkish economy has been in trouble since 1999, with the budget expected to have $3.4 billion shortage this year, they asked for additional $15 billion in loans. The US response was to increase the deal to $6 billion in grants, $2 billion of which cold be turned to US guaranteed loans for up to $20 billion. Baran expressed hope that over the next couple of days the two sides would find a compromise on the numbers, but added that at the end, if Turkey does not fully cooperate with the US, it would not get the assistance but still bear the economic burden of the war.

Turkey also wants to get a written commitment from the US administration that the Congress would not block the economic assistance package. While the administration has stated “our word is as good as a written statement,” both Baran and Abramowitz sympathized with the Turkish concern that the Congress might later on tie the assistance to other issues, such as human rights or the resolution of the Cyprus issue.

Kurds are Real Concern for Turkey

Baran then discussed the military and political issues that also need to be worked out. Turkish military wants to enter Northern Iraq and set a buffer zone for humanitarian reasons to make sure hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees do not come to Turkey. The military would also protect Turkey against possible terrorist attacks, which happened following the 1991 war. Recent articles by Kurdish opposition warned that Turkish military presence would be provocative and could even lead to military confrontation with the Kurds of Northern Iraq.

On the political side, Turks are seriously concerned about a potential revival of Kurdish separatism and terrorism inside Turkey. Therefore, Baran stated, Turks want assurances from the US that Iraqi territorial integrity and political unity would be respected and the formation of a separate Kurdish state would not be allowed. Turks also want an agreement that in addition to the Kurds and Arabs, Iraq’s third largest group, the Turkmen, will have proportional representation in the post-Saddam government. Similarly they want the Kirkuk oil fields to be shared by all of the Iraqi people and not come under one ethnic group’s control.

International Legitimacy Is Needed

According to Turkish constitution, there also has to be “international legitimacy” for foreign troop deployment in Turkey. Baran mentioned that many in Turkey insist on a second UN vote to establish this legitimacy. However, she said, NATO finally agreeing to provide Turkey with protection might be construed as the necessary international legitimacy, if the Turkish leadership so desired. Turkish Ambassador Faruk Logoglu, also present for the discussion, noted that international legitimacy is decided politically by the parliament and is not necessarily dependent on a second UN resolution though such a resolution would facilitate a favorable outcome.

Baran argued that even if all these conditions were met, Turkish parliament may still not say yes. Turks granted permission to the US to upgrade Turkish military bases and port facilities on February 6, but the troop deployment is a much harder decision. The vote was expected to be taken to the parliament on February 18, but now, Baran argued, it would not take place until at least Tuesday, February 25, which is when the parliament would meet next. [Author’s note: in fact, the proposal was submitted to the parliament on 2/25, but the vote did not take place as of 2/26] Even then it is only 50-50 that the parliament would vote yes, she argued, because the Turks would like to delay the war as long as possible. 

Abramowitz also expressed doubt that Turkey would say yes. He reminded the audience that unlike the current leadership, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal in 1991 believed Saddam Hussein was a real threat; also the US needed only bases. Baran agreed that the AKP had put itself into a political corner by not preparing the public for a possible war.

Long-Term U.S.-Turkish Alliance

Nonetheless, she explained that bilateral strategic relations with America were very important for Turkey. In a January letter to Bush, Gul pointed out that Turkey stood by the U.S. during the Korean War, as well as the more recent operations in Bosnia, Somalia and Afghanistan. Turkey’s Incirlik airbase has been home to Operation Northern Watch, in which U.S. and British aircraft patrol the Iraqi no-fly zone north of the 36^th parallel. Baran added that Turkey is also the only Muslim NATO country, Israel’s strategic ally, and a model for secular democracy in the Middle East. For all these reasons, Turks cannot conceive of US turning its back to Turkey. She noted that before the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, there were similar sentiments, but the US was quick to find another “strategic ally.” Any souring of bilateral relations would cost Turkey more as its economy would hit rock bottom and consequently the government could not last long either.

Turkey and Europe

The discussion also addressed potential implications Turkey’s EU membership if Turkey sides with the US at a time when France and Germany are opposed to the war. Baran agreed with comments that it was not clear if the US pushing for Turkey’s EU membership would help or hurt Turkey. While Greece has been supportive of Turkey, its EU presidency would end in June. Nonetheless, Baran argued, maintaining positive Greek-Turkish relations was important, especially as the Cyprus problem was also approaching a deadline.   

She was pessimistic about a solution by the UN February 28 deadline and expressed grave doubts about a deal even by April 16, 2003, which is when Cyprus would sign the EU accession treaty. With the Greek-Cypriot presidential election on February 16 bringing the anti-compromise candidate Tassos Papadopoulos to power, reaching a deal would be much harder after he takes office in March. The Greek Cypriot side has little incentive to negotiate, Baran argued, as the divided island could still join the EU in May 2004. In such a case Turkish hopes for EU accession may be seriously damaged, she noted, which then could have negative implications for Turkey’s future.

This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center International Security and Energy Programs Intern Melis Ozpinar.