“North
Korea’s Nuclear Program: U.S. Policy and Sino-American Relations”
A
Panel Discussion with the Honorable James Schlesinger, Donald Oberdorfer, and
David M. Lampton
December
3, 2002
The
Nixon Center, Washington, DC
Recently
at the Nixon Center, the Honorable James Schlesinger chaired a luncheon event
with Donald Oberdorfer and David M. Lampton. The topic of this discussion was
the current situation on the Korean peninsula in terms of U.S. Policy and
Sino-American Relations. Dr. Schlesinger has served in numerous cabinet
positions, including Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, Director of
Central Intelligence, and Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.
He is currently a senior adviser to Lehman Brothers.
Donald Oberdorfer was a journalist at The
Washington Post for 38 years. During
this time he served as White House correspondent (1968-72), Northeast Asia
correspondent (1972-75), and beginning in 1976, he worked for 17 years as the
paper’s diplomatic correspondent (1976-93.)
He has published numerous works including his most recent book entitled, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. Dr. David M. Lampton is director of China Studies at both The
Nixon Center and at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies.
James
Schlesinger
Dr.
Schlesinger began his remarks by offering an assessment of the relationship
between the United States and North Korea since the late 1980s. He feels that
North Korea has successfully sold the same deception to the West and to its
neighbors on numerous different occasions. The former Secretary of Defense
simplified the US’ current predicament, “We are in the position of Charlie
Brown, facing the question of whether or not the football will be there when he
arrives.” Dr. Schlesinger also explained that, since the late 1980s, the U.S.
has had suspicions North Korea violated the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty by
constructing two or three nuclear weapons.
By 1993, North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in
exchange for oil shipments from the U.S. and two 1000-megawatt reactors,
supplied mainly by Japan and South Korea, and with modest American
contributions. By the later years
of the Clinton administration, there were again suspicions that North Korea was
not living up to its agreements. The
most notable breach was the county’s acquisition of plutonium.
In addition, earlier this year, the North Koreans admitted to Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly that they had attempted to enrich uranium.
Dr.
Schlesinger contends that China is North Korea’s most pragmatic neighbor. He
believes the Chinese best understand the duplicity of the North Korean regime.
Other regional powers, such as Japan and South Korea, are determined to
use diplomacy to resolve the latest proliferation threat from North Korea.
Furthermore, Dr. Schlesinger asserts that the South Koreans are reluctant
to admit the extent of the current crisis.
In
Dr. Schlesinger’s view, the United States has a “massive problem.” Due to
both Iraq’s and North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction the
U.S. is facing duel crises. Dr. Schlesinger believes it is unlikely that the
North Koreans will back down. Therefore, he sees two strategies the U.S. can use
when dealing with Pyongyang: Either the Bush administration can refuse to
negotiate claiming the rogue nation has failed to live up to previous
commitments. Dr. Schlesinger
contends that this solution probably will result in military conflict; or the
U.S. can negotiate once again. This
strategy would mean a reversal of previous Bush administration policy and
provide the Dear Leader Kim Jong il the recognition he craves.
David
M. Lampton
Dr.
Lampton began by conveying what he learned about Chinese views on North Korea
while on a recent trip to China. He
described the views of several highly placed Chinese foreign policy makers that
he met with in Beijing, and provided four comments on the Chinese position.
First, Dr. Lampton claims that the Chinese are not completely focused on the issue of North Korea and its implications for U.S. policy. Domestic concerns are paramount to Beijing right now, foreign policy is not Beijing’s priority and, due to the recent leadership transition, the Chinese foreign policy apparatus is still in a state of flux.
Second, the Chinese were not fully aware that the problem is “double barreled.” Not only has the uranium enrichment program jeopardized the 1994 agreements, but the opening of the fuel rod containers could also elicit a very tough response from the U.S.
Third,
according to Dr. Lampton there is a wide range of views on North Korea,
horizontally within different Chinese bureaucracies, and vertically among
leaders at different levels. Taken
together the stance of lower level cadre within the Ministry of National Defense
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as individual senior policy makers
exhibit varying degrees of interest, anxiety, and understanding about the
problem.
Finally,
Dr. Lampton explained that he perceived that among the Chinese leadership there
was an overwhelming sense that the U.S. was getting too excited about the
situation. In general, the Chinese
feel that they know the North Koreans better than we do. Chinese officials
believe Pyongyang is probably exaggerating its capabilities. Furthermore, even
if the North Korean’s actually have the capability they claim the vast
distance between the U.S. and North Korea means that the DPRK is not a direct
threat to the U.S. Additionally,
the Chinese fear that they will bear the brunt of the burden if North Korea
breaks down under U.S. pressure. As
a result, the Chinese want to bring the crisis to a diplomatic solution. They also suggest the U.S. could help to encourage economic
reform in North Korea that would help the nation meet its people’s basic
needs.
Based on the above observations, Dr. Lampton argued that the Chinese would be relatively tough on the North Koreans because they see now as the best time since 1989 for the development of bilateral common interest with the U.S. In the Chinese view, contrary to the Bush administration’s original position, the current U.S. national security doctrine encourages the U.S. and China to cooperate against the forces of disorder. The Chinese want to preserve this policy change. They fear that if the problem is exacerbated it will lead to a nuclear arms race in East Asia.
Additionally, Dr. Lampton suggested that the Chinese could be helpful in other areas with North Korea such as economic reform. He also pointed out that the Jiang-Putin joint statement on North Korea was a good first step in showing the North Koreans that their nuclear proliferation does not have the support of their traditional allies. Dr. Lampton expects that the Chinese will cooperate if we cut support to the North Koreans by simply keeping their own aid at current levels and not attempting to make up for missing U.S. donations. He also suggested that it might be feasible to ask the Chinese to explain to the North Koreans that they will lose Chinese support if they open the plutonium fuel rods. He also observed that it might be wise to give the Chinese some intelligence on this topic to be sure that all the facts are known.
Donald
Oberdorfer
Dr. Oberdorfer began by commenting on North Korea’s relationship with China. Since the peninsula’s division, China has been North Korea’s staunchest ally. This historically close relationship shows the Chinese familiarity of the country’s historical development and current position. For example, the Chinese helped to diffuse the hostility of the 1994 nuclear tensions by attaining, what at the time appeared to be, Pyongyang’s to acquiesce. Oberdorfer contends that North Korea knows China is its most important neighbor, but also alluded to increase tension between the two countries.
Dr. Oberdorfer then commented on his trip to North Korea last November. He argued, contrary to Dr. Schlesinger’s position, that the North Koreans did not begin their nuclear programs just to create bargaining chips and that they will not back down. In fact, during Oberdorfer’s trip this fall he saw many signs of North Korea’s intractability on this subject. For instance, the topic of U.S. compensation for acquiescing was not raised during the trip nor has it been raised in any official statements. Rather their long-term objective has been to acquire a nuclear bomb, which they have wanted since at least 1964.
Nevertheless, there was a statement put out this fall that the North Koreans would seek a negotiated settlement of the issue on three conditions. First, the United States would recognize North Korean sovereignty. Second, the U.S. would sign a non-aggression pact. Third, the U.S. does not hinder North Korean economic development. Dr. Oberdorfer observed during his trip that the most important of the three conditions to the North Koreans was the non-aggression pact. However, to the U.S. these sorts of treaties do not have a good reputation. Americans often point to the failed non-aggression pact between Hitler and Stalin as proof of the fragility of such an agreement. Nevertheless, Dr. Oberdorfer surmised that North Korean leaders would settle for much less than that because they have realized that they have no choice but to get rid of their enriched uranium program. However, Dr. Oberdorfer stressed that both sides must come to an agreement in such a way as to save as much face as possible. Dr. Oberdorfer bases these conclusions on the fact that for the last two to three years North Korea has made efforts to improve its relations with all of its neighbors as well as the European Community. Most notable is the lessening of tension across the peninsula and the Japanese Prime Minister’s recent trip to North Korea.
In summary, Dr. Oberdorfer believes that, although it was not the DPRK’s intention to trade away their nuclear weapons program for concessions, the North Koreans would be willing to eliminate the program if given an opportunity to save face. He argued, on the basis of his discussions with the North Koreans and his own research, that this question need not be the cause of a military conflict between the United States and the DPRK.
This
Program Brief
was prepared by Nixon Center staff member Kelani C. Chan.
