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As a two-year $1.6 billion aid package to Colombia will soon be debated in Congress, U.S. participation in the war against drugs there has been questioned. What type of aid should we give? How can the U.S. involve itself in Colombia’s drug war without getting involved in the volatile civil war between the left wing guerrilla groups and the Colombian military? Is this the beginning of the "Vietnamization" of Colombia?

At a recent luncheon seminar organized jointly by the Nixon Center and the Institute for the Study of the Americas, Amb. Myles Frechette, former U.S. ambassador to Colombia, and Dr. Daniel García Pena, former Colombian peace negotiator, discussed the implications of the proposed U.S. policy in Colombia. Dr. Norman A. Bailey, chairman of the Institute for the Study of the Americas, moderated the discussion.

The Psychological Weight of the United States

When the United States first pledged military aid to the Colombian military for drug-related reconnaissance missions, Mr. García Pena noted that there were rumors of a "U.S. invasion" of Colombia in the country’s newspapers. The rumors were intensified when the United States decided to send 30 Blackhawk helicopters to aid in locating coca crops in the rainforest. Colombian officials and scholars began to question U.S. intentions; U.S. aid to Colombia was once purely developmental, yet the new proposed aid package allocates 80-85% of U.S. funds to military purposes. In addition, the United States did not consult the Colombian government this time on what the aid should be directed to and how much should be given. This sparked resentment in Colombia, Mr. García Pena argued, as Colombians began to view the U.S. as making important policy decisions they should be making themselves. He also stressed that the heavy provision of aid to the Colombian military, rather than to the police, could have a destabilizing effect on the delicate balance necessary to keep these two historically competitive institutions from overpowering one another.

An example of the heavy psychological weight the United States carried in Colombia, García Pena recalled a U.S. State Department human rights report that cited two individuals by name. That had a greater (positive) impact on the Colombian civil war than would the possible militarization of U.S.-Colombian relations, he said. Bailey added that the Blackhawk helicopters also held a great deal of symbolic significance as a token of U.S. commitment to Colombia.

Will the U.S. Brush with the Guerrillas?

For over a decade, U.S. policy towards Colombia had been centered on curbing coca production. An extraordinary 75% of cocaine smuggled into the United States is of Colombian origin. Frechette added that the current economic recession, the high numbers of displaced people, and the guerrillas’ encouragement of coca production in poverty-stricken regions had tied the narcotrafficking issue into the civil war. Although the United States had labeled the two largest guerrilla organizations (the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)) as terrorist organizations, it had stated that it would not take a position on guerrilla demands or involve itself in the civil war to any extent unless the guerrillas interfered with anti-drug missions, Frechette noted.

Yet increased U.S. military support and equipment to Colombia had raised fears in the U.S. that involvement in Colombia would pull the U.S. into another "Vietnam situation." Frechette stated that most of the U.S. military involvement so far had been in training a Colombian unit in halting drug trade and production. He added that this had been a very successful operation and a necessary one considering there was a 20% increase in coca plantings in 1999. Another reservation about U.S. military support came from U.S. allies in Europe, who feared that if the U.S. paid for solely military aid they would be pressured to finance the economic and developmental programs that are needed. He also noted the regional ramifications an aggressive U.S. policy in the region. Guerrilla forces could trickle into neighboring countries, a threat that may necessitate further attention sooner rather than later.

Peace Process Dilemmas

Both Frechette and García Pena agreed that the peace process between the Colombian government and the guerrilla factions should command more attention in U.S. policy. They recounted that recently ELN officials visited various European countries to examine different forms of governance – a sign of their confidence in victory over the Colombian army. Frechette argued that the Colombian government had made many concessions to the guerrillas – FARC controlled 40% of the Colombian countryside – but there had been little reciprocation on the part of the guerrillas. He cited the gripes that skeptics of the process had; the two most prominent being that the guerrillas were so strong they have little incentive to negotiate seriously and that they didn’t quite know what they wanted from peace negotiations. He also mentioned U.S. policymakers’ frustration with the Colombian government’s seemingly conciliatory stance toward the guerrillas. He recalled that the U.S. provided large amounts of developmental aid in the past, and considering the result was growing guerrilla strength and coca production, more military aid seemed the only option left.

García Pena viewed the peace process as another issue that, if tackled properly by the United States, would have more of an impact on the drug trade than U.S. military aid. He stressed that it was the decision of the Colombian populace to negotiate with the guerrillas and that the talks were an expression of the social ills that both the guerrillas and Colombian President Pastrana felt need to be dealt with. In a country that lacks the rule of law and complete democracy, and is plagued with corrupt judicial and law enforcement institutions, the drug issue is the symptom of a larger problem. In this sense, he argued, U.S. aid for anti-drug operations was a "band-aid" solution that left the factors that encouraged cocaine production in place. In response to a question on what type of aid he felt Colombia needed most, García Pena underlined the argument that aid towards social and economic programs would weaken guerrilla support. The fact that the U.S. did not participate in these negotiations gave many people the impression that a peace was not negotiable nor viable, García Pena believed. A demonstration of American support for the peace process would also be a cheaper and more fruitful policy to curb coca production.

Suggestions for Both Sides

Both Frechette and García Pena concluded that American policy should pay more attention to the peace process and dedicate more aid to bolstering law enforcement, judicial, and economic institutions. They viewed the guerrillas as becoming more moderate and reconsidering their stances, and predicted that this evolution would lead them to work with the government.

Note: On March 9, 2000, the House Appropriations Committee approved a $1.7 billion aid package that will go toward anti-drug initiatives in Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru.

This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center staff member Meghan Bradley.