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The Nixon Center, Washington, DC
October 19, 2000

At a recent Nixon Center seminar, two experts raised questions about the regional implications in East Asia of National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems. Though China still lags far behind the United States in terms of strategic weaponry, the speakers, Dr. Ronald Montaperto of the National Defense University and Dr. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, argued that NMD and TMD could provoke a destabilizing arms race in East Asia. Dr. David M. Lampton, Director of Chinese Studies at The Nixon Center, moderated the discussion.

CURRENT SITUATION

The U.S. is not alone it its desire to have a TMD system in East Asia; Japan has consistently supported the development of a TMD system, for protection from North Korean missiles. While that danger may be easing, many Japanese are also fearful of China because of historical animosities and China’s development of new ICBMs and other advanced systems. Montaperto commented that for their part, many Chinese are more concerned about the deployment of TMD in the Asia-Pacific region out of concern that including Taiwan in U.S. defenses would lend more credibility to the island’s status as a separate state. Contrary to O’Hanlon, Montaperto believes that TMD is a fait accompli and should be pursued, even at the risk of provoking China.

China is currently pursuing a nuclear policy of "minimum deterrence," based on guaranteeing the survival of a sufficient nuclear capability to retaliate after a first strike. However, O’Hanlon believes that this approach has been increasingly in question since the early 1980s, when China realized how vulnerable it was to U.S. and Soviet missile attacks.

Montaperto argued that some analysts in China continue to advocate minimum deterrence level, but he acknowledged that it is unclear whether they can continue to prevail. One participant suggested that China is moving toward a new and different strategic arsenal, composed of an all-mobile, solid-fuel force. Such a force would be capable of a second strike against the U.S., a first for China.

However, China’s nuclear modernization could include introducing a policy of "limited deterrence," a more ambitious doctrine that includes the possibility of a preemptive first strike. In the past, China’s military modernization has been a "one-for-one" modernization or the simple replacement of old hardware by new hardware, Montaperto explained; limited deterrence requires a larger arsenal. Alternatively, O’Hanlon said, if China wants to maintain its policy of minimum deterrence, it could do so with only a slight increase in the size of its missile force. In the event that China opts for a doctrine of limited deterrence, including a mix of conventional and nuclear warheads, then such a shift would alter China’s regional role significantly, O’Hanlon said.

CHINA’S REACTION

Montaperto explained that while China’s eventual decisions on doctrine and modernization will depend on many factors, including regional pressures from India and Russia, the bulk of China’s stance will be based on U.S. policy toward China, including the next president’s decisions on missile defense. China’s reaction will depend not only on what the U.S. builds, but also how it justifies both NMD and TMD development. This is true for both legal and political reasons. Legally, he argued, NMD development violates the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that the U.S. signed with the Soviet Union. Politically, Montaperto and O’Hanlon suggested that reduced tension on the Korean Peninsula would force the U.S. and Japan to redefine the purpose of TMD systems in that area.

One major problem with NMD is that China could feasibly bypass the system within ten to fifteen years using decoys or other new technology, O’Hanlon said. Though some have argued that the U.S. could use infrared detectors to discriminate between decoys and real missiles, O’Hanlon countered that a simple heater installed in the decoys could make them indistinguishable. In addition, he suggested, if the U.S. decides to deploy a robust NMD system in the future, China could proliferate decoy technology to other countries, such as North Korea.

Montaperto said that many in China suggest that development of NMD and TMD will shift the balance of power in international politics by eliminating all constraints on the U.S. if Washington feels safe from nuclear retaliation. Thus China fears losing some leverage if the U.S. is no longer deterred from intervening in regional conflicts.

U.S. POLICY

Ultimately, O’Hanlon concluded that the U.S. should not deploy a NMD system because it would involve taking significant risks – such as increased tensions with China, increased risks of proliferation, and decreased cooperation from China in areas where China’s participation is needed, such as relations on the Korean peninsula, proliferation, and monetary stability throughout Asia – with no guarantee of positive results.

To resolve this problem, O’Hanlon advocates more research and development effort for "boost phase" NMD, which involves the destruction of missiles shortly after launch rather than during flight. This idea is more palatable to many in China because they believe that the U.S. would not pre-emptively fire a missile directly into the heart of China, and would be especially hesitant to defend Taiwan in such a manner. Although the technology does not currently exist, Montaperto argues that the U.S. can afford to delay implementation of current systems in favor of "boost phase" technology because "boost phase" systems would bring greater results at a lower cost to U.S. relations with China.

Fortunately, Montaperto explained, there is an upside to Chinese military modernization. As Beijing develops a greater capacity to defend itself, he said, its response to both internal and external events will be more tempered. In the past, China has had a "hair-trigger" response to perceived or real threats, according to Montaperto, in part because of its weak military. An increase in China’s capacity to defend itself should encourage a more stable response to global events.

While China is in the process of military modernization, it is in the best interest of the U.S. to maintain open and productive diplomatic ties, O’Hanlon concluded. The task of dealing with both a modernizing China and the question of missile defense will be one of the major challenges facing the new U.S. administration.

This program brief was prepared by Nixon Center staff member Beth Hetzler.