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In the past decade, the world has witnessed the growth of new, more dangerous and unrestrained forms of terrorism that require a reevaluation of American counterterrorist strategies. This was a key conclusion in remarks by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer on "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism." Ambassador Bremer is Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorism, a non-partisan commission established by Congress two years ago in the wake of the attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam to conduct a six month study of U.S. policies to combat international terrorism. Geoffrey Kemp, Director of the Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon Center moderated the program.

The face of terrorism has changed immensely over the last decade. In the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s state-sponsored terrorism was the norm, and terrorist organizations exercised a certain level of self-censorship. Because they generally sought to raise awareness and attract attention to their causes without losing public sympathy, many terrorists limited themselves by making sure that casualties were limited. However, overt state support for terrorism has declined in the 1990s and terrorists’ motives and actions have evolved. Today, rather than simply attracting attention to their causes, many groups aim to cause massive casualties for purposes of revenge or ideological hatred of America. This shift is reflected in the drop in claims of responsibility for acts of terrorism in the 1990s and changes in the frequency and magnitude of international terrorist attacks. While the number of international terrorist incidents has decreased, the number of casualties in each incident has increased. If terrorist groups no longer deliberately limit casualties (or actually seek to increase them) they might turn to catastrophic mass attacks, possibly affecting tens of thousands of people.

Bremer discussed three areas the Committee considered and made recommendations towards: the intelligence communities, stopping support for international terrorism, and preparing to deal with mass catastrophic terrorism.

Intelligence is the best weapon for countering terrorism, but getting good intelligence on terrorism is challenging because it necessitates direct communication with the terrorists. The conclusions reached regarding acquiring intelligence information were twofold, addressing both the CIA and FBI guidelines. Since 1995, CIA guidelines have discouraged hiring terrorist spies. This limits the information we can gather on terrorists and their agendas. The committee suggests that these guidelines be lifted, and that the CIA actively recruit clandestine informants. Concerning FBI guidelines, they are problematic because although adequate, they are poorly written. The committee recommends that the attorney general clarify these guidelines.

Another important issue concerning intelligence is how information gathered should be shared within the executive branch, particularly between the law and intelligence communities. The committee concluded that the CIA does a good job in getting intelligence to people who need it, while the FBI does a less adequate job. The CIA has solved the problem of properly distributing intelligence by establishing a cadre of trained officers, called "report officers" to look at intelligence and see what information needs to be given to others, and the best way to transfer the intelligence to them. However, because the FBI is focused on prosecution of criminals and making a case and are not trained for distributing intelligence appropriately, valuable information can be easily lost while FBI officers are conducting an investigation. The committee recommends that the FBI establish a system modeled on the CIA system of "reports officers" for distributing intelligence information.

The Committee also expressed concern over intelligence budgets. In the case of the CIA, the budgetary process needs to be smoothed out and the commission suggested more steady appropriations from Congress to do this. For the FBI, it was suggested that more advanced technology be funded to help analyze information. Finally, it was recommended that the National Security Agency become more involved, receive an increased budget, and try to stabilize its management which has recently encountered severe problems.

Moving on to questions of stopping support for terrorism, Bremer addressed the situation with Iran, where overt state support remains and has actually increased since the election of Khatami. The fact is that Iran remains the leading state supporter of terrorism. The Commission therefore recommended that despite the interesting political dynamics there, the U.S. make no further concessions until Iran stop supporting terrorism and cooperates in the Khobar Towers bombing investigation.

Concerning non-state support for terrorism, the committee maintains a view that until recently the U.S. government has had too narrow an approach towards terrorist funding, which comes from a vast variety of sources including NGOs, and private financiers. The Committee suggests a broader approach to finding where the terrorists are getting their funds, which would involve customs officials as well as the INS.

The final issue dealt with by the Commission was preparing to deal mass catastrophic terrorism. Changing motives of terrorists might lead them to resort to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Biological terrorism has the largest potential for killing, and the committee has made several recommendations concerning this threat. First, it has suggested that biological agents be as tightly controlled – both their sale and transport – as nuclear agents. This would include fortifying porous borders, through which millions pass unregistered everyday, and developing technology which could monitor and detect potentially harmful materials. Second, it has been recommended that legislation be passed to control the high tech equipment needed to make biological agents effective as weapons. While there is already legislation to control the export of this equipment, there is none that deals with the sale in the U.S. domestically, and the domestic concern must be addressed.

In the event of a mass catastrophic attack, it will be important for the President to have the military capability to respond to the attack. The government must therefore plan ahead and take a closer look at research and development and counter terrorism. It is also important that all governmental agencies coordinate their efforts in the fight against terrorism. The committee recommends the establishment of a long-range program that could look into the future five to seven years, in order improve combating terrorism. If a response to an attack has already been thought through in terms of what the appropriate law of military would be after an attack, people's civil liberties would be less threatened.

There are many dimensions incorporated in these recommendations, all of which will require financing, time, hard work, and many significant organizational and institutional changes. However, if followed there will conceivably be fewer American victims of international terrorism. The consequences that could result from a failure to take these precautions are worth the tremendous undertaking.

This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center Intern Jennifer Rosenblum.