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At a recent Nixon Center briefing, former CIA Director R. James Woolsey accused the Clinton Administration of conducting a policy of appeasement toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and strongly endorsed the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, a bill meant to reinforce U.S. security commitments to Taiwan. However, two other speakers at the event—Brookings Institution Visiting Fellow Robert Suettinger, who served as Director of Asian Affairs on the National Security Council from 1994 to 1997, and Nixon Center Director of Chinese Studies David M. Lampton—disagreed, saying that by needlessly provoking Beijing, the bill would actually make Taiwan less secure.

The Gilman Amendment

Introduced this spring in both the Senate (S. 693) and the House (H.R. 1838), the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA) is the first major piece of legislation on Taiwan policy since the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. In its original form, the bill would authorize the sale of several specific military items to Taiwan, including conventional submarines, theater missile defense equipment, and destroyers equipped with AEGIS (a weapons system, including advanced radar and surface-to-air missiles, capable of defeating anti-ship cruise missiles).

Responding to criticism of the original bill, House International Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) offered a compromise text that eliminates all references to specific weapons systems, but still requires the U.S. to reserve additional places at U.S. military schools for Taiwan officers, to enhance training and exchange programs with the Taiwan military, and to establish direct, secure communications between the U.S. and Taiwan military commands. Representative Gilman’s version was endorsed by the International Relations Committee in a 32-6 vote on October 26. While the full House will likely pass the bill, the TSEA’s future in the Senate is much less certain.

Woolsey: Ambiguity is Dangerous

Mr. Woolsey said that while the Clinton Administration has been overly tough with the PRC on the issue of World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, the Administration has been too eager to accommodate the PRC on Taiwan. He criticized President Clinton for issuing, in June 1998, a "three no’s" statement —no support for Taiwan independence, "two Chinas", or Taiwan’s participation in state-based international organizations — without simultaneously emphasizing that any use of force against Taiwan would be unacceptable. The president, Mr. Woolsey explained, also erred by speaking favorably of the PRC takeover of Hong Kong as a model for Taiwan despite worrying signs that Hong Kong’s freedoms are eroding. Furthermore, he said, the Administration has "severely restricted arms sales, even of clearly defensive systems, to Taiwan."

Given the above, the TSEA is necessary to stop this tilt toward the PRC and to clarify U.S. commitments to Taiwan’s defense, Mr. Woolsey argued. According to Mr. Woolsey, the Administration’s policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding Taiwan creates the risk of miscalculation. "I believe that clear, not ambiguous, American support for Taiwan’s right to be protected from the use of force by Beijing is an essential part of maintaining peace in the Taiwan Straits. The Administration has turned instead to appeasement and ambiguity," Mr. Woolsey said.

Mr. Woolsey did add, however, that Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s July statement that Taiwan and China should deal with one another on a "special state-to-state" basis was not helpful. Although he acknowledged the "one China" principle is "fictitious and stale," Woolsey said it is nevertheless diplomatically necessary and President Lee’s actions have only given the PRC an excuse to continue its saber rattling.

TSEA May Reduce Taiwan’s Security

Robert Suettinger disagreed that the Clinton Administration was engaged in appeasement or that U.S. policy was overly ambiguous. "You may characterize the Administration’s perspective as appeasement but, in fact, if you look at the record, the support for Taiwan has been significant, it has been consistent, and it has been there when it was needed, including in the 1996 dispatch of two aircraft carriers to the region in response to PRC aggressiveness," Mr. Suettinger said, noting that the U.S. has made it clear that it would react if the PRC attacked Taiwan without provocation.

Despite the TSEA’s goals, Mr. Suettinger argued, the bill will likely reduce Taiwan’s security should it become law. The PRC, he said, will respond to the TSEA by "upping the ante" in terms of its military buildup. According to Mr. Suettinger, the TSEA is part of a larger partisan battle between Congress and the Administration. "I feel it is quite unfortunate that Taiwan has chosen to sort of fan those flames to set the Administration against Congress as to what is right and what is wrong on questions pertaining to Taiwan."

Regarding the establishment of secure communications between the American and Taiwanese militaries (a key provision of both the original TSEA and the Gilman version), Mr. Suettinger said he believed that such communication links could be established very quickly should circumstances warrant such action. Thus, he said, legislation to mandate such links is unnecessary.

David M. Lampton also contended that the U.S. has not abandoned Taiwan to mainland China. U.S. weapons sales, he noted, have increased in quantitative and qualitative terms in the 1990s, despite the 1982 U.S.-China communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan. According to figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, he explained, Taiwan is the world’s largest buyer of weapons with $13.3 billion in purchases between 1994 and 1998, much of that from the United States. Mr. Lampton also noted that Taiwan’s security cannot be won through military means alone, especially given the PRC’s size and proximity to Taiwan. Similarly, he said, the U.S. cannot concentrate solely on deterring Beijing. "Obviously, we have to deter the PRC, I think that is a given in our debate," Mr. Lampton commented, "but how do we encourage Taiwan to be prudent not only out of consideration of our interests but out of our understanding of their interests as well?"

Militarization of the Taiwan Strait and Missile Defense

Several audience members expressed concern about the "remilitarization" of the Taiwan issue. In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. policy focused on creating a political atmosphere conducive to maintaining peace across the Strait. The TSEA, several participants said, was an example of U.S. political leaders paying too much attention to the military balance across the Taiwan Strait at the risk of neglecting the delicate political issues involved.

Mr. Woolsey placed the blame for "remilitarizing" the Taiwan issue on the PRC, specifically on Beijing’s buildup of ballistic missiles across from Taiwan. Given the large role ballistic missiles play in mainland China’s strategy, not just toward Taiwan, but the region at large, it is imperative that the U.S. counter this threat with missile defense, Mr. Woolsey argued. Since the U.S. does not have any treaty with the PRC (such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia), he said, the U.S. does not "owe" China anything on missile defense. "China has no right to insist that its missiles have free play across the Pacific anymore than the empire of Japan in the 1930s had the right to insist that its navy have free play in the Pacific," he said.

Robert Suettinger fundamentally agreed with Mr. Woolsey on this point, but added that any missile defense system should be developed by and for the United States. "It should be our decision as to what stage and what pace that system is developed and it should be the U.S. decision as to where it should be deployed," he said, "such decisions should not be made in Tokyo, Taipei, or Korea."

China Must Make Better Offer to Taiwan

The panelists all agreed that the PRC must deal more effectively with Taiwan rather than simply make repeated threats. Mr. Woolsey noted that the PRC’s missile firings close to Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 increased independence sentiment on the island and that partly as a result of the crisis, most on Taiwan now choose to identify themselves as "Taiwanese" rather than "Chinese." The PRC’s attempts to intimidate Taiwan and its suppression of human rights and democracy at home, Mr. Woolsey argued, are the main factors in Taiwan’s resistance to reunification. Mr. Suettinger agreed, adding that "what is really needed is not more weapons, but more efforts to try to bridge the gap [between the PRC and Taiwan]. Both sides need to put aside their rhetorical posturing and think about ways to actually solve problems."

(This Program Brief was prepared by Nixon Center Assistant Director Greg May.)