“The U.S.-Russian Relationship After Iraq”
June 5, 2003
The Nixon Center
Washington, DC
Dmitry Rogozin, Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs, expressed considerable optimism regarding the development of the U.S.-Russian relationship after the war in Iraq during a recent Nixon Center dinner discussion. Nevertheless, he argued, Russian and American approaches are not identical and if our two countries are to be genuine partners, we must have a candid dialogue. In that context, Mr. Rogozin criticized American planning for the aftermaths of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and his Communist colleague Alexander Shabanov, Chairman of the Duma’s Commission on Geopolitics, defended Russia’s role in the construction and fueling of Iran’s nuclear power plant at Busheher. Dimitri K. Simes, the President of The Nixon Center, moderated the event.
U.S.-Russian Relations After Iraq
To call one another friends and partners in international relations, Rogozin began, is not merely a compliment; it also carries a great deal of responsibility. Friends must be willing to discuss issues openly, to listen to one another, to try and understand one another and thereby reach agreement, he said. Cooperation and even partnership in security matters is a large part of the equation, Rogozin continued, but economic cooperation and development issues are also important. Without effective joint work along this full spectrum, a constructive and sustainable relationship is not possible.
Rogozin stressed that the United States and Russia share “one hundred percent” identical goals. For example, he said, both nations are deeply committed to quelling terrorism throughout the world and promoting strong nonproliferation policies to check the danger of weapons of mass destruction falling into the wrong hands. Partnership is therefore natural and desirable. The difference between the two countries is one of scale, Rogozin argued: the United States sees these issues on a global level, while for Russia these problems are more immediate and closer to home. Countries such as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea are on the other side of the world from America, but they are on Russia’s doorstep. As a result, despite sharing many U.S. goals, Russia has considerable different views about the methods appropriate to achieve them.
Rogozin acknowledged that after September 11, Americans suddenly felt vulnerable in a way they never had before. As a result, the United States struck what it viewed as the roots of the problem, namely the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, to destroy the threat of future attacks. However, Rogozin asserted, Russians worry about America’s lack of foresight and well-thought out strategies with respect to the aftermaths of these two conflicts. Washington seems to be operating on the basis of inertia, he said, and been unable to find a clear way out of either country. Yet, he continued, what the United States leaves behind when it withdraws will affect Russia directly. This is why despite Russia’s desire for partnership with the United States, Moscow will continue to offer its own frank opinions about U.S. policy.
The War in Iraq
Russia does not understand how the conflict in Iraq can or will end, Rogozin said. Iraq did not surrender unconditionally to its conquerors like Nazi Germany and the coalition’s occupation forces have not accepted the same level of obligation as the World War II Allies. In Iraq, neither Saddam Hussein nor his weapons of mass destruction have been found. Yet in invading Iraq and assuming control of its government, the United States of America has accepted the responsibility to protect and help the Iraqi people. At the same time, Washington must also keep its promise to the American people to eliminate threats to their security. So the United States has assumed responsibility for restraining the Kurds in Northern Iraq, as it promised Turkey and has taken on the difficult task of finding a balance between the Shiite and the Sunni factions in Iraq. But, Rogozin explained, the recent example of Afghanistan does not inspire confidence. President Karzai has barely gained control of Kabul and the United States has already abandoned him. Russia wants solutions, Rogozin said—stability and success in the region—but also more foresight on the part of the United States as to what comes the day after tomorrow. Rogozin also expressed concern at the potential impact of the war on international law and urged U.S.-Russian cooperation to uphold international law and, if necessary, to reform international institutions.
Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions
Several U.S. officials and others raised a variety of questions regarding Russia’s construction of Iran’s nuclear power plant at Bushehr, Iran’s efforts to build nuclear weapons, and the possibilities for U.S.-Russian cooperation to prevent Tehran from developing such weapons. Alexander Shabanov, who is a nuclear physicist as well as a senior Duma member, addressed many of these issues.
Shabanov adamantly insisted that Russia has taken all necessary precautions to ensure its own security in Iran. In fact, he said, Russian legislation stipulates that if Moscow builds a nuclear power station in another country, that facility can use only Russian fuel and the fuel must be returned to Russia for reprocessing. Shabanov argued that this is necessary to safeguard not only Russia’s security interests, but also its economic interests by protecting markets for Russian nuclear fuel. Moreover, Shabanov continued, precisely this has taken place at similar Russian-built nuclear plants in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Finland. Further, Shabanov said, the Iranians are likely to sign the International Atomic Energy Agency’s additional protocols, which will establish tighter monitoring of Bushehr and other Iranian nuclear projects. Rogozin added that a non-nuclear Iran is as important, if not more important, to Russia as it is to the United States, Russia is not so stupid as to “put a time bomb under our own chair,” he said.
One U.S. official nevertheless expressed concern that Iran has publicly justified its other nuclear efforts—including a centrifuge facility essential to enriching uranium, a heavy-water plant that could be used to supply a nuclear reactor that would produce plutonium, and uranium—by referring to its need to fuel the Bushehr plant. Thus, the official argued, the Bushehr facility contributes to Iran’s nuclear weapons program even if it is extremely well-protected and even isolated from Iran’s other work. Shabanov disputed this, insisting that Iran’s other nuclear programs are technically unsuited to any use at Bushehr. He also argued that Iran’s nuclear technology is at least five to ten years away from the capability to produce a weapon.
Rogozin stressed that Russia, like the United States, is eager to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. He also urged continued U.S.-Russian dialogue on this and other issues and emphasized the importance of finding ways to further develop the relationship between Washington and Moscow.
This program brief was prepared by Nixon Center staff member Katrina Hochstetler.
