Arab
Democracy and American Security: A Meeting Report
March
27, 2003
On
March 27, 2003, a meeting was held at The Nixon Center on the topic of
"Arab Democracy and American Security in the Middle East."
Dr. Nikolas K. Gvosdev, senior fellow for strategic studies at the
center, presided over a roundtable, featuring Dr. Ray Takeyh; Professor and
Director of Studies at Near East and South Asia Center, National Defense
University, and Dr. Thomas Carothers, senior associate and director of the
Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment; and Dr. Geoffrey
Kemp, director of The Nixon Center's Regional Strategic Programs.
Dr.
Gvosdev opened the meeting by positing the two assumptions of the Bush Doctrine
concerning the Middle East. The
first is that the political, security, economic and military interests of the
United States are more likely to be secured by democratic regimes in the Arab
world than by non-democratic ones.
The second is that the destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime will create
conditions for the establishment of democracies, beginning in Iraq, and then
spreading throughout the region.
Dr.
Takeyh observed that the United States is at a crossroads: it can either protect
its interests in the region, or it can promote its Wilsonian values, but that it
cannot do both. He
identified three major clusters of interests.
The first is ensuring regional stability, which requires the deployment
of garrisons and outposts, cooperation with intelligence services in the war
against terrorism, and so on.
The second is to secure access to the region's hydrocarbons, which fuel
the global economy. Finally,
the United States seeks to protect and defend Israel.
He noted, however, that it is difficult to understand how democracies in
the Arab world would facilitate any of these goals.
The
assumption that radical Islamists alone would oppose American interests is
flawed. Indeed,
Takeyh said, there is a broad consensus--along the entire political spectrum,
from Islamists to secular liberals--that opposes American interests.
It is conceivable that Arab states could make the transition to secular,
liberal democracies and pursue meaningful political and economic reform--yet
these states would not be any more amenable to U.S. direction.
He cited opinion polls and the platforms of various political parties
throughout the region which demonstrate that one of the few areas of agreements
among all sectors of society includes opposition to U.S. bases in the region,
rejection of the state of Israel, and a firm desire to achieve military parity
with Israel, including the pursuit of a credible deterrent to Israel's nuclear
capability. (Dr.
Takeyh presented more in-depth analysis, discussing Jordan, Egypt and Algeria as
examples. He also
addresses this subject in a recent issue of In
the National Interest, at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol2Issue9/vol2issue9realist1.html.)
Dr.
Carothers began by observing that the apparent shift in American priorities is
suspiciously received in the Arab world.
At first, the United States wanted to combat terrorism.
Now, it supposedly desires to bring liberty to Arab states and societies.
He
outlined two dilemmas faced by the United States.
The first is the tension between democracy and stability.
"We hope that they will go together; we fear that they will
not." The U.S.
has a preference for ensuring stability but, after all, the name of the
operation is not Iraqi Stability but Iraqi Freedom.
This affects whether policy is to try and create democracy--with its
attendant problems--or to establish a moderate, semi-authoritarian regime
capable of maintaining stability.
The second is the tension between democracy and a pro-Western regime that
is compliant with American desires.
He pointed out that Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman had said, in
response to a question about the future orientation of an Iraqi democracy, that
"in
terms of whether the first thing they do will be to recognize the State of
Israel, I have no idea. But I certainly hope it's among the very first things
that they do." (Foreign
Press Center Briefing, March 19, 2003).
Is this really a realistic assessment, however, especially after what Dr.
Takeyh had presented on the sentiments among Arab publics vis-à-vis Israel?
Dr.
Carothers said that these two tensions are coming to play in the decisions being
made about the interim Iraqi administration.
Washington hopes to turn power over quickly to a civilian administration
(within two to three months after the cessation of hostilities) and then
transfer power to Iraqi authorities in stages.
There are two views in the Bush Administration: to have the interim
authority made up primarily of exiles (people we know and can work with) or to
set up a broader process, where different regions and communities choose
representatives. The
second option is messier, but may create a government that has a greater chance
of survivability.
He
then outlined various scenarios for possible transitions.
The first, "moderate strongman rule," envisions a figure in
power who can maintain stability yet construct institutions that gradually can
assume greater responsibility.
The second is to try and initiate a genuine democratic process, creating
conditions for the various communities in Iraq to work out the political bargain
for the governance of Iraq (the "permanent loya jirga" approach).
Then, there is the "transfer of the Western template" model,
where the United States funds and supports the creation of institutions with an
eye to holding national elections within 18 months.
Yet he warned that when this was tried in Cambodia, the template did not
hold up and the process was hijacked.
Dr.
Carothers finally addressed the question of a "democratic tsunami" in
the region in the aftermath of a U.S. military victory.
He noted that the "contagion" effect observed in Latin America
and Eastern Europe during the 1980s and 1990s was indeed real, yet conditions
were different than what now prevails in the Middle East.
Indeed, in the short term, military action in Iraq may strengthen, rather
than weaken, the legitimacy of surrounding non-democratic regimes.
Dr. Kemp began by observing that the current war, launched under the slogan of spreading democracy, could not have taken place without the active support of non-democratic regimes in the region, and that it was in fact the elected parliament in Turkey which has caused the most obstructions. He also cautioned about the lack of historic memory--that the Arab world has seen a number of experiments with democracy (Lebanon, the Gulf emirates, and so on). He worried that American forces will have little time to create conditions for democracy in postwar Iraq, that their primary task will be to ensure basic security. (See also his contribution to In the National Interest, at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol1Issue8/Vol1Issue8Kemp.html.)
A
successful conclusion of the war in Iraq and the emergence of a more democratic
government might shift the balance of power in Iran to the reformers; and even
the pragmatic conservatives may seek to improve relations with the United
States. It might also
have a positive impact in the Palestinian Authority, leading to a final showdown
between those who support a negotiated settlement and those who want to continue
the violence without any regard for the consequences.
Dr.
Kemp agreed with Dr. Takeyh that more democratic regimes might not be any less
inclined to seek weapons of mass destruction; after all, Iran's WMD program
began under the Shah. In
the end, the real issue may not be proliferation itself, but the types of
regimes that possess WMD.
