“Does Islamic Terrorism Have a Strategy?”
A Meeting with Steve Emerson
The Nixon Center, Washington, DC
March
3, 2003
Speaking
at the first seminar organized by the Immigration and National Security Program
at the Nixon Center, a noted expert on militant Islamic terrorism argued that
failures in intelligence collection and dissemination and immigration controls
have facilitated the development of a terrorist infrastructure in the U.S. that
could aid new attacks. Steven Emerson, Executive Director of the Investigative
Project, the largest archival data and intelligence on Islamic and Middle
Eastern terrorist groups, also dissented the nature and extent of Islamic
extremism in the U.S. Robert S. Leiken, Director of the Immigration and National
Security Program, moderated the discussion.
Islamic presence in the U.S.
Emerson
noted that until 9/11 Muslim groups, mainly of Palestinian origin, began
migrating to the U.S. during the 1960s with the object of influencing US
politics on behalf of the Palestinian cause. Emerson further noted that another
cohort from Muslim countries arrived as students during the 1980s when United
States was supporting Jihad in Afghanistan. The Palestinian Islamicists created
institutions in the United States that basically mirrored their organizations in
the Middle East. HAMAS, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood are examples of
these organizations. Emerson pointed that militant groups, however, do not
operate openly but under such names as the Holy Land Foundation, the Islamic
Association of Palestine and the Islamic Society of North America. These groups
seek to influence U.S. policy and spread Islamic fundamentalism through talks,
publications and videos.
Emerson explained that prior to 9/11, the success of militant Islam in the United States depended on the degree of credibility and legitimacy that these groups were able to create and the extent to which they were able to situate themselves in the domestic political process. Emerson pointed to FBI wiretaps in which some HAMAS leaders openly state that HAMAS does not fare well in the U.S. because of its terrorist connotation, therefore they redefined themselves as a human rights group. These wiretaps further show, Emerson said, the discussion of strategy of their political organization, fundraising, and recruitment of imams from abroad. Emerson noted that American lawyers assist them in bringing visitors into the U.S.
Jihadist figures
Emerson cited University of South Florida professor Al-Arian. Al-Arian came to the U.S. in 1979 and started at least in 1984 the beginning of the conspiracy to carry out Jihad. A key Islamic figure in the United States, who used the United States to acquire political influence power, Al-Arian headed an academic institute and organized charities, which provided perfect cover. Al-Arian use of a university setting and a political cause is typical of Jihadist organization, Emerson explained, and allows them to operate “under the radar” of U.S. law enforcement.
However, Emerson stressed that Al Qaeda has a different profile. They come legally and illegally directly for the purposes of carrying out terrorist attacks. But it is also becoming increasingly clear that there is co-mingling between Al Qaeda funding groups such as Benevolence International and Global Elite, two Chicago-based non-profits, and some of the other Islamic groups. Emerson explained that this interface seems to pertain more to political organization than to actual terrorist training. Thus a speech by Yousef Al-Khadali, one of the most prominent Jihadists in 1995, “Islam will reign supreme in Europe and the United States. We will conquer the United States by Jihad, not by sword but by DAWA (proselytization).” And that is really, Emerson said, the essence of what architects of Islamic organizations in the United States plan to do.
Further security concerns
Emerson noted that Europe and Canada, in contrast, are home to a lot more actual rank and file terrorists. The refugee lobby in Canada has allowed actual terrorists, Al Qaeda and others, to claim instant refugee asylum and get away with it for years, posing a serious risk for the United States due to its geographic proximity. In Europe the immigration flow has been going on for years, unmonitored. Emerson further emphasized that Militants often gain the leadership of these Muslim immigrant communities. Britain, France and the Netherlands are discovering that Islamic schools, particularly in the Netherlands, are teaching Jihad, virtually calling for terrorist training. In the U.S. Islamic schools Saudi militant Islamic curricula are far more prevalent than previously thought.
Emerson clarified that third and fourth generation Muslims are for the most part integrated into U.S. society, but this less the case of the first and second generations. Convinced that anti-Muslim sentiments are widespread, many disdain American politics. Emerson considers it noteworthy that no mosques or Islamic organizations have welcomed the recent apprehension of terrorist Khalid Sheik Mohammed or other prominent terrorists.
Other problems identified by the participants during the discussion were the need to enhance intelligence collection and the lack of cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Participants noted that the CIA scorns the FBI and this lack of cooperation increases our vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The State Department retains operational control over the issuance of visas. There is a large volume of visa applications that needs processing every year and the Immigration Act of 1990 explicitly forbids discrimination on the basis of ideology. Residents of European countries with large Muslim communities qualify for visa waives and easily enter the United States. A question raised by a participant was whether visas should be placed firmly under the control of the Homeland Security as a security measure. She noted that once in the U.S. individuals can bring in their families via immigration policies of family reunification. Families of terrorists use the same procedures. And there is also the “lone wolf,” or personal Jihad, which presents unique problems for intelligence agencies.
Are suicide bombers being prepared in the U.S.? Emerson does not know, but he knows that there are calls for Americans to support suicide bombers in Israel and, more importantly, there are websites exhorting this behavior and easy access to the Internet in any part of the world.
Emerson would not predict whether war against Iraq would trigger terrorist attacks. But he is certain that there are major cells here and networks of co-conspirators. As the discussion progressed, the main question became “what are effective ways to enhance our security?” Many agreed that terrorist financing needs better monitoring, e.g., IRS disclosures and the tracking of charities; some suggested improved coordination between attorneys and the FBI; and most agreed that the INS and intelligence agencies must read from the same page. Participants who had responsibility for the INS or for the State Department’s visa granting program stressed that the problem for them was lack of information, poor or non-existent linkages with the CIA or FBI databases. Others stressed sheer numbers of immigrants, arguing that a reduction would make law enforcement easier.
