"U.S. Needs Coherent Foreign Policy"
by
Robert F. Ellsworth and Dimitri K. Simes
from the January 11, 2001 edition of Newsday
IN WORLD AFFAIRS-as in managing the U.S. economy-the new Bush administration will quickly face serious challenges requiring a steady tactical hand and a strategic vision. World stability is more precarious than eight years ago, when Bill Clinton succeeded George W. Bush's father. The period in which unprecedented American dominance is at least tacitly accepted by most of the world is ending.
A new global environment will rest to a large extent upon the quality of American leadership. Yet backlash against this very leadership is a central element of today's world and is not limited to outlaw states such as Iraq or failed states such as Afghanistan under the Taliban, which has become a haven for terrorists, narcotics traffickers and others on the dark side of globalization. In fact, it includes many nations, some described as America's "strategic partners" or even staunch allies-as well as middle-class Americans such as those who harassed the trade summit in Seattle.
Being the sole superpower is a heavy burden, and bearing it often wins resentment rather than gratitude. But the Clinton administration's self-righteousness-its presumption that America, as the "indispensable nation," was entitled (indeed supposed) to provide answers to every international crisis-only increased that resentment.
Several disturbing trends are present today: China, emerging as a power in Asia and in the world economy, is confused by U.S. policy that embraces Beijing as a strategic partner while offering guidance on how it is supposed to behave.
Japan, our crucial ally, is economically weakened and now worries about a perceived U.S. tilt toward China.
Russia has become increasingly assertive under Vladimir Putin and is working to reestablish ties to former Soviet client states (and China) with the aim of reducing U.S. influence.
The European Union is seeking to establish both a financial and a security identity that could undermine transatlantic relations.
The Mideast, shaken by the failure of a peace process unduly accelerated by Washington, has been wracked by escalating violence between Israelis and Palestinians that has contributed to deterioration of American standing in the region.
Though globalization and technology continue to shift the templates of power in ways mostly, but not uniformly, favorable to the United States, there is a dawning realization that they also create great dangers. The so-called global village-absent commonly accepted rules of the game or common culture but featuring instantaneous communications, volatile financial markets and billions of have-nots-has opened a truly global arms bazaar that may make weapons of mass destruction available not only to governments but also to any radical faction with access to sufficient funds. We must have new procedures and institutions to manage this transformation.
Bush will not have the luxury of long deliberations before making difficult and consequential choices. A failure of coherence may come at great cost-not only because resources could be spent on misplaced priorities but also because resulting U.S. actions will require exceptionally subtle management.
For example, the new administration will need to find a delicate balance between enhancing Taiwan's self-defense and triggering a military buildup on the mainland. Similarly, it will have to weigh our necessary commitment to what Bush rightly called on Monday a "sensitive subject"-national missile defense-against its desire for steady relations with China and Russia and close ties with allies-especially before technology and funding necessary to deploy systems are even available.
Whatever decisions are taken on these and other issues should be firmly rooted not only in American interests but also American values. Nevertheless, claiming to do what is right cannot be an excuse for failing to establish genuine priorities.
The Clinton administration's experiences are a vivid reminder that trying to do too much can undermine key U.S. objectives.
For example, the administration's enthusiasm for humanitarian intervention has stretched our forces thin, provoked conflict with Russia and China, and come at a price to important U.S. national interests such as limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism and using the United Nations as an instrument of American policy. Clinton's paternalistic mishandling of Moscow has helped to bring to power national security-minded officials led by President Putin who are much less prepared to walk in lockstep with U.S. foreign policy. It would be a tragedy if American input in the forthcoming Chinese leadership succession similarly strengthened the hand of hard-liners in Beijing.
The first Bush administration skillfully managed the end of the Cold War on basically American terms. But in the turbulent new era, competence and courage will not suffice in the absence of well-defined overall international objectives. What is necessary is a coherent design integrating U.S. interests and ideals and addressing the priorities and trade-offs among them.
Robert F. Ellsworth is a former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Ambassador to NATO. He and Dimitri K. Simes are, respectively, Vice Chairman and President of The Nixon Center, Washington.
