Missile Defense in Asia

By Samuel Lang

            The Nixon Center hosted a panel discussion on “Missile Defense in Asia” on Tuesday, September 29, two days before the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Nixon Center’s Drew Thompson, moderator of the discussion, reminded the audience that the timing of this forum was significant just prior to the October 1 National Day parade in Beijing which would showcase China’s military might, including nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.  The leadership in Beijing is acutely aware that as Washington develops missile-defense capabilities in the Pacific to counter the perceived threat from North Korean missiles, Beijing’s own limited deterrent is potentially diminished, raising questions about how China will respond to developments and whether China has already embarked on a course towards an arms race that it claims it seeks to avoid.

            While Washington aims to minimize potential conflicts focused on the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, it must balance the need to maintain its security commitments to allies in the region - Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan and others - while also considering the reactions of other important regional stakeholders, such as China. Three experts on missile defense - Joe Cirincione, Brian Weeden, and Dean Cheng - offered their insights and spoke to several key topics, including whether President Obama’s call for regional missile defense, replacing an earlier global defense strategy is feasible, and whether missile-defense systems are effective for their intended purpose or principle drivers of a regional arms race.

            All three experts agreed on the importance of defining and understanding the scope of missile defense. Weeden, a former U.S. Air Force captain who commanded ICBM missile batteries, cautioned against equating U.S. plans for missile defense in Asia with merely deterring China. Washington’s plans should be seen in a broader context, he said. If the ultimate goal is to deter rogue states, such as North Korea, then the U.S. and its allies should explore the potential for regional collective missile defense, focusing on strategies that involve both the United States and China.  Dean Cheng, a fellow at the Heritage Foundation, noted the different interpretations of the word "deterrence" between Westerners and Chinese.  In the West, deterrence is seen as a way of  dissuading opponents from taking undesirable action, whereas Chinese see the term as a way of both dissuading and compelling their opponents from taking certain actions. Cheng discussed Chinese use of the term, "compellence," which refers to the act of coercing opponents to follow your objective without the actual use of force.  Joe Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund and long time non-proliferation expert, discussed some of the limitations of the present U.S. missile-defense system.  He pointed out that the United States still lacks an efficient and effective ground-based national missile-defense capability, despite massive investments over the past few decades.  He identified three problems with establishing a viable missile-defense network. First, any system can be easily overwhelmed since the attacker can “win” if it has only one more ballistic missile than the defender has interceptors.  The high cost of interceptors makes deployment of such large numbers unpractical.  Second, a system can be blinded when land or sea-based radars or satellites are targeted by an adversary before a ballistic-missile strike.  The development of anti-ship ballistic-missile systems threaten the Aegis cruiser platform, while China’s anti-satellite test in 2008 demonstrated the vulnerability of space-based early-warning assets.  Lastly, with current technology, missile-defense systems are easily fooled by decoys, whether false warheads, or low-tech radar reflecting chaff.

            In addition to the technical challenges, such as the failure and scrapping of speed-of-light systems such as the airborne laser system, political issues pose their own quandaries.  For instance, while President Obama’s vision for a global reduction of nuclear weapons is admirable, the long-term response of various Asian nations is unclear at this point.  The reduction of U.S. inventories could be perceived as a lessening of U.S. security commitments in the region.  Because development of offensive systems are generally more economical than defensive ones, Japan and Taiwan might seek to rapidly develop offensive capabilities if they feel threatened by China’s rise and U.S. security assurances are diminished.  Japan’s response could cause reactions in South Korea, in addition to justifying even greater investments in military modernization by China.  Furthermore, the United States needs to consider how China will respond to U.S. reductions of its nuclear arsenal, including the possibility China will increase its inventories and “race” to achieve parity or even surpass the United States.  China sees itself as the weaker party, justifying obsessive secrecy, which leads to significant questions about its intentions, even as China’s capabilities are paraded down Chang An Avenue in its national day parade.  Missile defense is an elegant concept, but unfortunately, its technical and political limitations ultimately make it of limited value, viable only as part of a comprehensive strategy that includes diplomacy and deterrence.