Thursday, July 29 2010  
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Nixon Center Bulletin
In The National Interest



"Power is Power"
by William Fisher


“Power is power.”  It is not “soft, hard, smart, or dumb - leaders are,” said Dr. Leslie Gelb on Tuesday at The Nixon Center.  Gelb, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, was in Washington to discuss his new book Power Rules: How Common Sense can Rescue American Foreign Policy, a manual for how to think about and use America’s power in the twenty-first century.

Gelb began the discussion by stating that, as his title implies, power is the heart of foreign policy. In response to the litany of definitions for power, Gelb offers this simple description: power is “the capacity to get people to do what they don’t want to do, by pressure and coercion, using one’s resources and position.”  According to Gelb, misconceptions about power have affected America’s policy choices over the last 15 to 20 years, with our policies toward Iraq serving as the most recent example. These decisions have been a product of poor judgment of America’s own power much as of the power of other actors.

Gelb remarked that U.S. presidents over the past two decades have often failed to conduct foreign policy guided by strategy. He mourned the loss of the art of strategic thinking, epitomized by Machiavelli, Bismarck, and Kissinger, of recent American statesmen. Strategy, he said, must be specific and based on concrete objectives. Indistinct statements such as the frequently heard “Let’s cooperate, let’s pressure” do not pass Gelb’s litmus test.

Foreign-policy commentary in recent years has also been a victim of these miscalculations, according to Gelb. He tossed aside the notion that “The World is Flat,” stating that America and a group of eight second-tier powers, including China, Russia, the United Kingdom, India, France, Japan, Germany, and Brazil, exercise disproportionate control over the global economy. Moreover, he asserted we are not in a “post-American era”; America is still the top global power, occupying its own tier in the international system.  Gelb then argued that the United States can form “power coalitions” with the second-tier nations based on shared interests, as none of these powers have the will or capability to individually lead the international system on any issue of consequence. According to Gelb, these power coalitions must be the cornerstone of American policy. He described a central power principle in which American leadership is indispensable to solving any global problem, but still requires second-tier partners to solve problems of mutual concern, creating what he called “mutual indispensability.”

      Dr. Gelb also addressed the need for the United States to make only threats it intends to keep, noting that much of the boisterous language of the Bush administration was not followed up with action. North Korea, for example, was allowed a nuclear weapon with impunity, causing a serious loss of credibility for the United States. To maintain credibility, foreign policy must be divided into “necessity, choice, and common sense.” Threats must not be made until a common-sense policy is decided upon, and only if leadership is prepared to back up words with actions. Choice, according to Gelb, creates the flexibility needed to craft a policy based on common sense. And as the leader of the international system, the United States has much more choice than others. However, current foreign policy debate in the United States creates the false impression that certain policies are necessities.  This illusion of necessity limits our choice, which in turn limits our ability to pursue sensible and effective policies.

Gelb outlined a framework by which his pragmatic approach could be applied to the global economic crisis. Under such an approach, the United States would sign onto plans, or parts of plans, that correspond with our national interests. This would amount to acceptance of significant portions of the regulatory framework desired internationally, and could potentially include agreements on contingency plans for increased spending by nations such as China. Such an approach seeks to lock in mutually desired gains rather than leave the table empty-handed because full consensus could not be reached.  

      Afghanistan and Pakistan also featured prominently in the discussion. Dr. Gelb stated that the problems in these countries typified recent American foreign policy in that idealism was high and strategy was lacking. He stated that the Obama approach to Afghanistan, while heralded as a new course, is likely to simply be a different label on the same Bush policy of turning Afghanistan into “some type of democratic capitalist paradise.”  Gelb offered an alternative approach which would aid friendly groups within Afghanistan in preparation for the eventual U.S. pull out, divide unfriendly groups, set up a deterrent situation for the Taliban by strike at areas under Taliban control, and contain these hostile regions.  According to Gelb, Pakistan, as well as “our great friends the Saudis and our great friend the UAE” must begin cooperating on restricting terrorist financing. Dr. Gelb emphasized the need to create clear sticks for these nations in order to make our intentions on the matter clear.

In addition to practical questions about current American foreign-policy strategies, event participants also posed more theoretical questions to Dr. Gelb, particularly about the role of principle in foreign policy.  Gelb responded that he was “not in favor of surrendering principle” but would like to see principle put “in its place” as a long-term goal rather than a short-term compass. Otherwise, principle could limit choice and force the United States to abandon its strategic goals. Pragmatism, he noted, can be principled, but principle is not the best measure of a policy. Gelb concluded with the question of humanitarian intervention in Sudan, an area in which he believes principled pragmatism is applicable. Gelb remarked that the United States must stand up for its principles and take action against genocide though achievable methods. He advocated a limited action based on his “common sense” framework, including air strikes, intelligence gathering, and setting up a safe haven for refugees, in order to bring genocide to a halt. 

The full event can be viewed here.



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